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This thesis examines the role of Felipe Angeles in the 
Mexican Revolution through his contradictory character 
traits and partnership with Francisco Villa. The basis of 
the inspection originates from and is guided by his two 
distinctive and occasionally contradictory characteristics: 
Angeles the soldier and Angeles the intellectual. Analysis 
of his relationship with the outlaw-general, Francisco 
Villa, exposes an unorthodox association of opposite yet 
complementary personalities and explains the intricate 
dilemma faced by Felipe Angeles. 
The study incorporated information in English and 
Spanish, first searching Angeles' writings and diary 
excerpts for the personality inside the person. From that 
understanding it progressed to an inspection of his 
activities, viewpoints, and role in history. To discern his 
historical role, eye-witness comments, personal accounts, 
official reports, and historic accounts were examined and 
compared. 
The results of the investigation and analysis exposed a 
multi-faceted man who adhered to a fundamental value system 
and moral code. An intelligent, unassuming man emerged who 
used the weapons of reason and logic in an emotionally 
charged atmosphere of revolution. His role in that chaotic 
historical event was subtle and difficult to disclose, yet 
profound and visionary. The results exposed Felipe Angeles 
as one of the few truly virtuous leaders of the Mexican 
Revolution. 
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THESIS STATEMENT 
Felipe Angeles was a military intellectual, which is a 
contradiction in principles and purpose. As a soldier he 
was expected to act according to the dictates of military 
psychology which was based on a national perspective and 
controlled by rules, regulations and a system of rewards. 
As a member of the military he was also expected to 
evaluate and consider things from a perspective of black 
and white or good and bad. Yet, as an intellectual he 
perceived a universal relationship and meaning. He utilised 
a creative mental process that was dictated by logic and 
reason, through which he questioned, examined, and refused 
to blindly accept assertions of facts. As an intellectual 
the appearance of black and white dissolved into gray with 
truth and reality becoming relative to the situation. 
Angeles was a composite of the two contradictory 
concepts and had the unique ability to balance their 
prinicples and perspectives. He used the intellectual 
skills of an organized mind and his military knowledge to 
command soldiers in war, yet retained humane motives and a 
peaceful purpose. While other people fought because of 
hatreds and vengeance, Angeles approached events of the 
times, his actions, and the war with a philosophical 
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perspective. 
The sources of information concerning the life of Felipe 
Angeles are rare and dispersed. Only two authors attempted 
to write biographies, and they were extremely biased. In 
his books, Feline Angeles. Federal and Lugarteniente Gris 
de Pancho Villa (Felipe Angeles). Bernardino Mena Brito 
created a literary trial in which he accused Angeles of 
multiple conspiracies. Using actual historical events, Mena 
Brito made assumptions and twisted the facts to serve his 
purpose which was to defame and degrade Angeles. If a 
person considers the bias of the author in reading the 
books, parts of the truth shine through. 
The other author who wrote a biography was Federico 
Cervantes, who served on General Angeles' staff during part 
of the Revolution. His book Felipe Angeles en la Revolution 
is apparently biased in favor of Angeles but not to the 
opposite extremes of those of Mena Brito. Although he 
portrays the general in a better light, faults are exposed. 
Glimpses into the personal side of Angeles are revealed in 
the numerous pages of the interrogation of Angeles during 
his trial in 1919 and Cervantes' visit to the general's 
cell. 
The other major source which includes information on 
Angeles is Martin Luis Guzman's Memoirs of Pancho Villa 
Because it is a personal account of the Revolution, it is 
also inaccurate and tainted. Villa's greatness and humble 
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actions are exaggerated along with his knowledge of 
principles of military warfare. Yet, with all of its faults 
the book exposes the relationship that existed between 
Angeles and Villa, and many of Angeles' activities and 
attitudes. 
The primary book used to trace the battles of 1914 was 
Miguel A. Sanchez Lamego's Historia Militar De La 
Revolucion Constitucionalist-a: Tercera Parte, Las. 
Qperaciones Finales v El Triumfa De La Revolucion. Tomo V. 
Sanchez Lamego utilised accounts and reports from both the 
revolutionary army and federal army in his narrative of the 
movements and combat cited in the book, and presented it in 
an objective manner. 
The extensive Records q± the Department ol State 
relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929 were 
extremely helpful, although many of the messages sent by 
agents were inaccurate or simply false. Often the reports 
made by field agents in Mexico during the Revolution were 
based on rumors or assumptions, and later corrected by them 
or other agents. Although it is an invaluable tool in 
researching the Mexican Revolution, discretion is 
necessary. 
The most revealing and personal sources were the two 
accounts written by Felipe Angeles himself. In the 
Description de la Batalla de Zaeatecas and Justification <ie 
la desobediencia de los generales de la Division del Norte 
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Angeles exposed not only some of his feelings toward the 
war but his thought processes and the complexity of his 
personality. Besides the sources already mentioned, 
numerous others were necessary to fill in the picture. In 
order to better understand the complexity of artillery, the 
author referred to a number of books including the Text 
Book of Ordnance and Gunnery. Barrage: The Guns in Action, 
and Heavy (Coast.) Artillery Orientation- Napoleon and 
Modern War: His Military Maxims was utilised because 
Angeles attended numerous French military schools that 
taught Napoleon's principles of warfare; and many of 
Angeles' battle tactics corresponded to those maxims. 
As with other historical papers, this thesis is a 
composite of information from .various sources... The search 
for information and sifting of the facts has been a 
stimulating ordeal but one of pleasure. My thanks to 
Professor Manuel Machado for stimulating my interest in 
Mexican History and directing my efforts in this 
expedition. 
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THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION 
The Mexican Revolution of 1910 was not one continuous 
movement but a series of internal wars consisting of 
revolution, counter-revolution, rebellion, revolt, and 
civil war. The beginning of the Revolution was a movement 
against the regime of President Porfirio Dfas in Novemeber 
1910. Diaz ruled Mexico from 1876 to 1911 with a policy of 
Pan 0 Palo (Bread or Club). Under that policy subordinates 
and local leaders either accepted financial benefits 
offered by the federal government, or were eliminated from 
power through political exile or subjugation by the federal 
army. The policy promoted peace and stability to attract 
foreign investments and progress in the country but created 
discontent. 
Along with that stability and progress came domination 
by the federal army and foreign businesses. Land usage was 
altered to accomodate commercial agriculture which required 
large ranches, farms and plantations. To achieve large-
scale agriculture, native peoples and small landholders 
were deprived of their lands, creating a large number of 
landless peoples. A small elite element, controlled society 
while the majority of people suffered in poverty. 
The initial movement that sparked the Revolution of 1910 
was based on the Constitution of 1857 and gained momentum 
to prevent the re-election of President Dfas; yet, the 
actual fighting involved in the overthrow of Diaz was 
minimal compared to later campaigns and wars that raged 
across Mexico. The Revolution ended in a compromise in May 
of 1911 which created a coalition government of the 
followers of Francisco I. Madero, the figurehead of the 
revolt, and Porfirio Diaz. That compromise and the 
resulting coalition retarded changes declared necessary by 
the revolutionary forces. Elements that had participated in 
the movement wanted swifter changes and when that did not 
occur a number of revolts and rebellions erupted. 
In February of 1913 a counter-revolution, referred to as 
the Barracks Revolt or Revolt of the Generals, succeeded in 
forcing the resignation of Madero. General Victoriano 
Huerta replaced Madero in the nation's highest office but 
the movement sparked another counter-revolution in the 
northern states. Various regional leaders joined in a 
common desire to defeat Huerta and his forces. The war that 
raged from March 1913 to July 1914, when Huerta fled the 
country, involved the development and usage of equipment 
and techniques of modern warfare. It also created the seeds 
of civil war through greed for power and jealousy between 
leaders. 
Once General Huerta's forces were defeated in the summer 
of 1914, the revolutionary leaders convened to determine 
the country's course; but their efforts were hindered by 
the personal confrontations of two main elements of the 
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movement led by Francisco Villa and Venustanio Carranza. 
The situation evolved into chaos with two groups claiming 
to be the legal government of Mexico. Then, at one point, in 
1915, there were four persons claiming to be the President. 
The contending forces of the Conventionist and 
Constitutionalist governments fought a bitter and bloody 
civil war between November 1914 and June 1915. With his 
victory complete, President Carranza reoccupied Mexico City 
but peace did not come from the victory. He was plagued by 
continuing revolts in various parts of the country and the 
intimidating tactics of the United States, which persisted 
in attempting to dictate the course of Mexico's internal 
affairs. 
The replacement of the Constitution of 1857 in 1917 did 
not quiet the atmosphere in Mexico but served to stimulate 
more rebellion. In 1918, Generals Felipe Angeles and 
Francisco Villa, who had led the Division of the North in 
1914 and 1915, mounted a revolution against Carranza. The 
movement was squashed in 1919 by the interference of the 
United States army at Ciudad Juarez and the revolution 
dissolved into guerrilla warfare after the execution of 
General Angeles, in November 1919. But, that movement was 
soon replaced by a more successful one from within 
Carranza's own forces. General Alvaro Obreg<&n led the 
revolution which succeded in removing Carranza from power 
in May 1920. The establishment of the Sonoran "Dynasty", 
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which included Obregdn, Plutarco Elias Calles, Benjamin 
Hill, Manuel Dieguez, and Adolfo de la Huerta, in national 
power did not stop revolts and rebellions. Various generals 
led armies in rebellion in unsuccessful attempts to 
overthrow Obregdn. The most serious of those revolts was 
one led by Adolfo de la Huerta in 1923. After its defeat 
the period referred to as the Mexican Revolution of 1910 
ended. 
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PREFACE 
The Mexican Revolution of 1910 was the first large-
scale, internal revolution of the 20th Century. It preceded 
the Russian Revolution and overlapped that revolution and 
World War I. Between the years of 1912 and 1915 drastic 
changes occurred in the methods used by the armies in 
Mexico. Before the Revolution, the federal army was 
commanded by elderly generals who resisted adoption of the 
emerging innovations in weaponry and developing techniques 
of combat. Those staff officers clung to a 19th Century 
belief in individual bravery and the use of valiant 
infantry and cavalry charges. During the Revolution younger 
officers, civilian-soldiers and federal officers who had 
been repressed, emerged to accept and utilise modern 
concepts of warfare and use developing technology. 
The leaders of the armies during the Revolution were the 
first to use a combination of the technology and techniques 
of modern warfare. The extensive use of the railroad to 
transport troops and supplies to a battle area, which 
Germans first used on a large-scale in the 1870's, was ref 
ined and expanded. The use of artillery to reduce defensive 
fortifications and cover attacking troops, which proved 
effective during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, became the 
primary ingredient of most battles. The machine gun, which 
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was to become the primary weapon in Europe during World War 
I, was swiftly adopted as a primary defense weapon. The 
first use of an airplane to bomb a fortification from the 
air occurred in northwestern Mexico, and airplanes were 
used for reconnaissance of enemy lines. A hospital train 
was first used by General Francisco Villa in northern 
Mexico in 1913 and that innovation was later modified for 
use by the armies in Europe. In addition to the above, it 
was shown in Mexico that cavalry was fast becoming an 
outdated arm of the military. 
The railroad in Mexico became the primary factor in 
troop movements because of the distances involved and 
variety of terrain. The armies were often required to cross 
treacherous mountains, traverse deserts, penetrate jungles 
and fight a bloody and exhausting battle at the end of the 
trip. To assure that troops were fresh and ready for 
combat, trains moved large units from base camps to the 
area of engagement, and because trains were used to move 
troops, supplies and equipment, possession or destruction 
of railroad lines became an important part of battle 
strategy. Closely associated with movement was the repair 
of railroad tracks which became a routine task that allowed 
an army to reach its objective or facilitate the movement 
of large artillery pieces that were too heavy to be moved 
cross-country. 
It was in Mexico that the effective use of artillery in 
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the destruction of enemy fortifications and covering the 
assault of troops was first used. The techniques of the 
concentrated barrage by heavy guns and close support of 
soldiers in the assault, which were used by the Division of 
the North in 1914, was later used in Europe. The armies in 
the European war did not use the concentrated artillery 
barrage until March 1915 and it was not until September of 
that year when they successfully used cannons to fire in 
front of the assaulting troops. With drastic changes 
occurring in warfare, the need for men with more technical 
knowledge became apparent. Bravery and daring alone could 
no longer win battles. Men were needed who could plan, 
organise, and use the tools available to create a strong 
defensive position or launch an offensive. Skills were 
needed in arranging for railroad transportation between 
points and the logistics necessary for mounting an extended 
campaign. Men were needed with military training and 
experience in the use of those modern weapons to win 
battles. One such man was General Angeles, who was an 
expert in the field of artillery and schooled in the art of 
warfare in some of the best French military schools. 
Felipe Angeles was born on June 13, 1869 in the State of 
Hidalgo, the son of a district chief. Entering the Military 
College at Chapultepec in 1883 at the age of fourteen, he 
excelled in mathematics and graduated in three years. For 
ten years he served in Engineer companies at the College 
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until being transferred to the artillery. His mathematical 
talents attracted the attention of professor Eduardo Prado, 
Mexico's greatest mathematician. With Prado's 
recommendation, Felipe Angeles was made professor of 
mathematics and ballistics at the College, and during the 
1890's he was also instructor of the Theory and Practice of 
Artillery Marksmanship. 
During his years at the Military College, Felipe Angeles 
applied his intelligence and talents to reshaping war 
materiel, producing of smokeless powder, and designing 
shooting tables for artillery. In 1901 he began a series of 
foreign missions to inspect the manufacturing of artillery 
pieces for the War Department, examine war material for 
possible purchase and attend French military schools. 
Between 1904 and 1911 he attended and studied the methods 
of instruction at the schools at Detail, Fontainbeleau, 
Mailly, and St. Cyr. The entrance requirements of those 
schools included knowledge in subjects such as plane and 
spherical trigonometry, analytical geometry, mechanics, 
chemistry and natural philosophy. The courses taught at the 
French schools were specialised and technical, examples of 
which are listed and described in Military Schools and 
Courses of Instruction in the Science and Art of War, 
published in 1872. (See Table 1) 
Two of those missions were the result of his criticism 
of the administration of the Military College at 
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Chapultepec and the War Department. In January 1904, he was 
arrested by General Manuel Mondragon because of the 
publication of a critical article. Then, in 1908 he was 
again arrested by the Director of the Artillery Department 
and sent on a mission. It was that mission that caused 
Angeles to be absent from Mexico when the Revolution of 
1910 swept President Dias from power. After completing his 
mission in late 1911, Colonel Angeles returned home to be 
appointed by President. Madero as the Director of the 
Military College. 
While he restructured the Military College to conform to 
the French pattern, Angeles was promoted to General and 
became a loyal supporter of Madero's. In September 1912, he 
was pulled from his administrative position at the School 
to command troops against the rebellion in the South led by 
Emiliano Zapata. He was in the State of Morelos in February 
1913, when the military revolt rocked Mexico City but 
returned to the city upon the personal request of Madero. 
When the revolt succeeded in forcing President Madero to 
resign, General Angeles was arrested and confined with the 
President and some of his cabinet members in the National 
Palace. But, instead of sharing in the fate of Madero, who 
was shot, General Angeles accepted a mission to France in 
August 1913. 
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TABLE 1. COURSES OF INSTRUCTION IN FRENCH MILITARY SCHOOLS 
IN 1872. 
A. Artillery Courses. 
1. Effects of Powder 
2. Motions of Projectiles in 
Space 
3. Motion of Carriages 
4. Small Arms 
5. Projectiles and Cannons 
6. Fire of Ordnance 
7. Effects of Projectiles 
8. Uniform Organisation of 
the Artillery 
9. Organisation of Field 
Artillery 
10.Artillery in the Attack 
and Defense 
11.Design for Ordnance: 
Projectiles and Ordnance 
12.Training of Batteries 
13.Military Art 
14. Field Fortifications 
15. Tactics 
16. Military 
Commun icat ions 
17. Strategy 
18. Attack and Defense 
19. Topography 
20. Geology 
21. Metallurgy 
22. Manfacture of Small 
Arms, Ordnance arid 
Powder 
23. Munitions 
24. Mechanics 
25. Resistance of 
Materials 
26. Construction: 
Masonry, 
Architecture, 
walls, and 
arches 
27. Vetiriary Art: 
Horse Care 
B. St. Cyr School for Infantry and Cavalry Courses. 
1. Physical Science 
2. Military Literature 
3. Military History 
10. Reconnaissance 
Survey 
11. Redoubts, Armament, 
Intrenchments, 
Attack and Defense, 
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CHAPTER I 
The Reluctant Rebel 
General Felipe Angeles stepped off the ship at La Havre, 
France on August 29, 1913, unofficially exiled from his 
native Mexico. Officially, Angeles went to France to study 
artillery materials for the Mexican War Department. 
Unofficially, the recently established government of 
General Victoriano Huerta sought to remove him as a 
potential threat to the new regime. In February 1913 Huerta 
commanded the military forces defending the National Palace 
against troops led by rebellious military officers. He 
secretly conspired with the rebels and betrayed the trust 
of President Francisco I. Madero. When the rebellion 
succeded in forcing Madero's resignation cabinet members 
and certain people known to be loyal maderistas shared his 
confinement in the Palace. General Angeles was a strict 
supporter and friend of the President, and was one of those 
people arrested and held prisoner. (!) 
After President Madero and Vice President Jose Pino 
Su&rez were assassinated on February 22, the newly 
established government under Huerta's control offered 
Angeles governmental posts to neutralize his influence 
among Madero loyalists. The first offer was a mission to 
Belgium as Military attache, and when Angeles refused the 
War Department proposed the command of federal troops in 
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the State of Michoacan. When he rejected the second offer 
Angeles was transfered to the military prison of Santiago 
Tlaltelolco for an unspecified term of confinement.^) 
It was not the first time Angeles adhered to his 
principles and accepted the consequences. Twice before he 
had publicly spoken out against military ineptness and the 
refusal of superiors to institute needed changes in the 
military. On both occasions he was arrested and confined, 
with resulting assignments on foreign missions. The same 
man who arrested him in 1904 for publishing an article 
which criticised the administration of the Military College 
was his protector in 1913. General Manuel Mondragon was a 
colleague of Angeles' at the Military College and the only 
professor "who could rival Angeles in his knowledge of 
artillery. Although Mondragon joined the rebels in February 
and led the cadets of the College against Madero, it was a 
statement of his political views and not the abandonment of 
his friendship with Angeles. In his capacity as the new 
Minister of War under President Huerta, Mondragon protected 
Angeles from the firing squad or long term imprisonment. 
Angeles was aware of that protection and realised that as 
long as Mondrag6n occupied the cabinet post he would be 
sheltered from the continuing efforts of General Aureliano 
Blanquet to see him punished for his loyalty. The shield of 
friendship continued through the Spring of 1913 but 
suddenly disappeared in the early months of Summer, leaving 
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Angeles exposed to the wishes of his antagonist. ( 3 )  
On June 23, President Huerta removed Mondragon from his 
position in the War Department and quickly sent him to the 
United States on a mission. As Mondragon was escorted to 
the train station, General Blanquet quickly occupied his 
new position in charge of the War Department. Soon after 
deposing Mondragon, Blanquet offered Angeles a mission to 
Europe. Angeles knew that refusal of the mission could 
produce consequences of a terminal nature and quickly 
accepted the assignment. The practice of dispatching 
persons, considered dangerous to officials in power, on 
foreign missions was not new nor unique. Porfirio Diaz, the 
longtime President of Mexico, used the method of unofficial 
exile to neutralise political foes and uncontrollable 
military officers; and the practice survived Dias's 
overthrow in May of 1911. Once his power base was 
stabilised, Huerta began the elimination of real and 
imagined enemies through the use of foreign missions. In 
addition to Mondragon, General Felix Dxas, a perennial 
rebel, co-conspirator in the Military Revolt of 1913 and 
aspirant to the presidency, was dispatched to Japan; and 
Francisco Leon de la Barra, the Interim President after 
President Dias's resignation in May 1911 and huertista 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, found himself enroute to 
France in July of that year. M) 
Neither the city of La Havre nor the country of France 
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were unfamiliar to Angeles because of his previous missions 
to that country. While on his way to Paris, Angeles 
analyzed his situation. Fulfilling the assigned duties of 
his mission would indicate a professional association with 
and create an appearance of support for Huerta's 
government, which he believed to be based on the immoral 
foundation of deceit and treachery. Association with such a 
disreputable government would not only discredit his 
personal honor and integrity but.prevent him from assisting 
in the restoration of a moderate and just government like 
Madero's. Yet, abandonment of the mission would end his 
long arid illustrious military career as a federal officer. 
If he : decided , to disobey his orders and renounce the 
mission he needed an alternative. (5> 
He found that alternative in the guise of an elderly 
gentleman named Venustiano Carranza who was the Governor of 
Coahuila. While Angeles languished in the military prison, 
forces in Mexico arose to challenge General Huerta's 
takeover of the government. Carranza and others who denied 
the legitimacy of Huerta's government drafted the Plan of 
Guadalupe on March 26, 1913 and sparked a counter­
revolution, During that Spring and Summer the 
Constitutionalists, as they chose to call themselves, 
recruited revolutionaries in the northern States and began 
their struggle to depose Huerta. Despite their efforts the 
movement was still in various stages of guerrilla warfare 
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in August, except for a few victories by Alvaro Obregon in 
the State of Sonora and Francisco Villa in Chihuahua. 
During the latter months of the summer of 1913 the 
revolution was not a monumental uprising against a tyrant 
but more like an irritating leak that spurted and dripped, 
seeped and spewed. It was a revolution of farmers, bandits, 
and civil politicians that needed the help of a 
professional soldier. (6) 
In Paris, Angeles conformed to the orders of his mission 
by reporting to the Mexican Minister, Francisco Leon de la 
Barra. Soon afterward he located Miguel Diaz Lombardo, 
agent for the Constitutionalist forces in France, who 
arranged a series of communications with Roberto Pesqueira. 
As the revolutionary representative in Washington, D. C., 
Pesqueira negotiated with Angeles concerning the offer of 
his knowledge and services to the revolution. Angeles' 
reluctance to simply leave France and join the 
revolutionary forces in Mexico was not based on ambitious 
motives nor material gain. Having reached the age of forty-
four in June of that year, Angeles was no longer a young, 
impulsive man who whimsically tossed caution aside for an 
ideal. (?) 
The offer of assistance was welcomed by the 
Constitutionalist government because of Angeles' reputation 
as an expert in artillery and an officer knowledgable in 
the art of warfare. The Constitutionalist army lacked 
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professional military officers in their ranks, and by 
September of 1913 were still unable to control completely 
any State in the north. That situation indicated the 
desperate need for a man who could provide guidance in 
military strategy, and Angeles was commissioned to evaluate 
their strategy and furnish that advice. The 
Constitutionalist government sent funds for his passage to 
Mexico and some extra for the support of his family who 
remained in France, and allowed Angeles to reserve the 
right of incorporation into the revolutionary army. Only 
one problem remained to be solved by Angeles, that of 
providing an excuse for his absence from France. That cover 
story would assure his family's protection from persecution 
by Huerta's agents until they could be moved to another 
location. (8) 
While decisions were being made concerning the 
acceptance of Angeles and his position in the revolutionary 
army, President Huerta dissolved the Mexican Congress, 
arrested some of the representatives, and converted the 
government into a military establishment. Then, while 
Angeles prepared a cover story for his absence an event 
occured in northern Mexico that would later alter the 
General's life. On September 27, 1913, the Division of the 
North was formed with Francisco Villa as its commander. A 
few days before Angeles left France the Division stormed 
the Federal stronghold at Torre6n where they added the 
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strength of eleven cannons to their forces. (9) 
Angeles notified Minister Le6n de la Barra that he was 
going to England to enroll his son, Alberto, in a college. 
Returning to his home in the city, he instructed his wife 
to confirm the story to all who inquired. If the subterfuge 
worked his family would be safe until arrangements could be 
made for their relocation. By October 6, 1913, the General 
and his eldest son were enroute to the United States, and 
from there to Mexico. Some unknown factor made Minister 
Leon de la Barra suspicious. As a result, he telegramed the 
port at La Havre and ordered that General Angeles be held; 
but it was too late, Felipe Angeles was on his way home to 
Mexico. (io) 
Upon his arrival at Nogales, Sonora, on October 16, 
Angeles did not find an army in the sense of organisation 
and leadership. Instead he encountered an assemblage of 
undisciplined farmers and artisans led by unpolished 
amateurs. Some of the commanding officers had fought in the 
brief Revolution of 1910 while others served against the 
rebellions that rose against President. Madero in 1912; yet 
they still lacked the organisational, tactical and 
strategical knowledge and skills necessary to produce an 
efficient military organisation. A few of them had military 
experience in the federal army but most of those were 
relegated to lower command positions. Although few federal 
officers had more combat experience than the revolutionary 
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leaders, they did have leadership experience and knowledge 
of how to maintain discipline in a military organisation. 
(ii) 
The revolutionary leaders came from a variety of 
backgrounds, with few having regular army experience. 
Francisco Villa was a Chihuahua and Durango bandit who 
joined the 1910 Revolution and rose to command a division. 
Plutareo Ellas Calles was a former teacher and inspector of 
schools; Salvador Alvarado, a former druggist; Francisco 
Murguia, a photographer; Ju&n Barragan, a student; and 
Lucio Blanco, a stock raiser. Besides Villa, the only other 
leader who had a record of military victories in 1913 was 
Alvaro 0breg<5n. He was a former rancher and mechanic who 
served under Sonoran Governor Jose Maria Maytorena against 
Pascual Orozco's rebellion in 1912. (12) 
A number of revolutionary dignitaries met Angeles at the 
train station in Nogales. Among them was Alvaro Obregon who 
personally escorted him to Hermosillo and introduced the 
renowned artillery officer to Venustiano Carranza. The 
First Chief of the Constitutionalist government immediately 
welcomed and praised Angeles, and the two men appeared to 
get along extremely well, for they were both educated and 
cultured gentlemen. First Chief Carranza was the member of 
a rich and powerful family of landowners in Coahuila. He 
spent twenty-six years in politics rising to positions of 
National Senator, State Governor, and, finally, Minister of 
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War in Madero's revolutionary government. The cordial 
relationship between Angeles and Carranza in the fall of 
1913 must have caused great concern for Obregdn and his 
followers because they needed a continuing influence with 
the First Chief to counter that of Governor Maytorena. (13) 
In Sonora there were two groups struggling for control 
of the State. Governor Jose Maria Maytorena led one faction 
while the other was headed by General Alvaro Obregdn. When 
President Madero fell from power in February 1913, 
Maytorena fled to the United States. In his absence, 
Ignacio Pesqueira served as acting governor and named 
Qbregon commander of the Sonora troops. By the time 
Maytorena returned in July to resume his duties as 
Governor, Ignacio Pesqueira, Alvaro Obregdn, Benjamin Hill, 
Salvador Alvarado, and Ju&n G. Cabral had brought most of 
the State under their control. Obregdn and his followers 
reluctantly agreed to Maytorena's demand to be reinstated 
as the constitutional governor, and then began a campaign 
to force him out of power. As their campaign began, 
Maytorena started a movement to neutralize their control 
and reestablish his power base. Then came the event that 
threatened the balance of power in Sonora. (14) 
In Mexico City, President Huerta scheduled national 
elections for October 26, 1913 to legitimize his 
government. That move must have been the stimulus for 
Carransa's decision to formally establish a complete 
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revolutionary government on October 20. He needed to 
appoint men in certain governmental cabinet positions to 
make his government conform to the guidelines of the 
constitution, and one of those positions was Minister of 
War. He needed a capable man to head the army, someone 
knowledgable in military administration and strategy. A few 
days prior to his decision concerning the appointments 
Felipe Angeles had arrived, bringing a superior intellect, 
knowledge of military tactical and strategic theory, and 
y e a r s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  a s  a  s o l d i e r .  ( 1 5 )  
Carranza announced his selection of cabinet members to 
the revolutionary leaders on October 20, 1913, including 
General Felipe Angeles as Minister of War. The naming of a 
former federal officer resurrected old suspicions and 
inflamed revolutionary jealousies. An atmosphere of 
distrust concerning the loyalty and intentions of ex-
federal officers was common throughout most of the army. 
That apprehension stemmed primarily from the military 
revolt that toppled the Madero government and led to his 
death, arid those suspicions naturally transfered to 
Angeles. Additionally, jealousy among revolutionary leaders 
who were afraid of losing their power or influence to more 
knowledgable persons worsened the hostility toward Angeles. 
( 16 ) 
The primary source of the movement to prevent Angeles 
from gaining the post came from Obregon's army, and 0breg<5n 
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himself personified the suspicious and jealous leader. 
Angeles' appointment seriously threatened the balance of 
power in Sonora because it appeared that he favored 
Maytorena. That friendship was based on their known 
loyalties to Madero and must have caused Obregon to suspect 
that Angeles would use the post to tip the scales to his 
disadvantage. As soon as the names of the appointees were 
announced, Generals Benjamin Hill, Manuel Diegues, Salvador 
Alvarado, and Alvaro Obregon protested to Carranza. In 
addition to the suspicions and power jealousies, some of 
the generals resented Angeles for what appeared to be a 
privileged position by having the choice of incorporation 
into the revolution, (i?) 
Obregon personally went to Hermosillo to dissuade 
Carranza from placing Angeles in the cabinet position. 
Their conference resulted in the reduction of Angeles to 
Subsecretary of War, which Angeles deeply resented because 
he believed himself more capable of administering the post 
than any of the revolutionary generals. Although he was 
disgruntled over the demotion Angeles accepted his new 
title and duties, (is) 
Angeles served in a non-combatant-, advisory role as 
Subsecretary of War in Charge of the Dispatch of War with 
the duties of giving direction to the military forces. The 
influence that succeeded in forcing his reduction in office 
continued to hinder his effectiveness. His decisions and 
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orders relating to the displacement and direction of 
revolutionary forces were either countermanded or changed 
by First Chief Carranza, making the Subsecretary post a 
sterile exercise of evaluation and advice. Unable to 
counterbalance the influence of the Sonoran faction with 
Carranza, Angeles adopted an attitude that would preserve 
his soldierly honor and yet allow him to perform the 
duties. That attitude is reflected in his report concerning 
the planned attacks on Forts Mazatlan and Guaymas. He 
returned from a reconnaissance of the areas to express his 
professional opinion. 
Mv opinion as a soldier is that both Guaymas 
and Mazatlan should be attacked in proper 
form, in order that the revolutionary march 
toward the south of Sinaloa proceed.... only 
after having dominated and organized the 
regions of the north in a suitable manner... 
You can decide as civilians and revolutionaries 
and can do what appears to vou to be the best. 
I have given mv opinion as a soldier. (19) 
His advice concerning the capture of those two coastal 
cities, both of which were in Obregdn's area of operation, 
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was disregarded. Obregon's army held Guaymas under siege 
from the latter part of 1913 until the garrison evacuated 
the fort and city in July 1914 to reinforce Manzanillo. 
They also isolated Mazatlan as the war passed by and did 
not occupy it until August 1914. Guaymas contained 4,000 
federal troops with fourteen cannons and four machine guns, 
and Mazatlan had atleast fifteen hundred federals with six 
cannons and four machine guns. The capture of those two 
forts would have greatly increased the meager supply of 
artillery and machine guns that Obregon's army possessed in 
early 1914; but, 0breg<5n evidently made his own decision 
and r e f u s e d  A n g e l e s '  a d v i c e .  ( 2 0 )  
As Obregon and his forces pushed into the State of 
Sinaloa in late 1913, the Division of the North was 
smashing at the federal garrisons in Chihuahua. After an 
attempt to capture Chihuahua City, General Francisco Villa 
turned north and took Ciudad Ju&rez, the import point for 
supplies and arms across the border from El Paso, Texas. 
The spectacular victory at Ciudad Juarez established 
Villa's reputation in the United States as a brave, daring, 
and admirable person; but before the Division of the North 
could consolidate its victory, Villa was forced to defend 
the area against a huertista force coming from the south. 
The federals, augmented by General Pascual Orozco's 
Colorados. encountered Villa's Division at Tierra Blanca. 
After three days of fighting the federals were routed, 
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causing the federal garrison at Chihuahua City to leave the 
State capital to the Division of the North. By December 
1913, Villa had isolated the federals in the area of 
Ojinaga on the Texas border. The assault on that garrison 
began on January 1 and ended with the federals' surrender 
on January 10, 1914, and was a critical lesson for Villa. 
Martiniano Servin, who commanded the Division's artillery, 
failed to utilize the cannons properly in stopping federal 
charges, neutralising enemy fire or supporting Villa's 
troops. (21) 
By the end of 1913, Angeles was committed to the 
revolution because federal authorities were aware of his 
abandonment of the European mission. He wished to escape 
the suspicious atmosphere, continuing character attacks, 
and degrading remarks about his loyalty, honor, and 
manliness made by Generals Hill, Di6gues, and Obregdn. In 
his search for that escape, Angeles' attention was drawn to 
the Division of the North and Villa. After the victory at 
Ojinaga, he dispatched a congratulatory telegram to Villa. 
(  2 2  )  
The receipt of a personal telegram from the Subsecretary 
of War, and from such a noted artillery officer must have 
had a considerable effect on Villa. The Commander of the 
Division of the North continuously desired praise and 
credit for his military accomplishments and endeavored to 
make the Division of the North the best fighting force in 
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Mexico. He appointed his brother, Hipdlito, and trusted 
friends to purchase equipment and supplies from the United 
States. He formed an elite cavalry unit at Ciudad Ju&rez, 
called Los Dorados (The Golden Ones), who were supplied 
with the best arms and uniforms. He also authorised the 
formation of mobile hospital trains to accompany the army 
into battle and treat his wounded soldiers. In early 1914, 
he ordered the formation of a corps of mountain troops 
specifically for crossing and fighting in areas of high 
terrain. Those innovations resulted from his awareness that 
warfare was changing, and glorious cavalry charges and 
valiant infantry assaults were no longer sufficient to 
d e f e a t  t h e  e n e m y  o n  t h e  b a t t l e f i e l d .  ( 2 3 )  
Along with his awareness that specialised military units 
were needed, Villa also saw machine guns becoming 
commonplace weapons and artillery a necessity of war. He 
recalled the adept use of cannons in 1912 by the artillery 
commander, Rubio Navarrette, when they served under General 
Victoriano Huerta against the rebelling forces of Pascual 
Orozco. Those memories, coupled with the inadequacy of his 
artillery at Ojinaga and the reconnaissance reports that 
his next objective at Torredn was heavily fortified, 
convinced Villa and his advisors of the need for an expert 
i n  a r t i l l e r y .  ( 2 4 )  
One of the best artillery officers had just sent a 
glowing message of congratulations and the fact that 
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Angeles was a former federal officer did not adversly 
affect Villa's consideration of requesting his help. 
Numerous ex-federals were incorporated into the ranks of 
the Division of the North, and Villa benefited from their 
experience and knowledge. Besides, Villa's request for 
Angeles' services could only be temporary because Angeles 
was a member of the Constitutionalist staff and War 
Department with duties to perform. Once the artillery was 
effectively organised and the Torredn campaign over, Villa 
could search for a suitable officer to permanently 
command his new Artillery Corps. (25) 
First Chief Carransa departed Sonora for Chihuahua in 
the latter part of February 1914. The governmental party 
was unable to travel by train because the rail line 
entered the United States for a considerable distance, so 
it traveled cross-country with General Angeles commanding 
the escort. Near Agua Prieta, Carransa received a telegram 
from Villa requesting the assignment of his Subsecretary to 
the Division of the North for the Torredn campaign with the 
object of reorganising the artillery. He approached Angeles 
with the request and asked if he consented to the 
assignment. Angeles saw the assignment as at least a 
temporary relief from the political bickerings in Sonora 
and an opportunity to directly contribute to the war. He 
agreed to the assignment and left for Chihuahua City about 
the second week of March. (26) 
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The grand reception given by the Division at Chihuahua 
City to welcome Angeles was a pleasant change from the 
atmosphere in Sonora. Although he felt appreciated, his 
position in the Division was unorthodox. As Artillery 
Commandant he was subordinate to Villa; yet he retained the 
superior position of Subsecretary of War with the 
responsibility of directing the forces of the revolution, 
which included those of Villa's. Because of those 
simultaneous positions he was superior and subordinate to 
Villa, a peculiar situation of war. (27) 
As Division Commander, General Villa retained 
responsibility for the operations, successes, and failures 
of his army, and maintained authority over all elements. 
Yet he was technically responsible to the War Department 
and the Subsecretary for the conduct of his operations. If 
it were two other men, the contradiction of positions may 
have resulted in conflicts over authority and jealous 
bickerings; yet, the question of authority and 
responsibility was not the only unusual aspect in the 
partnership of Angeles and Villa. (28) 
The personalities of the two generals were antithetical. 
Unlike the educated and cultured Angeles, Francisco Villa 
received little formal education and lacked cultural 
refinement. Prior to the Revolution of 1910 he was the 
bandit Pancho Villa operating in the hills of Durango and 
Chihuahua. As Angeles adapted to the discipline and 
atmosphere of the army, Villa adjusted to his trade and 
environment which was one of desperation and survival. 
While Angeles learned the technical skills of artillery in 
foreign schools, Villa mastered leadership skills that 
would later make him a reckless general. His daring and 
often unconventional methods produced a spectacular record 
of victories which usually included his standard method of 
frontal, mass assaults. That tactic, described as a flash 
of lightening or Golpes Terrificos (Terrible Blows), was 
his main plan of battle with more complicated battle 
t a c t i c s  b e i n g  i n t e g r a t e d  f r o m  t h e  a d v i c e  o f  h i s  s t a f f .  ( 2 9 )  
As a hunted outlaw, Villa developed the tenacity 
necessary to survive and a conflicting, nonchalant attitude 
toward life which marked his personality and attracted 
respect. Along with streaks of cruelty and native 
shrewdness, he acquired a code of honor which rested on his 
personal word and behavior. While Angeles rarely displayed 
his emotions, Villa unpredictably fluctuated between 
extreme mood changes. His personal secretary recalled that 
his moods varied from agreeable and tender to hard and 
brutal. Unlike Angeles who maintained an emotional 
equilibrium, Francisco Villa was ruled by his emotions 
which varied from love and melancholy to intense hatred and 
murder. (30) 
Villa considered the war and every battle a personal 
enterprise while Angeles approached combat from an 
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intellectual and relatively professional perspective. 
Contrary to Angeles' ability to conceal his anger, pain, 
and exaltation, Villa openly displayed his feelings and 
reactions. His emotional outbursts and sometimes irrational 
decisions were kept reasonably in check by the men he chose 
as advisors and staff officers, and the one man who could 
usually guide him in the right path was Angeles. (31) 
Thus the union of the emotional, uncultured bandit and 
the scientific, military intellectual was formed. The 
elements of character which made that union successful were 
a mutual respect and the attainment of an understanding of 
the partnership. Villa respected Angeles for his knowledge 
and bravery; Angeles respected Villa for his emotional 
loyalty and willingness to accept advise. The compromise 
that negated the contradiction in authority and conflict of 
personalities was a seperation of responsibilities. They 
accepted the fact that the coordinated use of artillery and 
troops won battles and, if one failed to support the other, 
the battle was lost. The compromise was based on that 
concept with General Angeles responsible to Villa for the 
conduct of his artillery and General Villa responsible to 
Angeles for the conduct of his troops. It was a compromise 
that was devastating to federals at Torreon, Zacatecas and 
other battles. As events evolved in Mexico, a third factor 
affected their relationship and welded their friendship. 
That factor was loyalty to the entity called "La Division 
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del Norte". (32) 
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CHAPTER II 
THE MASTER OF ARTILLERY 
At the headquarters of the Division of the North in 
Chihuahua City, General Angeles entered the turmoil of 
organizing for a major campaign. Reconnaissance reports of 
the objective at Torreon revealed that the area was 
strongly fortified with a great amount of artillery 
situated for a stubborn defense. Those reports caused the 
revolutionaries to realize they were no longer fighting the 
old federal army, commanded by elderly generals who were 
reluctant to accept and use modern tactics. Their adversary 
was the product of _a.reorganization by General Victoriano 
Huerta. (!) 
Huerta was a compulsive organizer who could not tolerate 
an inefficient military unit in the state of disarray. One 
of his first projects after gaining control of the 
government in February 1913 was renovation of the army. It 
had become progressively stagnant under the administration 
of President Diaz, and although the Revolution of 1910 
succeded in replacing D£as it failed to revamp the War 
Department. Huerta initially replaced the elderly Minister 
of War, General Angel Garcia Pefia, with Manuel Mondragon 
and then chose division generals, such as Joaqufn Maas and 
Jos<§ Refugio Velasco, who were competent at organization 
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and managing armies. He organized the new federal army 
around centralized strongpoints with outlying detachments, 
and increased the role of artillery. That increased use of 
artillery forced the revolutionary armies to adopt new 
techniques of offensive warfare or remain as guerrilla 
units. (2) 
It was that reorganized federal army that the Division 
of the North prepared to assault at Torreon. Although some 
of the techniques for improving the army caused corruption 
and reluctance to fight, it was larger, better equipped, 
and superior to most of the revolutionary Divisions. None 
of the other three divisions of the Constitutionalist army 
were better prepared for the task than Villa's army which 
had 46 cannons of various calibers. The Division of the 
Northeast, commanded by General Pablo Gonz&lez, possessed 
eight cannons in March 1914; General Eulalio Gutierrez's 
Central Division had no artillery, relying on 
guerrilla-type raids on the railroad; and the Division of 
the Northwest, commanded by General Alvaro Obregon, had ten 
artillery pieces in early April. In contrast, Villa's 
division was the most formidable army in Mexico in the 
Spring of 1914. Besides the large number of artillery 
pieces, his troops were armed with modern Mauser and 
Remington rifles, possessed thirty-five of the "most modern 
machine guns"(3), and even had a water train which 
accompanied them into the arid regions of northern Mexico. 
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( 4 ) 
Angeles quickly organized his Artillery Corps into two 
regiments, using 36 of their cannons. The 1st Regiment 
consisted of three batteries of artillery and was commanded 
by Colonel Martiniano Servin who had served with the 
Division of the North through 1913. The 2nd Regiment 
included the standard three batteries and an additional 
section of Mountain cannons. The commander of that 
regiment was Colonel Manuel Garcia Santib6riez who had 
joined the Division in January. Santibafiez served as an 
artillery officer in the federal army in General Salvador 
Mercadors command, and when the garrison at Chihuahua City 
was abandoned in December 1913 he deserted the army. (5) 
Angeles' guns were of French and German manufacture, 
ranging in caliber from 70 to 30 milimeter, and could be 
fired accurately up to 2 1/2 miles. The regular cannons 
were mounted on carriages which were attached to shell 
caissons and drawn by mules. The mountain cannons were 
light guns capable of being disassembled, transported over 
rough and hilly terrain, and reassembled in the vicinity of 
the target for. firing. Although their effective range was 
considerably less, their mobility was suited for use by 
Villa's mountain troops and often accompanied cavalry units 
in pursuing the enemy. There were, in addition to the 
regular complement of artillery pieces, two large 80mm 
cannons affectionately and sarcastically called El Nino 
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(The Infant) and El Chavalito (The Young Lad). Because 
they weighed almost two tons each, they were mounted on 
armor-plated railroad cars and fired from those platforms. 
While Angeles reorganized the artillery new men were being 
added to the Division. <6> 
Villa received numerous men from the Sonora area who 
prefered the busy atmosphere of Chihuahua City to the 
ceremonial politics around Carranza. Most of those men were 
Madero loyalitst, such as Roque and Federico Gonz&lez 
Garza. Roque led maderista troops in the State of Coahuila 
during the Revolution of 1910, served as a federal 
legislator during Madero's presidency, and was instrumental 
in starting the 1913 revolution against Huerta. His 
brother, Federico, was a lawyer who served in the Madero 
administration and later joined Carranza's government. 
They, like the rest who came, were assigned posts that 
suited their abilities. Not all who came from the west were 
attracted by the reputation of Villa. (7> 
General Angeles also received men who came with the 
specific intention of serving in the artillery. They were 
men capable of performing duties of staff officers, battery 
commanders, section supervisors, gunners, or technicians, 
all. the posts necessary to make the new Artillery Corps an 
effective unit. Among those men were: Federico Cervantes, a 
former federal officer and future Chief of the General's 
Staff; Major Gustavo Bazan, who joined in March 1914 just 
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before the battle of Gomez Palacio; Jose Heron Gonzalez 
(Gonzalitos), who had been a student at the, military 
college under Angeles and was to become a member of his 
Staff; and Vito Alessio Robles, a "former federal artillery 
officer who was acquainted with Angeles since 1898 and 
joined prior to the battle of Paredon. (8) 
While Angeles busied himself with his various duties 
Villa approached him with plans for the Torredn campaign. 
He requested the advice and approval of Angeles in his 
capacity as Subsecretary of War and simultaneously 
coordinated with his Artillery Commandant. Angeles reviewed 
and approved .the plans as Staff Officer in charge of giving 
direction to the military forces, rioted the requirements of 
the artillery and resumed his duties. Besides personnel and 
equipment assignments, he had to purchase or have 
manufactured a sufficient amount of shells for the various 
gun calibers, obtain carriages for the shells, acquire 
mules to pull the carriages, and inspect all equipment 
before the division began its move toward the Laguna 
District. <9> 
The Laguna District was located in north central Mexico, 
overlapping the States of Coahuila and Durango. It was the 
site of an ancient lake that evolved into flat plains with 
rich soil, surrounded by low mountains. Due to the 
fertility of the region, cotton became the primary 
agricultural product in the 1890's and the district 
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developed into a commercial center. The increase of 
commerce attracted railroad construction and by 1913 it .was 
one of the centers of commerce and transportation in 
northern Mexico. Torreon was the nerve center of railroad 
traffic for the area and was connected to other centers 
such as Monterrey and Saltillo, to the east; Chihuahua City 
and Ciudad Juarez, to the north; San Luis Potosi, to the 
southeast; and Zacatecas and Mexico City, to the south. 
( 10 ) 
With the increasing use of railroads to transport armies 
and Torreon's central location, possession of the city was 
of prime importance. Occupation of Torreon assured an army 
not only control of the Central Railroad, that stretched 
from the United States border straight to the capital of 
Mexico, but dominance over two other major railways. A 
revolutionary force attempted to capture the city in the 
summer of 1913 but the effort was uncoordinated and failed. 
In October of the same year, Villa led the Division of the 
North in a successful assault on the city but by December 
9th it was back in federal hands. (H) 
The vanguard of the Division of the North left Chihuahua 
City on March 15, 1914, followed by fifteen trains carrying 
7,600 troops and 36 artillery pieces. Besides the troops 
aboard the trains, another 2,000 under General Tom&s Urbina 
moved cross-country; 4,000 Durango troops under General 
Calixto Contreras moved eastward toward Torreon; and an 
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additional 1,500 soldiers under General Jose Isabel Robles 
destroyed railroad tracks east of the city. Those forces 
were superior to the army Villa led against the same 
objective in 1913, with double the number of troops. He 
must have felt confident they could again capture the 
federal stronghold in a couple of days; but he was facing a 
different commander, one who was just as determined to be 
the victor as Villa. (12) 
General Jose Refugio Velasco, Commander of the Division 
of the Naaas, had established a network of listening posts 
within a radius of 60 miles from his stronghold at Torreon. 
Using Cavalry and Explorer units at those outposts, he 
hoped to receive warnings of any rebel advance. Villa 
concentrated on. those outlying posts before attempting an 
assault on Torreon. It is understandable why he needed to 
capture the posts along the line of march and in nearby 
areas, but the others were far removed from his advance and 
contained garrisons too small to be a threat. Because of 
the direction of march from Chihuahua most of the attacks 
on outposts merely drove the federals back toward their 
main base, reinforcing the garrison there by over 1,000 
men. (13 > 
On March 20th, the main body of the Division moved south 
toward the outpost of Bermejillo. With their artillery 
still aboard the trains, the infantry pushed in front along 
the tracks while cavalry rode the flanks. Following the 
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capture of the outpost, Angeles made a long distance 
telephone call. After identifying himself to the operator 
at Torreon and requesting to speak, to General Velasco, he 
waited for the federal commander. "Good afternoon, My 
General", Angeles cordially spoke when Velasco identified 
himself on the telephone. "Good afternoon," Velasco 
answered, and quickly asked. "From where are you speaking?" 
When Angeles notified him of the location, Velasco wished 
him well and then asked, "What did we do to you?" (14) 
Velasco's reference to Angeles" relationship with the 
federal army must have caused a long pause, while fleeting 
memories of his long years of service passed through his 
mind. "Nothing," Angeles responded, probably wishing to 
avoid the issues that brought him to his present 
circumstances. He must have felt uncomfortable as the 
representative of an army in rebellion against the 
government, particularily while talking to a man he had 
known during his years in the army. He quickly continued 
before Velasco could pursue the line of questioning, " With 
the object of evading a useless spilling of blood and to 
comply with what we believe is a duty to humanity, I ask 
you for the city of Torreon." There was silence on the 
telephone lines. (15) 
Velasco, who was an old veteran of the federal army, 
must have considered the request of surrender a brazen act 
on the part of Angeles. He probably considered it 
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unthinkable to surrender his Division to an army of rebels 
when his men were well fortified and prepared for attack. 
He stalled for a while and then gave the telephone to a 
junior officer. The officer spoke in an optimistic tone, 
attempting to convince Angeles that it was he who should 
consider surrender. Villa took the telephone and informed 
the officer that he was coming with his Division to take 
Torreon by storm and indicated that defeat for the garrison 
would not be enjoyable. When his colorful threats did not 
produce fear in the officer, Villa's temper flared and he 
threatened the worst for the garrison if it did not 
surrender. When the federal officer continued with the 
verbal joust, Villa "hung up. After the phone call Villa 
directed the army down the same route he had taken in 
September 1913 in his advance on Torreon. (is) 
On March 22, the Division stopped six miles north of 
Gomes Palacio at the Infernillo ranch near El Vergel 
because the tracks beyond that point were severely damaged. 
Along the banks of the Nazas River and in front of the 
army, there were three cities: Torreon situated south of 
the river in the State of Coahuila and the twin cities of 
Ciudad Lerdo and Gomez Palacio along the northern side in 
Durango. The federal forces had spent the last few months 
building entrenchments and forts, arranged in an exterior 
and interior defense system to protect the city of Torreon. 
Velasco commanded over 7,000 troops in the area with 18 
m | -^ n»nri| 
La Cm + A La Jabcnera 
t 
(Iran Rail) 
33 
pieces of artillery and 10 machine guns. It was not the 
loosly fortified and defended city the Division assaulted 
and captured in two days of fighting five months before. 
(17 ) 
By 4:30 in the afternoon Angeles had his artillery 
unloaded and the Division formed a battle line across the 
tracks. As the troops pressed forward seven federal cannons 
bombarded them from fortified positions. Left of the tracks 
was the neighborhood of La Jabonera, nestled between rails 
that veered eastward toward Monterrey and stretched south 
into Torreon. In that area were two fortifications, four 
artillery pieces, and 600 cavalry troops, (is) 
To the right of the tracks was Gomes Palacio, setting 
behind La Pila hill which was a fortress protected by three 
companies of infantry and four artillery pieces in five 
forts dominating the plains below. Part of a cavalry 
division waited in the city behind the hill and a heavy 
platform-mounted cannon sat at the railroad station. Beyond 
the city were three fortified hills, de la Crus, Santa Rosa 
and Calabasas. To the right and behind Gomes Palacio was 
Ciudad Lerdo with four more fortified positions. Connecting 
the network of defenses in Lerdo, Gomes Palacio and Torreon 
was a series of tram rails, normally used for urban 
transportation but capable of transporting reinforcements 
and artillery between towns. (19) 
As the line advanced, Angeles rode with forward units to 
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scout for gun positions. He was unable to bring the guns 
into action to counter the federal artillery because the 
enemy was out of range of his guns and the cannons could 
not be positioned while the battle line moved forward. From 
their point of departure, the artillerymen had to wait 
until the Division covered at least three and a half miles 
before the guns' breachlocks could be opened and shells 
prepared for firing. While covering that distance, the 
Division suffered a considerable amount of casualities 
un d e r  t h e  b a r r a g e  b u t  p u s h e d  f o r w a r d .  ( 2 0 )  
To determine the best gun locations, Angeles plotted 
enemy strong points, determined the distance from those 
points to possible positions for his guns, calculated the 
height of the fortified hills, and then determined 
effective firing. Once those calculations were complete, he 
chose positions for the guns, the type of shell to be used 
and elevation of the barrels. He began placing the guns 
just before dark and by dawn they were ready to support the 
primary attacks that would concentrate on the two strongest 
points of the defense: La Pila and La Jabonera. He placed 
16 cannons on San Ignacio hill under the combined command 
of Colonels Servln and Santibafiez. Placement on the hill 
increased the guns' range and enabled the shells to hit-
higher on La Pila hill. He took eight pieces, which he 
personally commanded, and moved them into a woodland east 
of the railroad tracks. (21) 
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On the morning of March 23, the first of a series of 
desperate and bloody assaults against Gomez Palacio began. 
As the Division attempted to envelop the town from both 
flanks and mount a simultaneous an attack on La Pila hill, 
the guns on San Ignacio hill and those in the woodland 
concentrated their fire on the federal artillery positions. 
Their main objective was to silence the federal cannons 
while they covered troop movements and drew federal fire 
from the brigades. The capture of La Pila was the primary 
objective of the assaults because the summit dominated the 
entire area. (22) 
Angeles rode behind the troops in their assault on La 
Pila searching for .gun relocation points. Although the 
center was reinforced to 7,000 men they could not 
successfully climb the hill against the intense rifle, 
machine gun and artillery fire. As the attacks continued 
the railroad tracks south of Vergel were repaired allowing 
the two big guns to move forward, and before nightfall El 
Nino and El Chavilito begin firing at closer range. The 
battle raged until night when the exhausted Division halted 
a n d  h e l d  t h e i r  c a p t u r e d  g r o u n d .  ( 2 3 )  
During the night General Maclovio Herrera's troops 
stormed and captured Ciudad Lerdo which threatened the 
federals' left flank. While Herrera's troops pushed into 
Lerdo, Angeles' artillery engaged in its first deadly duel 
with the federal guns, an occurance that became common 
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during the campaign. The next morning Villa met with his 
officers and staff instead of mounting another attack. They 
reconsidered the battle strategy and decided to change to 
night attacks because of their vulnerability during 
daylight hours. Troop movements would begin in the late 
afternoon so the brigades could orient on their objectives 
but assaults would not begin until after dark. Not only 
would darkness mask troop movements but help the artillery 
commanders to accurately locate federal guns by the flash 
of their fire. Prior to the Torreon campaign the night, 
mass attack was not a common offensive tactic but, after it 
proved successful, Villa used it again; and by 1915 the 
tactic was common practice in World War I in Europe. (24) 
Angeles took advantage of the lull in fighting to scout 
forward, specifically for gun positions where the gunners 
could fire directly on La Pila's fortified position 
instead of using less accurate indirect fire. As he made 
calculations and measurements for his cannons, gunners 
adjusted El Nino to fire on the hill. To train the barrel 
of the large gun in on its target, angles of the railroad 
track were measured; azimuths taken from its location to 
the hill and that information compared to the altitude and 
direction of the hill. Those calculations were then 
adjusted to allow for factors of wind and projectile drift. 
Once those computations were made the cannon barrel slowly 
revolved toward La Pila hill. To prevent the recoil of the 
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gun from moving the armored car, hydraulic stands were 
lowered at the corners and then El Nino began to thunder. 
(25) 
After the brigades were in position and awaiting the 
signal for the night attack Angeles and Villa went into the 
darkness to scout the front and confer on coordination of 
artillery fire with troop movements. They agreed on a 
technique of fire support which was later called creeping 
fire. They shifted the center of the attack to the left of 
La Pila against La Jabonera while brigades assaulted the 
hill from the west and the troops to the east attempted to 
circle behind G<5mes Palacio. When the soldiers began 
attacking at 9:00 p.m. Colonel Santibaflez's guns fired at 
the base of La Pila hill, a safe distance in front of the 
advancing troops, as El Nino bombarded the the summit. The 
gunners of the 2nd Regiment elevated the gun barrels to 
correspond with the forward movement of the soldiers and 
their shells blasted holes in barbed wire and destroyed 
other obstacles with a walking barrage. The troops charged 
forward over ground cleared by the artillery and upward 
toward the summit where the defenders were being pirmed 
down by the barrage. (26) 
By early morning the effects of the artillery fire 
assisted in capturing four of the five forts on the summit, 
but the victory was short lived. The federals launched a 
desperate counterattack and forced the exhausted rebels 
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down the slopes and onto the plains below. A cavalry 
charge, with artillery support, was launched at the same 
time to draw attention from the main counterattack and 
silence the rebel artillery. Angeles had moved some guns 
close to Gomes Palacio and was delivering a devastating 
barrage. With the good location of Casa Redonda in his 
possession, he was determined not to withdraw the guns in 
the face of the cavalry charge because that act would leave 
the troops exposed to further attacks. To prevent his 
gunners from pulling the guns back he drew his pistol, 
forcing them to hold their ground and fire at the charging 
federals. The cannon fire turned the attackers and saved 
the center; and when daylight came the battle ended for 
weary troops who pulled back to rest. (27) 
Railroad tracks were repaired during the morning of the 
26th and El Nino and El Chavilito moved closer for a more 
effective bombardment. With the two big guns firing at 
close range, Angeles pulled the rest of his artillery back 
to El Vergel for a rest. The federals saw the units 
returning to Villa's army from silencing outposts and 
realized the next rebel assault would be victorious. As 
Villa and his commanders planned another night attack, the 
federals mounted an assault from the railroad station in 
G6mez Palacio to cover their retreat south across the Nazas 
and to safety in Torreon. (28) 
While the Division of the North assaulted the hills 
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around Gomez Palacio, the three other Divisions of the 
Constitutionalist army were busy. General Obregon divided 
his Division of the Northwest to hold Guaymas under seige 
and push south along the Sonoran Pacific Railroad toward 
Culic&n. General Gonzalez split his Division of the 
Northeast into four units to continue fighting small 
engagements north of Saltillo and east of Monterrey, while 
one moved toward Tampico. Farther south, General Eulalio 
Gutierrez and his Central Division continued to wage 
guerrilla warfare against the railroads between Saltillo 
and San Luis Potosi. (29) 
Villa and his commanders were unaware of the federal 
retreat from Gomez Palacio and assembled 14,000 men for 
another great assault. Angeles took command of the 1st 
Artillery Regiment and moved it toward La Jabonera with the 
center under the command of General Tomas Urbina. As the 
Division advanced on the federal fortifications the only 
resistance encountered was on La Pila hill, where some 
federal soldiers remained to prevent the hill from being 
used to stop the retreat. Villa's troops immediately 
occupied the town and busied themselves with other duties. 
They spent the rest of the day and that night clearing the 
battlefields of corpses. There were so many dead men on La 
Pila that they were collected and burned. While the troops 
buried or burned the dead, Angeles and Villa offered 
General Velasco another opportunity to surrender, which was 
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answered with a federal bombardment of the Gomez Palacio 
area. ( 3 o) 
The federal commander was unaware that Villa had 
obtained sketches of the defense positions around Torreon, 
and as he and Angeles ate dinner on March 27th they 
formulated new plans of attack. If the sketches before them 
were correct, both were aware of what awaited on the other 
side of the river. Torreon was nestled into the eastern 
side of a group of hills with narrow canyons protecting the 
west side and the wide, dry bed of the Nazas River across 
the northern side. Eighteen fortifications surrounded the 
city with six strong positions. Calabasas hill had five 
fortifications with artillery which dominated the area 
between Gomes Palacio and Torreon, and covered one side of 
Huarache canyon to the west. South of Calabasas a series of 
hills with artillery emplacements dominated the canyons of 
Huarache and La Polvorera. Metalurigica hill protected the 
city from the south with artillery, and the strong 
positions of la Crus hill and the Panteon were fortified to 
directly protect the urban center. In addition to the 
artillery pieces on the hills the large 80mm cannon had 
been moved from Gomes Palacio and placed at the railroad 
station in Torreon. (si) 
The general advance on Torreon was basically a replay of 
Villa's movements during the last days of September and 
first of October 1913. Both campaigns included the advance 
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through Bermejillo to El Vergel, an attack on Avfles and 
Gomez Palacio, and the capture of Gomez Palacio and Ciudad 
Lerdo before striking at Torreon. Although the same basic 
plan of attack was used, the results were quite different. 
The first attack on Gomez Palacio was made with 
approximately the same amount of men Villa commanded in 
1913 against the same target and failed miserably. Twice 
that number of troops, 12,000, made the second assault and 
it also failed. Whereas it took only five hours to capture 
Ciudad Lerdo and Gomez Palacio in 1913, it had taken four 
days to take the same objectives. In 1913, they had swept 
across the Nazas River and occupied Torreon within ten 
hours but it is doubtful if Villa believed the Division 
could accomplish the same feat after looking at the defense 
plans. (32> 
The federal artillery began a concentrated bombardment 
of Gomez Palacio in the afternoon of March 27th and 
continued to shell the area into the night and the next 
day. The shells were not seriously damaging the Division's 
positions so Angeles ordered his guns to hold their fire 
and let the federals expend their ammunition. He 
reconnoitered the area for two days to verify the defense 
sketches, measure distances and choose potential artillery 
emplacements; and by the evening of March 28, the Division 
was ready to assault the bastion. (33) 
The two main advances concentrated on strong points to 
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the west and north of Torreon, with a secondary assault on 
the east where the defenses were weaker. Colonel Santib&fies 
commanded one regiment of artillery at Ciudad Lerdo and 
fired on the western hills to cover the assault by Durango 
forces from the west. Angeles personally commanded the 
second regiment in the center because of the absence of 
Colonel Servfn, who had been transfered to command an 
infantry unit. Angeles' guns were on Santa Rosa hill, south 
of Gomes Palacio, and fired on the fortifications in front 
of Torreon to support the direct attack toward the Nasas 
River. (34) 
During the night, General Calixto Contreras' Durango 
troops took Calabasas and La Polvorera hills, which were 
critical for the final assault on the city; but lost them 
in the early morning. Another coordinated attack was 
launched at noon the next day against Calabasas hill and 
Coyote dam, which sat in front of the hill; but it also 
failed. By darkness the fighting and artillery fire 
decreased along the lines and the battlefield was quiet 
until early in the morning when federal artillery opened 
fire. During the morning of the 30th Angeles' cannons and 
the federal guns took turns bombarding each other's 
defenses. By noon El Nino and El Chavillto were calibrated 
to coordinates of federal positions and began firing; and 
that long range and deadly fire silenced the federal 
a r t i l l e r y  f o r  a  w h i l e .  ( 3 5 )  
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In the quiet of the afternoon, Villa received a request 
from Velasco for a cease fire. The federal general proposed 
a cessation of hostilities for a period of forty-eight 
hours so the dead and wounded could be collected. Villa 
held a conference with Angeles and George Carothers, the 
United States agent assigned to Villa's army by the State 
Department. Suspecting that Velasco's intentions were not 
to bury the dead and treat the injured but to either 
strengthen his defenses or evacuate, they agreed to send a 
denial. The refusal was followed by a day and a half of 
artillery duels with the guns of the two opposing armies 
intermittently shelling each other's defenses. (36) 
While the guns thundered on March 31, the War Council of 
the Division of the North conducted a trial. They found 
General Jose Carrillo guilty of failing in his duty by not 
holding the line on Calabasas hill and sentenced him to be 
shot. After Carrillo's execution Colonel Martiniano Servin 
was permanently withdrawn from the artillery corps and 
assigned to command part of the general's troops. With the 
loss of Colonel Servin and the men who were killed or 
wounded, Angeles saw a need to reorganise his artillery 
command before the attacks resumed. In the late hours of 
the night he dictated that reorganisation to his aid and 
went to bed. The rest of the night was quiet and the next 
day was occupied with more artillery duels. (37) 
Villa met with Angeles and Urbina in the afternoon to 
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consider the attack scheduled for that night. When they 
discussed the placement of troops, Angeles and Urbina 
agreed it would be best to leave the federal garrison a 
route of escape from the city. They based that suggestion 
on the desperate and bloody defense encountered at Gomea 
Palacio and the few days of battle in front of Torre6n. 
Angeles concluded that to completely surround the garrison 
would produce unnecessary bloodshed, and he may have 
recalled Maxim #67 of Napoleon's Principles of Warfare 
which stated that: things that appear impossible can often 
be accomplished when the only alternative is death. A 
desperate and brutal assault on a cornered army invited 
disaster and would result in too many casualities for the 
Division. Although his suggestion may have also been based 
on an honorable concept of generosity to a worthy 
adversary, his main argument probably appealed to Villa's 
sense of humanity and compassion. Villa agreed with them 
and did not issue the orders to block the railroad from 
Torreon to Viescas. (38) 
After dark on April 1, the attack was launched on the 
north, west and east, leaving the south open. Angeles' guns 
fired down from their position on Santa Rosa hill on the 
defenders of Coyote dam and across the river into the city 
of Torreon. The shelling was coordinated to cover the third 
desperate assault on the dam, which if taken would give 
them easier access to the city. While artillery shells 
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exploded in Torreon, the Durango troops captured Calabazas 
and La Polvorera hills which gave them control of the two 
western canyons; and another force entered the outskirts of 
Torreon from the east. The Division was quickly crowding in 
on the federals but the defenders desperately fought back. 
During the night the forces from the east encountered 
federal resistance at the bullring, Salvador Hotel, 
Cathedral and military barracks in Torreon. Then dawn came 
and the battle ended. (39) 
After a couple of hours of welcomed quiet, the federal 
guns resumed their shelling of Gomes Palacio and Santa Rosa 
hill. Villa met with Angeles in the afternoon to discuss 
plans for the attack that night but they could not 
accurately plot their strategy without an updated report on 
the location of the units. The fighting of the previous 
night was so furious that some units advanced farther than 
expected, and both Villa and Angeles lost contact with 
some. Angeles prepared to perform a complete 
reconnaissance, including assessment of the federal 
defenses and location of the Division's lines, but his trip 
was delayed. A strong wind swept across the arid plains, 
blew up dust clouds and reduced visibility to near zero. 
(  4 0  )  
Once the dust cloud had passed Angeles left Gomez 
Palacio in an automobile for his reconnaissance. At the 
same time, the federal cavalry launched an attack into 
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Huarache canyon and federal guns increased their fire on 
the Division's positions. As Angeles scouted the lines he 
discovered the federals had evacuated the city and 
fortifications during the dust storm, taking the escape 
route left open to them. The Division moved into Torreon 
early the next morning and accepted the surrender of 
federal troops left behind to cover the retreat. When news 
of the surrender reached some villistas on la Crus hill one 
of them blew a bugle which stimulated a general firing of 
rifles and salvos of artillery to celebrate the great 
victory. (41) 
Torreon was captured but the victory was not yet 
complete. As the Division occupied the city, Velasco fled 
eastward with 6,000 soldiers and 16 cannons. Although he 
was pursued by two brigades of villista cavalry, Velasco 
was moving toward federally held territory and safety. The 
threat to the Division's victory was not their inability to 
overtake the fleeing federals but the possibility of their 
turning north at Hornos station on a branch railroad. That 
branch line led north to the town of San Pedro de las 
Colonias where it connected the northern and southern 
railways. That move by Velasco would allow him to join 
another federal force that was waiting in San Pedro. <42> 
From the time of the first attack against the defenses 
of Torreon on March 28th Villa had dispatched various units 
to the San Pedro area to prevent those federals from 
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entering the action. They had been dispatched toward San 
Pedro from the east to either reinforce the garrison at 
Torreon or aid in retaking the city. If Velasco turned 
north and joined the 3,500 federals at San Pedro there 
would be a combined force of 11,000 capable of storming the 
ill prepared defenses and exhausted troops of the Division. 
When Villa sent cavalry after Velasco's retreating army he 
also dispatched a couple of telegraphers to keep him 
advised of their movements; but regardless of Velasco's 
intentions, the Division's hold on Torreon would not be 
secure with a federal outpost only 25 miles to the 
northeast. That outpost had direct access to the Monterrey 
and Saltillo garrisons by rail and could be transformed 
into the staging point for an assault and had to be 
eliminated. (43) 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DESERTS AND MOUNTAINS 
General Villa telegramed Carranza from Gomez Palacio 
announcing his victory and expressing the great sacrifice 
the Division suffered in the campaign. When the First Chief 
received the news, he was in Ciudad Juarez enroute to 
Chihuahua with his government. Unlike the majority of 
revolutionaries Carranza was not overwhelmed with delight, 
although he must have been pleased that the first step had 
been taken to expel the federals from his home State of 
Coahuila. That attitude of indifference'resulted from his 
exclusion from * initiating the campaign, not the 
significence of the victory. If he did not order it, the 
victory could not be important. That reaction reflected his 
growing resentment of the independence that Villa had in 
his operations, (i) 
When the Division made its triumphal entry into Torreon 
on April 3, Villa and Angeles were occupied with more 
pressing matters than Carranza's opinion of their success. 
Villa immediately began sending troops toward San Pedro, 
and within two days 6,000 soldiers and most of the 
Division's artillery assembled under the command of General 
Urbina west of the federally occupied town. They must have 
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considered the assault on San Pedro as a mop up operation 
because only half of the Division's forces were dispatched. 
With Velasco's army continuing its flight eastward and 
Urbina's forces considered to be more than sufficient to 
overwhelm the garrison at San Pedro, Angeles and Villa 
elected to stay in Torreon where other duties awaited. (2) 
As Villa busied himself with the forceful explusion of 
Spaniards from the city, Angeles considered his future. The 
Laguna campaign and his assignment to the Division of the 
North were both coming to an end and he faced the prospect 
of returning to the company of Carranza. He must have felt 
a certain reluctance at the thought even though he would 
not be returning to Sonora where Obregdn and his generals 
had undermined his relationship with Carranza. Chihuahua 
City was far from Obregdn, who was advancing through the 
State of Sinaloa, but the position with Carranza must have 
seemed shallow compared to the challeging responsibilities 
in the Division. (3) 
In the brief time he served with the Division, Angeles 
developed a strong attached to that nonentity. He had 
accompanied the Division as it marched out of Chihuahua 
like an ancient army, swept through the State of Durango 
compelling federal garrisons to quickly retreat, stormed 
and broke the defenses of Gomes Palacio and delivered a 
crippling blow to the huertistas by crushing the garrison 
at Torreon. The Artillery Corps he formed and commanded in 
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battle had been bloodied in those eleven days of combat and 
proved its worth. It had withstood the terrible 
bombardments; returned the fire, shell for shell; and was 
instrumental in the great victory. No other revolutionary 
army possessed what he had organised and commanded, and 
that idea must have intrigued General Angeles. 
By April 5, the battle line around San Pedro extended 
from Santa Elena, southeast of the town; across the branch 
railroad leading to Hornos; then westward and north to the 
railroad leading to Gomes Palacio; and north by east to 
Carolinas, north of the town. That day Urbina ordered a 
general attack against the garrison, and the fighting 
continued into the next day when he pulled the troops back 
for a rest. While the villistas relaxed General Benjamin 
Argumedo led 600 cavalrymen of Velasco's command across the 
Nazas River east of Santa Elena, through federal lines 
established to prevent the rebels from completely 
surrounding San Pedro, and into the town. The next day the 
cavalrymen tried to leave with thirty railroad cars filled 
with ammunition, equipment and supplies for the federals 
waiting near Viescas but were stopped and turned back by 
Urbina's troops, who held the railroad leading south. M) 
Meanwhile in Torreon, Angeles and Villa discussed plans 
for the Division's next campaign, the advance south toward 
Zacatecas. Both blamed General Gonzales for the presence of 
federals in San Pedro because of his failure to cut rail 
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lines farther east and stop the movements westward. 
Gonzalez continued to confine his forces to the Monterrey 
area and maneuver them for a strike against that city. When 
Urbina made the first assaults on San Pedro on April 5, 
Gonzalez's forces attacked the defenses of Monterrey and 
General Luis Caballero launched an assault on Tampico. 
Neither attack succeeded but Caballero's caused confusion 
that resulted in an international incident. <5) 
By April 7 the rebel forces were in the outskirts of 
Tampico and threatening the federal garrison. Some American 
sailors, who were in the area to evacuate United States 
citizens, entered the battle zone and were arrested by 
federal troops. Although the. federals soon released the 
sailors, United States Admiral Henry T. Mayo made 
unreasonable demands for an apology by the federal 
commander which were refused. While the insignificant 
incident was being amplified and developed into the basis 
for invasion, Caballero's forces were repelled. (6> 
The day after the American soldiers were arrested in 
Tampico a force of 2,000 federals attacked Urbina's troops 
near Santa Elena from the northeast. Although the attack 
was stopped by cavalry and artillery fire from the rebel 
lines, it did divert attention from the San Pedro-Hornos 
railroad. During the attack General Argumedo led a supply 
convoy of railroad cars across the river and hurried 
southward. When the supplies and news of the situation at 
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San Pedro reached Velasco at La Soledad he changed his 
fleeing army into one advancing to the aid of fellow 
soldiers, and by the next day was marching north. (?) 
When Angeles and Villa received the news of Velasco's 
change in direction, they knew the importance of San Pedro 
had just increased. They also knew that although the 
garrison was small some of Huerta's most trusted and 
competent generals were in the town. Francisco Romero 
commanded the garrison which included Joaqufn Maas, 
Commander of the Division of the Brave; Carlos Garcia 
Hidalgo, Commander of the federal Division of the North; 
and Javier De Moure, sent by Huerta himself. With Velasco 
moving north, Villa and Angeles had the opportunity to 
defeat most of Huerta's best generals in one battle. They 
seised the opportunity and left Torreon with 2,000 
additional troops and the rest of the artillery the same 
day that Velasco turned his army north. (8) 
Upon arrival in the San Pedro area the two generals 
immediately made a reconnaissance. Looking east and south 
from the cliffs west of San Pedro they estimated it would 
take Velasco twenty four hours to move his forces from La 
Soledad. If they could defeat the garrison and be in 
possession of San Pedro before Velasco crossed the Nasas 
River, they could crush both armies separately. They 
formulated plans for a coordinated effort between the 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and issued orders for a 
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swift attack and seizure of San Pedro. (9) 
In the early morning hours of April 10, 3,000 troops of 
the Division advanced across the desert from the north, 
west and south. Under the cover of artillery fire they 
assaulted the federal trenches and barricades. The 
strongest federal artillery position was at the panteon, a 
building constructed and dedicated to the dead. During the 
night of April 9th Angeles ordered artillery placed on an 
adjacent hill above that position and when the attack began 
his guns maintained a continuous bombardment of the 
federals. Expecting more shells to be delivered to his 
position, Angeles directed his gunners to continue firing 
until they exausted their supply of ammunition; but the 
shipment did not arrive and the cannons were silenced. Due 
to the desperate defense of the garrison, the attack could 
not continue without artillery support and was halted after 
fourteen hours. (1°) 
While Angeles anxiously awaited the delivery of 
artillery shells, plans were being formulated far to the 
north in the United States for military forces to seise and 
hold the city of Veracruz. The planned invasion of Mexico 
was based on the flimsy justification that the Mexican 
government would not humble itself to the flag and power of 
the United States and properly apologise for the arrest of 
the sailors at Tampico. While foreign politicians were busy 
with their pencils, the Division of the North waited and 
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hoped the artillery ammunition would arrive before 
Velasco's army; but their hopes were dashed when Velasco's 
troops pushed through their lines and began entering San 
Pedro in the late evening of the 10th. (H) 
The arrival of Velasco's forces raised the garrison's 
strength to over 9,000 men with twenty-six cannons. Knowing 
that the Division could not hope to defeat a superior force 
in defensive positions, Villa sent for an additional 4,000 
troops. Angeles used the time to place artillery batteries 
to support the next attack. Within two days the Division 
was reinforced to 12,000 and on the morning of April 13 
launched a fierce attack on San Pedro. The assaults were 
covered by artillery barrages and quickly crushed the outer 
defenses, pushing the federals back into the town. (12) 
After resisting the onslaught for over twelve hours, 
Velasco ordered the withdrawal. Cavalry troops charged out 
of San Pedro to the north and south in attempts to open an 
avenue of escape for those who could not leave by train. 
The northern side proved to be the easiest to penetrate and 
some federals fled in that direction. The remainder of the 
forces desperately held the center of town against the 
overwhelming forces of the Division while artillery, 
supplies, ammunition, and their wounded were loaded on 
trains for evacuation. As the Division pushed in to capture 
the town the next morning, 4,000 troops and their artillery 
which were left behind to cover the retreat drastically 
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increased their fire and caused heavy casualties in the 
rebel ranks. (is> 
By noon the garrison fell and General Villa entered San 
Pedro behind a captured military band. Seven hundred of the 
captive soldiers elected to join the Division and fight 
against the government. Another five hundred were not given 
a choice. They were members of the Colorados. a unit of 
irregular troops formed by General Pascual Orozco in 1912. 
Orozco led them in his revolt against President Madero, and 
when General Huerta overthrew Madero they joined the 
federal army. Villa fought against the Colorados in 1912 
and strongly disliked them, which caused him to order all 
of them executed. While Villa was arranging the execution 
of Orozco's men, ^Angeles inspected the abandoned federal 
c a n n o n s  b u t  d i s c o v e r e d  t h e y  h a d  b e e n  d i s a b l e d .  ( 1 4 )  
The federals fled eastward from San Pedro onto the 
desert, pursued by the Division. The troops who escaped 
northward circled around to rejoin those on the railroad 
and the combined force fled toward Saltillo; but after 
traveling only twenty miles they were stopped at Benavides 
Station by destroyed railroad tracks. Caught on the desert 
with little or no water, many of the federal troops died of 
thirst as they held back assaults from the west and 
repaired tracks to the east. Villa ordered a full assault 
on April 16 in an attempt to crush the federal force 
instead of allowing them to esacpe. As he rode to the front 
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lines with his escort of cavalry during the battle, Villa 
moved too far forward in the excitement arid confusion. A 
federal cavalry unit spotted the small force and charged 
out to flank them. Angeles saw how the situation was 
evolving and led some troops in a counterattack that turned 
the federal cavalry and saved Villa from being killed or 
captured, (is) 
As the federals fled across the desert they abandoned 
twenty trains because they lacked water to operate the 
engines. At Hipolito they met federal troops who were 
coming to their aid, and the combined force turned eastward 
to safety. By the time Velasco arrived in Saltillo he 
commanded only 1,200 of the 6,000 soldiers he had led out 
of Torreon on April 2nd. The humiliation of the defeat of 
five of Huerta's best generals was a devastating blow to 
the federal army in the North, but the great rebel victory 
was overshadowed by the actions of the United States. (16) 
United States Marines landed at Veracruz on April 21 and 
occupied the city. The invasion was a result of President 
Woodrow Wilson's desire to depose President Huerta and 
force Mexico to establish a constitutional government under 
someone other than Huerta or Carranza. Veracruz was the 
primary import point for arms and munitions for the Huerta 
government and the occupation severely curtailed those 
shipments. Although it was planned as a measure against the 
Huerta government, the invasion and occupation caused many 
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Constitutionalists to consider an alliance with Huerta to 
repel the North Americans, (i?) 
The most vocal revolutionary general was Obregon. On the 
day of the invasion he urged Carranza to declare war on the 
United States but Carranza refused to take such drastic 
action. Two days later he suggested freeing the federal 
garrison at Mazatlan, which he had under seige, so they 
could defend their country against a feared attack on the 
west coast. Carranza again counseled against impulsive 
actions, prefering to use diplomatic channels and address 
the issue more conservatively. He drafted a message to the 
United States government strongly protesting the violation 
of Mexico's sovereignty and suggested that the action could 
cause a war between the two countries, (is) 
Angeles attended a cabinet meeting on April 25 at 
Chihuahua City in which Carranza informed them of his 
actions and read his message of protest. Although he 
disagreed with Carranza, Angeles remained silent during the 
meeting because the other members present were loyal 
followers of the First Chief and agreed with him on 
everything. A couple of days later he accompanied Villa to 
Ciudad Juarez where they publically stated their position. 
Angeles, with Villa's concurrence, viewed the occupation of 
Veracruz as a benefit, to the revolution because the port 
had been controlled by their enemies, and they received the 
means to resist the revolutionary forces through Veracruz. 
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Losing that means to resist the revolution was thus a 
liability for Huerta and an asset to the 
Constitutionalists. (19) 
When Angeles and Villa publicly supported the occupation 
of Veracruz and reassured the United States they had no 
intentions of fighting them, there were political and 
practical motives behind the statements. They realized the 
North American government not only wished to see Huerta 
deposed but prefered the establishment of a government 
similiar to Madero's, not one headed by Carranza. Those 
desires corresponded to the wishes of Angeles and Villa 
because both were loyal supporters of Madero and believed 
Carranza was only temporary chief of the government. 
Besides the political reasons they foresaw a problem of 
supply. The Division's line of supply stretched from 
Torreon, through Chihuahua, and into the United States at 
El Paso. Arms, ammunition, supplies, and equipment flowed 
down that line, and neither Villa nor Angeles wished that 
flow to stop. The arms embargo had been lifted in February 
1914 and if it were reinstituted the victory over Huerta 
wo u l d  b e  d e l a y e d .  ( 2 0 )  
The failure of Angeles and Villa to support the official 
Constitutionalist policy, as stated by Carranza, increased 
the First Chief's suspicions of their intentions. When he 
visited Torreon in early May to discuss plans for the 
Division's next campaign, Villa enthuastically presented an 
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outline for the advance southward along the Central 
Railroad and the capture of Zacatecas. Carranza opposed 
those plans and ordered Villa to lead his forces eastward 
to take Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila. He justified 
that demand as a strategic move to assist Gonz&les in 
gaining control of the northern states. Villa strongly-
protested against the Saltillo campaign and insisted on 
moving on Zacatecas, and the two plans were submitted to a 
board of revolutionary generals for the final decision. 
(  2 1 )  
During the meeting of generals at Torreon, Angeles 
agrued vigorously in favor of the Zacatecas campaign. He 
naturally believed himself the most qualified to speak on 
strategy because his primary duties in the government 
involved directing the armies in the revolution; and as 
Subsecretary of War he probably assumed that his opinion 
would weigh heavily on the decision. Using logic to state 
his points, as he usually did, Angeles stressed the fact 
that the federal army in the northern area was demoralized 
after their defeats at Torreon and San Pedro. That 
demoralization reduced their fighting ability, and with 
that reduction in their ability to resist, the Division of 
the Northeast could easily conquer the remaining federal 
strongholds. He insisted that the penetration of central 
Mexico was necessary to move closer to victory; but his 
arguments were disregarded. With Carranza presiding over 
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the board, his wishes were obeyed and the Division was 
ordered eastward. (22) 
For Villa the rejection of the Zacatecas plans was a 
threat to his independence of operation and control of the 
Division. To Angeles it was more than a mere dismissal of 
battle plans. It was another example of his professional 
military advice being rejected in favor of personal 
desires, as had occured in Sonora. The actions of Carranza 
and the refusal of the generals on the board to listen to 
reason pushed Angeles closer to Villa and the Division. 
Their attitudes were demonstrated a couple of days later 
when neither Angeles nor Villa attended a supper given for 
Carranza by the generals of the Division of the North.(23) 
The increasing disagreements between Carranza and 
General Villa were primarily the result of their mutual 
distrust of the men around each other and passions for 
personal victory. Each man was a caudillo, or regional 
authoritarian, who was extremely protective of his power; 
yet each man maintained or extended that power by different 
means. Carranza was a political patriarch who exchanged 
favors and gained allegiance with subtlety, and he 
maintained that power through the dependence created by 
those favors. Villa was the adventurous and daring leader 
who gained power as a result of his deeds of valor and bold 
action. He gained allegiances through hero worship, and 
maintained them with the use of fear and belief in his 
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invincibility. While the main contest was between Villa and 
Carranza a third element, that was to become a controlling 
f a c t o r ,  e n t e r e d  t h e  p i c t u r e .  ( 2 4 )  
That third element was General Angeles who was neither a 
caudillo with an established power base nor did he have the 
type of obligations that plagued the other two. Unlike 
Villa and Carranza who possessed provincial viewpoints of 
evolving affairs, Angeles maintained a cosmopolitan 
perspective of events. He did not view them in the context 
of how they would benefit or injure him, but how they 
corresponded to what he perceived as reality. Although he 
was aware of Villa's faults, which sometimes contradicted 
his value system, he also saw an honest man who believed in 
the people. He believed Villa to be a man who would listen 
to reason, if it was presented in the proper mariner, and 
honor his word. In contrast he saw Carranza as a devious 
man who was unwilling to listen to reason, if it countered 
his personal desires, and progressively demanded blind 
o b e d i e n c e  t o  h i s  d e s i r e s  a n d  d e c i s i o n s .  ( 2 5 )  
Angeles believed that Carranza's requirement of 
unquestioning submission was the cause of the First Chief's 
refusal to see the obvious. The Division of the North was 
the strongest of the revolutionary armies and was poised at 
an advantageous point on the Central Railroad, thus it was 
the logical choice for an attack on Zacatecas. He 
considered Carranza's stubborn interference with the 
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Division's movement south and its diversion to other 
regions as a mark of military incompetence. In his opinion, 
sacrificing a swift victory for personal motives was to be 
strongly resisted because it would prolong the revolution 
and cause further damage to Mexico. However, Angeles did 
not believe the issue of a Zacatecas or Saltillo campaign 
warranted the extreme measure of disobedience. (26) 
Displeased with the choice of campaigns but willing to 
cooperate, Villa issued orders for the Division to prepare 
for the trip eastward. The vanguard of the Division left 
Torreon on May 11 under the command of Angeles, who had 
received his commission as a General of Brigade in the 
latter part of April. It took the familiar route through 
San Pedro de las Colonias and eastward for 155 miles to 
Saucedo station, beyond which the tracks were destroyed. 
From Saucedo Angeles and his new aid, Colonel Vito Alessio 
Robles, immediately scouted the 27 mile area that separated 
them from the federal garrison at Paredon. Colonel Robles 
was an educated man who had served as an engineer officer 
in the federal army. He remained loyal to Madero during the 
revolt by General Huerta and joined the Constitutionalist 
movement but disagreed with the First Chief and left. In 
May he traveled from Sonora to join the Division of the 
North and was assigned to Angeles. (27) 
As the rest of the Division arrived at Hipolito, Angeles 
examined the area around Paredon with the aid of a 
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geographic chart of the State of Coahuila, and formulated 
his plans for the attack on the town. On May 15, Colonel 
Robles delivered those plans to Villa at Hip6lito. Angeles' 
plans were structured in concise and consecutive phases of 
troop and equipment movements, with the coordination of 
unit actions and a logical synchronisation for the 
isolation and defeat of the federal garrison. Although the 
plan involved the complex movement of 10,000 troops, 
thirty-six cannons and all of the equipment and supplies 
for an army that size, it was stated in clear and simple 
terms. (28) 
Angeles even included reasons for the necessity to 
quickly isolate and defeat the garrison. He reminded Villa 
that a total of 15,000 federal troops, were in the area, 
divided into three garrisons. While Paredon contained only 
5,000 troops with 10 artillery pieces, General Pascual 
Orosco was a short distance away at Ramos Arispe with 2,000 
cavalry and General Joaquin Maas commanded another 8,000 at 
Saltillo. Villa immediately saw the logic in the plan and 
i s s u e d  o r d e r s  t o  c o r r e s p o n d  w i t h  t h e  d e s i g n .  ( 2 9 )  
Paredon sat at the intersection of two railroads: one 
connecting Saltillo with Monclova and the Texas border to 
the north; the other ran east to west connecting Torre<5n 
with Monterrey and the east coast. The areas north and east 
of the junction were controlled by the Division of the 
Northeast, so the only logical direction for the garrison 
tmm-im 
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to withdraw was south. To prevent that possibility, 2,000 
cavalry troops went southeastward from Hipdlito to a 
position 25 miles south of Paredon. They were ordered to 
destroy the railroad in Zertuche canyon, but not until the 
morning of May 17. On the 16th, the rest of the Division 
traveled on trains to Sauceda where 8,000 infantry and 
cavalry troops detrained. From there they followed sixteen 
miles of damaged railroad tracks through Josefa canyon to 
Frausto, only 12 1/2 miles from Paredon. (30) 
The Division's artillery could not travel through the 
canyon, so it turned northward at Sauceda, according to 
Angeles' plans. From there the long column of guns, armor, 
carts, equipment and supplies crossed rough country with 
Angeles directing their movements. As the troops 
confidently marched forward over dusty, rough roads, 
Angeles rode the length of the column again and again 
attending to details of proper marching order, and assuring 
himself they were progressing according to the plan. After 
passing the village of Trevifio, they entered the mountains 
and turned eastward toward Santa Catarina pass. Once across 
the pass they came out of the mountains and down onto the 
desert at Las Norias. (31) 
After thirty-two hot, grueling miles the artillery 
column joined the rest of the Division in Frausto. Although 
their assembly point was relatively close to Paredon, a 
high hill stood between the two points and masked their 
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movements. The artillery formed files of carriage and guns, 
one behind the other, and followed the cavalry. As the 
battle line moved forward, Angeles rode with cavalry 
leaders in front to pick proper locations for the guns. 
When they passed the abandoned village of Flores and 
adjacent hills the troops spread out into attack formation. 
The federal garrison was unaware of their presence in the 
area and federal cavalry units were making excursions to 
the north and east guarding against an attack by Gonzales's 
troops. At Rancho San Juan, one and a half miles from 
Paredon, Angeles met with Villa and they issued orders for 
the attack. (32) 
Angeles sent his battle orders back to Major Gustavo 
Bazan and joined the forward elements for the assault. The 
infantrymen mounted behind cavalrymen for a swift advance 
across open ground, a practice that was common in the 
Division because it created swift attacks and reduced 
casualties. When the signal was given, 8,000 soldiers 
charged across the hot desert. Federal artillery 
immediately opened fire from San Francisco hill, southeast 
of Paredon, but it did not slow the attack. The charge was 
so swift and unexpected that resistance was weak, and 
within thirty minutes the attack on Paredon was over with 
the federals either killed, captured or in retreat. 
Although his artillery had not fired a shot, Angeles 
positioned some of the guns while troops were entering the 
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town. With the federals desperately fleeing, he quickly 
formed four batteries of guns in column to advance behind 
t h e  p u r s u i n g  c a v a l r y .  ( 3 3 )  
The Division occupied the town and took control of the 
major railroad intersection. As Angeles examined the 
results of his plan, he was informed that only 2,000 of the 
defenders escaped. The rest of the 5,000 were either 
killed, wounded or captured. Along with the captured 
soldiers were 10 cannonsammunition, supplies, trains and 
3,000 guns. Among the prisoners was a wounded federal 
officer whom Rodolfo Fierro wanted to shoot, in accordance 
with the new law issued by First Chief Carransa. The Law of 
Benito Juares dictated that all captured officers would be 
shot, but. Angeles interceded. He told Villa that it was 
inhumane to shoot a wounded person because he could not 
defend himself. While Felipe Angeles was trying to follow 
humane rules of war, Francisco Villa had other ideas. He 
ordered that all healthy federal officers be shot, in 
accordance with the Law; and those who were wounded should 
first be cured of their wounds, in the interest of 
h u m a n i t y ,  a n d  t h e n  t h e y  w e r e  t o  b e  s h o t .  ( 3 4 )  
General Jose Isabel Robles' cavalry chased the fleeing 
federals into Saltillo and stopped at Ramos Arispe, six 
miles north of the city. While soldiers of the Division 
skirmished with federals north of the city, Angeles 
positioned guns in the mountains surrounding Saltillo. When 
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three trains were derailed by villista troops at Certucha, 
panic spread through the federal garrison and city. With 
the country to the north, west, and east under the control 
of Gonz&lez and Villa, General Joaquin Maas ordered his 
8,500 troops to evacuate the city and move south toward San 
Luis Potosi. (35) 
Soon after his entry into Saltillo on May 21 Villa 
appointed Jesus Acofia governor of the State of Coahuila, 
according to Carranza's orders. Carranza planned to move 
the Constitutionalist government back to Coahuila and 
wanted a man in the state office who was loyal, and as 
insurance against Villa appointing someone else, he sent 
Acoria with the Division on its campaign. With the Saltillo 
campaign finished except for transfering military command 
to Gonzalez, Villa and Angeles discussed their future 
strategy. The Division could advance south from Saltillo to 
take San Luis Potos£ and probably move farther down to take 
Aguascalientes, but Angeles believed that move unwise. 
Their supply center was in Torreon with lines extending 
north to the United States border. If they turned Saltillo 
over to Gonz&lez and pushed south, the supply lines would 
not only be over extended but subject to the desires of 
Carranza through Gonz&lez. (35) 
After eliminating the possibility of using the eastern 
route to the center of Mexico, they again turned to the 
plans of moving against Zacatecas. Before Carranza 
interfered with those plans the Division had acquired 
enough munitions, provisions and supplies to mount the 
attack southward but the majority of those supplies had 
been expended in taking Saltillo, and must be replenished 
before mounting the next campaign. While Villa waited in 
Saltillo for Gonzalez to assume command of the city, 
Angeles and some other officers returned to Torreon to 
refit and reinforce the Division for the push southward. 
(  3 7  )  
72 
CHAPTER III 
ENDNOTES 
1. Guzman, ̂ Villa Memoirs. pp. 175-176. Felipe Angeles, 
Justification de la desobediencia de los gerterales de la 
Division del Norte, en Torreon. el iaes de marso de 1914. 
Chihuahua, Imprenta del Gobierno del Estado, 1914, 
Francisco R. Almada Collection, Centro de Informacion del 
Estado de Chihuahua, p. 38. (Hereafter cited as Angeles, 
Justificacion.) RDS, Hamm to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/11842, May 5, 1914. 
2. Gusman, Villa Memoirs, pp. 176 and 182-183. 
3. RDS. Hamm to Secretary of State, File No. 812.00/11706, 
April 13, 1914. Lamego, Historia Militar: Tercera Parte. 
PP. 191-208. 
4. Ibid, pp. 64-67. Gusman, Villa Memoirs, pp. 183-184. 
5. Ibid, p. 188. Angeles, Justificacion. p. 38. Lamego, 
Historia Militar: Tercera Parte, pp.77-103. 
6. Atkin, Revolution, pp. 188-189. 
7. Gusman, Villa Memoirs, p. 184. Lamego, Historia Militar: 
Terecera Parte, pp. 67-68. 
8. Ibid, PP. 60-63 and 68-70. Gusman, Villa Memoirs. pp. 
183 and 184-185. 
9. Ibid, p. 185. 
10. Lamego, Historia Militar: Tercera Parte, p. 70. Gusman, 
Vi11 a Memoirs. p. 186. 
11. Atkin, Revolution, pp. 189-190. Gusman, Villa Memoirs. 
p. 186. Lamego, Historia Militar: Tercera Parte, p. 71. 
12. Ibid, PP. 71-72. Gusman, Villa Memoirs, p. 186. New 
York Times. April 15, 1914. 
13. Lamego, Historia Militar: Tercera Parte. pp. 72-73. 
Gusman, Villa Memoirs, p. 187. 
14. HfiiZ York Times. April 15, 1914, Gusman, Villa Memoirs. 
p. 187. Lamego, Historia Militar: Tercera Parte, pp. 73-74. 
15. Ibid. pp. 73-74. New York Times. April 15, 16 and 17, 
1914. 
73 
16. New York Times, April 17, 1914. Lamego, Historia 
Militar: Tercera Parte, pp. 73-74. 
17. Atkin, Revolution, pp. 192-196. 
18. Alfonso Taracena, ill Vida en el Vertigo de la 
Revolucion (Anales Sinteticos 1900-1930. Mexico, D. F., 
Ediciones Botas, 1936, pp. 254-255 and 257. (Hereafter 
cited as Taracena, Mi Vida.) 
19. Brito, Lugarteniente Gris, pp. 66, 69 and 71. New York 
limea., April 26, 1914. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 191. 
20. Atkin, Revolution, p. 128. 
21. Angeles, Justificacion, pp. 39-40. Lamego, Historia 
Militar: Tercera Parte, p. 114. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, pp. 
191-192. 
22. Ibid, PP. 192-193. Angeles, Justificacion. p. 38. 
23. Ibid, p. 39. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 193. 
24. Francois Chevalier, "The Roots of Personalismo" in 
Dictatorship in Spanish America. ed. Hugh M. Hamill, Jr., 
New York, Alfred-A-Knopf, 1966, pp. 39, 41 and 58-63. 
Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 193. RDS. Carothers to Cobb, File 
No. 812.00/12219, June 10, 1914. RDS. Canova to Secretary 
of State, File No. 812.00/12433, July 3, 1914. Norman 
Dixon, On The Psychology of Military Incompetence. New 
York, Basic Books, Inc., 1976, pp. 258 and 267. John J. 
Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America. 
Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1964, pp. 
39-41. 
25. Angeles, Justificacion. pp. 43 and 54-55. 
26. Ibid, PP. 37, 38-40, 41-42, and 44-46. 
27. ^Guzman, Villa Memoirs. pp. 193-195. Documentos 
Historicos d<£ la Revolucion Mexicana X5L Revo luc ion v 
Regimen Constitucionalista. Volumen 2 d<sl Tomo I, ed . 
Comision de Investigaciones Historicas de la Revolucion 
Mexicana, S. A. Mexico, Editorial Jus, 1969, p. 77. 
(Hereafter cited as Documentor Volnmen 3 del Tomo T. ) 
Cervantes, Zilla, p. 139. Lamego, Historia Militar: Tercera 
Parte. pp. 114 and 116. 
28. Cervantes, Villa. p. 139. Lamego, Historia Militar: 
Tercera Parte, pp. 114, 116, and 118. Guzman, Villa 
Memoirs. p. 195. 
74 
29. Ibid, p. 195. 
30. Lamego, Historia Militar: Tercera Parte, pp. 118-120. 
Guzman, Villa Memoirs, pp. 195-196. Cervantes, Villa, P. 
140. 
31. IMsL, P. 140. Lamego, Historia Militar: Tercera Parte, 
p. 118. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 196. 
32. Ibid, p. 196. Lamego, Historia Militar: Tercera Parte, 
p. 120. Cervantes, Villa. p. 141. 
33. Ibid. pp. 141-142. Lamego, Historia Militar: Tercera 
Parte. p. 120. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 196. 
34. Lamego, Historia Militar: Tercera Parte, P. 121. 
Guzman, Villa Memoirs, pp. 197 and 198. 
35. L&M, P. 197. Lamego, Historia Militar: Tercera Parte. 
P. 121. New York Times. May 17, 18 and 22, 1914. Angeles, 
Justificacion. p. 40. 
36. Ibid, PP. 40-41. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, pp. 195, 199, 
and 203. 
37. I&M, P. 203. Angeles, Justif icacion. p. 40. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISOBEDIENCE OF THE GENERALS 
Upon his return to Torredn from Saltillo Angeles 
immediately began reforming and supplying the Division for 
their long planned attack on Zacatecas, but he discovered 
that Carransa had not been idle. Taking advantage of 
Angeles and Villa's absence, the First Chief initiated 
another plan to frustrate their campaign. He met with 
Generals Panfilo Natera and Domingo Arrieta in Durango and 
authorized the formation of a new army Division with Natera 
as commander. The first mission of the First Division of 
the Center was to advance and capture the city of 
Zacatecas. (i> 
While Villa was transfering command of Saltillo to 
Gons&lez on May 28, Natera and his generals left Durango to 
complete the formation of their new Division. Villa 
returned to Torredn and learned of the new development, but 
neither he nor Angeles believed the meager 7,000 man force 
of Natera's could take Zacatecas, particularily without 
artillery. Confident that only the Division of the North 
was strong enough for the task, they continued reorganizing 
and preparing for what they considered their campaign. (2) 
Soon after Saltillo was turned over to Gonzales Carranza 
began relocating the revolutionary government from 
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Chihuahua. On June 4 he arrived in Torredn where a banquet 
was prepared for him by the generals of Villa's Division. 
Villa chose not to attend the banquet because of self-
doubts concerning his ability to control his anger over 
Carranza's recent scheme. He absented himself from the city 
and left Angeles to represent the Division command. During 
the social function at the Casino de la Laguna, Angeles 
made a speech in which he applied his diplomatic skills to 
deliver a veiled warning to the First Chief. He stated 
that, "we revolutionaries of the Division of the North 
venerated the memory of Madero and were expecting such a 
legal government as Madero had given us3) not one 
like that of Huerta or Diaz. The warning disturbed Carransa 
because he understood the meaning behind the words, and 
noted an implication of loyalty transfer in Angeles' words. 
( 4 ) 
Although Angeles still held the post, of Subsecretary of 
War in Carranza's cabinet, he had experienced the formation 
of a bond that overpowered the fidelity of government 
service. That bond was the comradeship within the Division 
which resulted from shared misery, toil and danger of 
victorious campaigns. The feeling of brotherhood among the 
members of the Division centered on and was sustained by 
the symbol of that union which had evolved into a demanding 
mistress. The Division of the North represented their 
cumulative effort and collective success in becoming the 
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strongest and most formidable military unit in Mexico. The 
record of victories gave its members great pride in being 
an active part of that organisation, and that pride caused 
the development of an almost fanatical loyalty. It was that 
loyalty which Carranza sensed in Angeles' speech and the 
tone served to increase his suspicions of Angeles' 
intentions. (5) 
While Villa and Angeles continued preparing for their 
advance southward along the Central Railroad, Carransa 
returned to his power base in Saltillo and monitored the 
progress of his new Division. Natera began his attacks 
against the 1,800 man garrison of Zacatecas on June 10, but 
the fortified hills around the city were too strongly 
defended to be taken without artillery. Natera would 
launch furious assaults for four days but realised by the 
11th he needed additional troops for victory. On that day 
he requested that Carransa send reinforcements, and it was 
that request, which exploded into a major confrontation. (6) 
While Carransa drafted a telegram to General Villa, 
international commissioners met in Niagra Falls, New York. 
The conferences began in May, with representatives from the 
United States, Argentina, Brasil, Chile, the Mexican 
Federal government and Constitutionalist government, trying 
to mediate the problems in Mexico. While the 
representatives of the two Mexican governments attempted to 
arrange for the American evacuation of Veracrus, other 
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Mexicans and the United States were pressing for a 
coalition government in Mexico that was agreeable to both 
Huerta and Carranza. A list of proposed names for 
Provisional President was presented to the assembly on June 
11 which included that of Felipe Angeles. Although he was a 
member of Carranza's War Department, Angeles was also an 
officer attached to Villa's army, a former federal soldier, 
and trusted by other elements inside and outside of the 
country. United States Secretary of State, William Jennings 
Bryan, urged his representatives to press for the 
acceptance of Angeles because he believed Angeles was able 
to consolidate the factions. The Secretary praised him as, 
"...a man of great intelligence and high character,..." and 
stated that he, "...has the confidence of the army. Would 
possibly be more acceptable to the military men of Mexico 
than anyone else mentioned."(7) 
Villa received a telegram from Carranza on June 11 
requesting his assistance by dispatching reinforcements to 
Natera at Zacatecas, but Villa replied that it would be 
wise to suspend the attack. As one of Villa's major 
advisors, Angeles believed Carranza had made a mistake in 
ordering Natera to attack the city with an inferior force 
and little support. He and Villa knew that Carranza 
dispatched that force without regard for the safety of the 
soldiers merely to hamper the Division's operations, and 
they resisted cooperating with the First Chief. Villa 
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received a second telegram the next day in which the First 
Chief ordered 3,000 troops with two batteries of artillery 
be sent to Natera. Villa reminded Carranza of their 
conference in Torredn where it was agreed that once the 
Saltillo campaign was completed the entire Division would 
move on Zacatecas under his command. He again requested 
that Natera suspend the attack because it would take 
atleast five days before his Division could arrive. (®) 
The next day, June 12, 1914, the two men participated in 
a telegraphic conference, with the First Chief in Saltillo 
and Villa in Torredn. Carranza repeated his order for 
reinforcements, added a demand for immediacy, and directed 
Villa to also sent rifles and ammunition. He then specified 
that either General Jose Isabel Robles or Tomas Urbina, 
whom he considered merely attached to the Division by his 
orders, should command the reinforcements. Villa promptly 
notified him that General Robles was sick and unable to 
command such a force, Urbina was absent from Torredn, and 
the railroad between Torredn and Zacatecas was not 
completely repaired. After presenting points that 
frustrated each of Carranza's demands, Villa asked the 
accusatory question of who was responsible for the error in 
sending those forces when more powerful ones were 
available. He ended the transmission with a refusal to 
place his men under the command of another general and 
surrender credit for victory. The telegraph lines must have 
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hummed in those few minutes because tempers were flaming. 
( 9 ) 
Carranza again ordered Villa to send the reinforcements, 
increasing the number to 5,000 with all of the Division's 
artillery, and stated that the commands of Generals Urbina, 
Contreras and Robles were not part of the Division but 
attached units. At the end of the telegram he refused to 
authorize or consider movement of the entire Division. 
Villa quickly questioned the reasoning behind the refusal 
and Carranza abruptly replied that it was because he 
ordered it. At that point in the confrontation Villa 
decided to wait until the next day to continue while he 
considered the situation and a possible solution. <io> 
When he found the situation unchanged on the morning of 
the 13t.h, Villa notified Carransa that he resigned his 
command of the Division of the North. Following the 
dispatch of his resignation, and while he awaited the First 
Chief's response, Villa sent for his generals. Angeles was 
located and informed, without an explanation, that Villa 
wished to talk to him in the telegraph office. He found 
Villa sitting beside the telegrapher in the crowded office 
and the other generals standing with solemn faces. Angeles 
seated himself beside Villa and waited for an explanation. 
While waiting, he listened to the phrases of disgust and 
heated comments of other generals. After piecing together 
fragments of conversations he surmised that a crisis 
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existed. Most of the generals believed Carransa would 
realise he needed Villa at the head of the Division and a 
compromise would be reached. Upon understanding the 
situation, Angeles declared that Carranza would definitely 
and gladly accept Villa's resignation, and the confident 
tone of his statement caused panic among the officers, (ii) 
Villa knew that Angeles was right in his evaluation of 
the situation and presented the command of the Division to 
Angeles. Carranza's reply soon came over the wire, 
confirming Angeles' declaration and creating havoc among 
the generals. The message instructed the generals to choose 
a temporary commander from among themselves to.serve until 
a permanent one could be appointed. Angeles was positive 
the new commander would ;be the First Chief's brother, 
General Jesus Carransa, and perceived that move as the end 
of the Division as an independent fighting unit. If he was 
right, the Division would soon be under Carranza's total 
control unless something was done. The other generals, 
motivated by fear of dissolution of the Division, suggested 
drastic actions to force Carransa to repeal his orders and 
deny Villa's resignation. One of the more irate was General 
Maclovio Herrera who ordered the telegrapher at gun point 
to send a message calling Carransa a son-of-a-bitch. <12) 
Angeles also felt apprehension and regret but stressed 
the importance of self-control and moderation; but his 
pleadings failed to calm the generals. At that point, he 
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asked them if they preferred to march against Saltillo and 
Carranza or against the huertistas at Zacatecas. Such a 
question, in that moment of heated emotional turmoil, was 
gambling with the future of Mexico, the integrity of the 
Division and the honor its members. If the answer was to 
strike at Saltillo the nation would be plunged into a civil 
war within a revolution, and that situation would certainly 
label the generals of the Division as reactionaries 
determined to sabotage the cause of the Revolution. (13) 
The blatant statement of their mental dilema caused the 
generals to hesitate and reflect long enough to allow 
tempers to cool down. Angeles knew every general in the 
Division and was aware they had allowed their emotions to 
block out reasoning. The prospect of assaulting their own 
government and its leader suddenly appeared radical, and 
the generals settled into a confused state of doubt. The 
atmosphere of bewilderment convinced Angeles that everyone 
needed time to reflect, examine their alternatives, and 
determine the consequences of each possible course of 
action. ( 14) 
By the time Angeles asked the critical question in the 
telegraph office Natera's forces had suspended their 
attacks on Zacatecas; thus, the critical question was no 
longer reinforcing another Division but loyalty and 
obedience. The controlling factors of that question were: 
to whom were they loyal and what guiding principle would 
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they obey. The generals asked Carranza to reflect on the 
consequences of his actions and optimistically requested 
him to revoke the acceptance of Villa's resignation; but 
their hopes were dashed when the First Chief refused the 
request. He persisted in his demand that they immediately 
choose a replacement for Villa and send the reinforcements 
as ordered. That continued stubborness only served to 
infuriate and further confuse the officers. Ignoring the 
demand for immediacy, Angeles arranged a meeting for the 
next morning to allow them to examine their feelings and 
desires. (i5) 
While the telegraph wires bussed between Saltillo and 
Torreon, the situation in Sonora deteriorated. General 
Plutarco Elias Calles, the military commander of the State, 
and Governor Jose Maria Maytorena gathered soldiers to 
forcefully remove the other from power. Because Calles was 
backed by the resources of the Division of the Northwest, 
Governor Maytorena solicited Villa's help. The request 
arrived a couple of days before the telegraphic 
confrontation and Villa forwarded it to Carransa for 
action, and the First Chief probably delegated the matter 
to Obregon because Sonora was in his area of operational 
responsibility. General Salvador Alvarado was sent to 
resolve the problems but he was not the disinterested party 
needed in Sonora. Instead, he was a close associate of 
Obregon's and one of the generals responsible for Angeles' 
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demotion from Minister of War, and that affiliation placed 
him in opposition to Maytorena. When Alvarado arrived in 
Hermosillo, Calles' forces had Maytorena's troops 
surrounded and under seige. Although Alvarado ended the 
seige, the Sonoran conflict would continue to inflame and 
disrupt the course of the revolution, pulling Angeles into 
the melee. (16 > 
As Angeles considered the grave situation and their 
limited alternatives, he examined the causes. He viewed the 
line of the Central Railroad, which extended through 
Torredn, Zacatecas, and Aguascalientes, as the natural line 
of operation for the Division of the North. That conclusion 
was based on his comprehensive perspective of the strategy 
for victory over General Huerta. With Obregon's army moving 
down the western railroad from Hermosillo through 
Guadalajara, and Gonsales's forces pressing from Saltillo 
through San Luis Potosi, the logical route for the Division 
was in the center. To Angeles it was simple logic, three 
routes and three armies uniting for the entrance into 
Mexico City. <17) 
If that strategy was followed and properly coordinated, 
victory over Huerta would have been assured; but logic and 
reason were corrupted by political manipulation of armies 
and the desires of Venustiano Carransa to direct military 
operations personally. Carransa had deliberately demeaned 
the Division's victories and attempted to force his will on 
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their operations. The only unit he failed to control was 
the Division of the North, and that independence of 
operation resulted in glorious victories that severely 
injured the enemy's ability to fight. While the Division 
stormed enemy garrisons and planned operations directed at 
their strongest points, other units floundered or stalled 
in a sea of political dictates. (18) 
Angeles perceived the inability of other units to 
advance rapidly along their natural line of operation as a 
result of the disregard for a "fundamental principle of the 
art of war"(19) and their dependence on Carranza's 
authority. In his opinion, using all available forces with 
the primary objective of defeating the enemy was elemental 
because of the historical lessons concerning that 
principle. It was obvious to him that a commander never had 
too many forces, only too few; and dividing those forces 
reduced the ability to deliver a crushing defeat, as one 
would "flatten a mosquito",<20> thus prolonging the war. He 
had personally experienced the corruption of military 
principles through political intrigues in Sonora and viewed 
the formation of the new Division as a similar tactic. (21) 
He also believed Carranza intentionally disregarded the 
fact that a splendidly equipped and fully manned division 
was available when he sent that inferior force to attack 
Zacatecas. He knew they would have to be reinforced and 
that situation gave him the needed justification to weaken 
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the operational ability of the Division, and prevent its 
advance toward the heart of Mexico. The one factor Carransa 
did not consider in his planning of the intrigue was the 
cohesion of the component units and commanders of the 
Division. By .June 1914, the Division of the North was no 
longer merely a collection of soldiers, equipment and 
supplies but a living entity that demanded loyalty to 
s u r v i v e .  ( 2 2 )  
Angeles perceived his duty in the context of a grander 
scheme, above the immediate circumstances, and arrived at 
his conclusion through logical analysis of the facts, as he 
knew them. If the generals obeyed Carransa's orders the 
Division would no longer operate independently. Angeles 
assumed that he would be named temporary commander of the 
Division and doubted if he could obey those orders, knowing 
they fluctuated with the political atmosphere and power 
struggles. Then Carransa's brother would take command and 
they would no longer have the aggressiveness and leadership 
that Villa contributed, and the spirit and strength of the 
Division would be destroyed. With the weakening of the 
enemy's greatest threat, Huerta's forces would fight with 
new vigor and assurance, thus prolonging the revolution. 
That delay of victory would cause more bloodshed and 
postpone the return of a lawful government. To prevent that 
from occurring, Angeles concluded that the generals had 
only one choice which was to disobey Carransa's orders. He 
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perceived it as an act necessary to the cause of the 
revolution arid humane principles by which he tried to live. 
(  2 3  )  
Insubordination to superiors was an act of dishonor to a 
professional soldier. His duty was based on obedience of 
orders and that duty dictated the degree of military honor. 
General Angeles had lived with that code of conduct for 31 
years of his life and adhered to those principles until 
logic told him they were wrong. He had previously 
challenged superior authorities in the army, because of 
principles he believed superceded his duty to remain quiet, 
and suffered the consequences of those breaches of 
discipline. Those instances were examples of the conflict 
between his belief in the military code and his personal 
ethics. So, Angeles was not a stranger to abiding by his 
pri n c i p l e s  a n d  s u f f e r i n g  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s .  ( 2 4 )  
On June 14, the generals of the Division assembled and 
concurred with Angeles' analysis of the situation and 
conclusions. After agreeing that they must perform the 
distasteful act of insubordination a telegram was drafted 
that firmly and moderately stated their position and 
decision. They again asked Carransa to revoke Villa's 
resignation and ended with the declaration that the 
Division was immediately moving south under the command of 
General Villa. Expecting no reply, they turned their 
attention to Villa and convinced him that it was his duty 
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to the Revolution and Mexican people to continue as 
commander. It is doubtful if Villa resisted for long or 
offered any rebutals to the declarations, because he 
regretted the hasty act that was submitted in a moment of 
emotional outrage in response to Carransa's unreasonable 
stubbornness. (25) 
Carranza refused to accept the fact that all the 
generals were willing to disobey his orders and believed 
Angeles used his position in the War Department to force 
their agreement. Because of Angeles' higher position in the 
command structure, Carransa held him personally responsible 
for their actions. To assure himself of their determination 
to challenge his authority, he repeated the .orders and 
reiterated his refusal to allow Villa to command the 
Division. Upon receipt of the telegram, Angeles speculated 
as to what would convince the First Chief of their 
determination. (26) 
On June 15, he sent a personally drafted telegram to the 
First chief explaining their actions and intentions. 
Angeles frankly stated in undiplomatic and accusatory 
language that Carransa's intentions were known. He referred 
to the "malignant resolution" to remove Villa from command 
and the "principle of obedience, to a Chief who defrauds the 
hopes of the people". He further accused Carransa of having 
a "dictatorial attitude", creating "disunion in the 
States", and ineptness in foreign relations. He concluded 
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by accusing the First Chief of desiring blind loyalty and 
obedience, and stated that the decision of the entire 
Division of the North to march on Zacatecas was "final". 
(  2 7  )  
General Francisco Villa was back in command with renewed 
faith in his generals and the future of the Division of the 
North. He knew, as the others did, that the Division would 
survive because of the determination and loyalty of the 
leaders and men. Villa complied with Angeles' declaration 
that the advance south would be started immediately by 
sending Urbina toward Zacatecas with two brigades the next 
day. Angeles followed on June 17t.h with five trains of 
artillery and joined Urbina north of Zacatecas. The two 
generals were charged with planning and preparing for the 
attack on the federal stronghold, evidently with Angeles in 
charge of the overall strategy and Urbina directing the 
tactical problems and placements of troops. (28) 
Angeles directed the offloading of his artillery at 
Calera station, 15 miles northwest of Zacatecas, and 
ordered the corps to remain in camp. Meanwhile he left in 
his automobile with an escort of thirty men, provided by 
General Manuel Chao, to scout the area around the village 
of Morelos. When they entered the village federal cavalry 
rushed them from the nearby hills and forced them back to 
San Vicente, where they repulsed the attacks and withdrew 
to the safety of Calera. After joining Urbina in 
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dispatching the brigades commanded by Generals Maclovio 
Herrera and Manuel Chao south to San Antonio and 
Cieneguillo, Angeles prepared to return to Morelos. (29) 
With the assistance of General Trinidad Rodriguez and 
his brigade, Angeles again entered the village. While the 
troops cleared the hills of federal soldiers, he inspected 
the surrounding countryside from a nearby hill. He was 
satisfied with the area as a preliminary location for the 
artillery and brought 36 cannons from Calera. The next 
morning he entered the abandoned mining village of Veta 
Grande with General Natera acting as his guide. From the 
summit of a hill south of town, he looked down the arroyos 
and valley that turned and twisted southward. Four miles 
away was Zacatecas and to either side were the huge 
fortified hills of La Bufa and El Grille. Down the valley 
and on top of the high hills were 14-15,000 federal troops 
waiting for the attack. On the hills of El Grillo and La 
Bufa were eleven cannons and an additional one mounted on 
an armored railroad car between the railroad station and 
the town of Guadalupe. As he surveyed the terrain and 
defenses, Angeles must have noted that the federal guns on 
the hills were positioned on the extreme summits exposing 
the m  t o  t h e  f i r e  o f  h i s  c a n n o n s .  ( 3 0 )  
Angeles saw the ruins of buildings in an adjacent valley 
to his left that was the La Plata mine. After comparing the 
terrain with a map and analysing the geography in relation 
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to the use of artillery and movement of troops, he 
concluded that the area was the key to the coming battle. 
The mine was in a secluded location at the base of a hill, 
hidden from both Magistral and Loreto hills which were 
south of Veta Grande. There were three hills near the mine 
which could be used for artillery positions, with inclines 
facing six directions. After the area was cleared of 
federals Natera walked the area with Angeles who decided to 
bring the artillery to the secondary area, (31) 
At Morelos, he ordered Major Gustavo Bazan to move two 
groups of artillery to the mine area, but told him to wait 
until after dark to position them. As a consequence, the 
federals did not know their locations. Angeles and Urbina 
met with Natera and his generals in the afternoon and sent 
them south of Zacatecas in the area of Guadalupe. Before 
leaving for a reconnaissance of the southern areas, Angeles 
advised Urbina that his two brigades would be placed in the 
Veta Grande area in the coming battle and then dispatched a 
brigade and a regiment to Veta Grande to protect his 
artillery. (32) 
Angeles met with Herrera and Chao in the town of San 
Antonio, southwest of Zacatecas, to fulfill his promise to 
scout the area for proper gun emplacements. He chose a hill 
near the town as the most advantageous location and 
searched for exact positions. As he methodically chose each 
one, Angeles explained to Herrera the importance of 
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artillery, "...where the cannon thunders, the enemy hides 
and our infantry advances, and when the enemy ventures to 
stick their heads up, then they have our infantry on top of 
them and they hurriedly abandon the position. "(33> That was 
one of the guiding principles Angeles used in his planning 
of the Zacatecas battle. He was determined to perfect the 
technique of coordinated artillery fire and infantry 
assaults which he and Villa began at Torreon. After 
returning to Veta Grande, he sent ten guns under the 
command of Major Carrillo to the San Antonio area to 
support the attacks and prevent the federals from 
ret r e a t i n g  i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n .  ( 3 4 )  
On the morning Of June 21, Angeles took his regular 
morning bath which hot only refreshed him but served to 
establish the routine of the day. He firmly believed in 
Napoleon's Maxim #82, which stated that "The actions of a 
great general results from planning and genius, not chance 
or destiny."(3s) In order to obtain that great action, he 
had to be alert and prepared to think clearly. After all 
the controversy over the Zacatecas campaign and the dilemma 
that preceded the distasteful act of insubordination, 
Angeles was not going to depend on chance. Recalling the 
tactical lessons taught in the French military schools, he 
must have examined the three requirements: preparation, 
mass and impulsion. If he planned and prepared thoroughly, 
utilized every available soldier, and struck with force, 
93 
Zacatecas would fall and the disobedience would be 
justified. (36) 
He found the gunners of his 28 cannons at Veta Grande 
waiting for the signal to return the federal artillery 
fire. Although the batteries were suffering under the 
shelling from La Bufa and El Grillo, Angeles ordered them 
to hold their fire and conserve shells. He was not going to 
place himself in the situation that occurred at San Pedro 
when they exausted their shells and the battle had to be 
delayed. He had ordered a reserve supply of artillery 
shells but they had not arrived, and he would not again 
wager a battle on a timely delivery. While the guns 
remained silent, he was informed that the brakes on some of 
them were defective. Without brakes to keep the guns 
relatively stationary during firing the recoil would move 
the cannons with each shot and reduce their effectiveness. 
To assure accuracy and prevent gunners from being crushed 
by their own guns, Angeles sent for his artillery mechanic 
who was in San Antonio. (3?) 
Although the problem of cannon brakes demanded immediate 
action and could be quickly resolved, another problem 
presented itself that was unsolvable. Angeles received a 
telegram from Carranza removing him from the post of 
Subsecretary of War in the Constitutionalist government. 
The removal was based on Carranza's loss of confidence in 
Angeles and his disobedience at Torreon. Thus, Angeles took 
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the blame and suffered the consequences for all the 
generals of the Division in refusing to obey Carransars 
orders. The news was disheartening but probably not 
unexpected. He had examined the possible consequences and 
decided on his priorities. His priority at the moment was 
the battle and he turned his attention to it. (38) 
By the next day the artillery brakes were being repaired 
and his older brother, Major Eduardo Angeles, established a 
first aid station near the gun emplacements. While Angeles 
inspected the gun positions near the mines, General Villa 
arrived. Angeles had been waiting for three things before 
starting the battle: first, the arrival of Villa who would 
lead the Division; second, the rest of the brigades; and 
finally, his reserve ammunition from Torreon. All three 
arrived on the 22nd, and the final phases of preparation 
could be made. He walked the area with Villa, explaining 
his arrangements and plans for the battle. Like his plans 
for the battle at Paredon, they were arranged in orderly 
phases of combat. The key to the capture of the city were 
the dual mountains, El Grillo and La Bufa, that dominated 
the valley; but before they could be captured secondary 
objectives had to be taken. One of the first hills 
scheduled for attack was La Sierpe on the east side of the 
valley, because it was higher in elevation than El Grillo 
and would give his artillery dominance. In addition, they 
must capture El Loreto and Magistral hills on the west side 
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of the valley, and Los Padres hill and the railroad station 
to the south of the city. Once those secondary positions 
were secured, attacks could be launched on the two main 
mountains and then against the city of Zacatecas. (39) 
While he pointed out enemy positions and the planned 
direction of attacks, Angeles noticed the old mine shafts 
of La Plata. His artillerymen were still suffering under 
federal artillery fire and he saw the shafts as places of 
safety until the battle began. The guns were placed inside 
the shafts which not only sheltered them from the shells 
but hid them from view. The two generals continued their 
examination of positions and terrain into the early part of 
the night, making final adjustments to troop dispositions. 
The combination of Angeles and Villa exemplified the 
perfect military partnership. Angeles was the organiser, 
planner and task master, while Villa provided the heroic 
flair, energetic leadership and desire to lead the men into 
combat. They were ready to prove that the partnership was 
bet t e r  t h a n  b e f o r e  a n d  a  fo r m i d a b l e  f o r c e .  ( 4 0 )  
On the morning of June 23, Angeles sent messengers to 
the various commanders concerning their assignments and 
informed them that the assaults would begin at exactly 
10:00 a.m. He then went to La Plata mine, ordered the 
artillery out of their hiding places, and positioned them 
to cover the troops. At the designated time, 23,000 troops 
advanced toward their first objectives under artillery 
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fire. Villa led 5,000 in simultaneous assaults on Magistral 
hill and the west side of Loreto hill, while Colonel Raul 
Madero assaulted Loreto on the east side with 1,500. On the 
other side of the valley, Urbina led an assault on Sierpe 
hill from the north with 3,500, as Colonel Martiniano 
Servin commanded 2,500 from the west on the same hill. 
Meanwhile in the south, Natera charged El Refugio hill and 
the west side of Los Padres hill with his 5,000 men; 
Maclovio Herrera directed 3,000 against the railroad 
station and the east side of Los Padres hill; and Domingo 
Arrieta commanded 2,000 men in taking Guadalupe and pushing 
toward La Bufa. (41) . 
While Colonel Carrillo directed his ten guns, situated 
on the hill above San Antonio, in the support of the three 
advances in the south, Angeles supervised the artillery 
support on the north. The terrain in the area of the La 
Plata mine, which he had chosen for the guns, allowed the 
artillery to support all major attacks on the three primary 
mountains. With seven guns in each of four positions, he 
directed the bombardment of enemy positions on Sierpe, 
Loreto and Magistral hills at the same time, while troops 
crossed the open ground from their assembly point to the 
vicinity of attack. Meanwhile, El Nifio sat on its platform 
beyond Pimiento Station and fired on El Grille. (42) 
The shells from Angeles' guns blasted the ground in 
front of the attacking troops and diverted federal 
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artillery fire away from them. Both armies used schrapnel 
shells which exploded in the air, raining bullets down on 
the soldiers, gunners and crew. Angeles' used that type of 
shell in a concentrated barrage on Loreto hill, and within 
thirty minutes it was captured by Villa and Madero's 
troops. When he saw the flag raised on the summit, Angeles 
immediately went to search for new gun positions to better 
support the continuing attack on Sierpe hill and bombard La 
Bufa. (43) 
As he and Villa rode up the side of Loreto hill, federal 
soldiers hidden in buildings of the old Loreto mine fired 
on them. Although they were in personal danger, both were 
more concerned with giving support to Servin's attack on 
Sierpe, which was faltering under heavy fire, than their 
own health. Angeles immediately ordered the artillery moved 
up but it was half a hour before the first gun arrived. In 
the meantime, he and Villa supervised rifle and machine gun 
fire across the valley to prevent the federals from 
mounting a counterattack against Servin. (44) 
As each artillery piece arrived on Loreto Angeles 
immediately put it into action against Sierpe, and within 
fifteen minutes the federals were evacuating their 
positions. With Sierpe secured Angeles turned his attention 
to the south and El Grillo. Near the summit, where he 
needed to place cannons, he encountered a combination of 
small arms fire from federals and shelling from the guns on 
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El Grillo and La Bufa. He collected some infantrymen who 
were left behind and ordered them to clear the federal 
troops off the hill. Once that was done, his guns began 
answering the federal fire. (45) 
While the soldiers and artillery conquered Loreto and 
Sierpe hills, the forces to the south strugged for their 
objectives under direct artillery fire from both La Bufa 
and El Grillo. To take pressure off the southern advance 
and press against the main hills, Angeles moved all of the 
artillery from the Veta Grande area and divided the 
batteries. From positions on Sierpe hill they supported 
Urbina's assault on La Bufa, and from Loreto they covered 
Villa's attack on El Grillo. Five hours after the attacks 
began, Los Padres and El Refugio hills were taken in the 
south, and assaults were launched on El Grillo and La Bufa 
in the north. After two more hours of fighting, the 
federals were abandoning El Grillo and La Bufa, Natera and 
Herrera's forces entered the southern outskirts of the 
city, and Angeles' guns bombarded the city of Zacatecas. 
(  4 6  )  
Eight hours after the battle began the federals started 
evacuating the city. First, they moved eastward toward 
Guadalupe but were turned by Carrillo's artillery fire and 
the forces of Domingo Arrieta. After seeing that route 
blocked, they turned westward in an attempt to reach the 
town of Jeres but were driven back by Natera's troops. In 
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desperation they turned north hoping to escape through the 
area of Veta Grande; but as they moved up the valley, 
Angeles' guns shelled them. Trapped between the forces of 
Urbina and Villa in the north, and Natera and Arrieta 
coming from the south, they scattered into a disorganized 
mob. Most of them again turned south and east toward 
Guadalupe with the hope of breaking out toward 
Aguascalientes; but they stumbled onto 7,000 troops that 
Angeles had posted along the road to prevent reinforcements 
from reaching Zacatecas from Aguascalientes. The murderous 
fire on the Guadalupe road ended the battle of Zacatecas 
and almost totally annihilated the federal defenders. (47) 
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CHAPTER V 
GENERAL OF THE ARMY 
Suddenly the artillery pieces were quiet. Federal 
cannons no longer thundered from atop El Grillo and La Bufa 
hills, and the rattle of rifle fire was far away. When 
silence filled the valley, Angeles did not want to hurry 
off his mountain and rush into Zacatecas to taste the 
victory. Instead, he needed to prolong the solitude and 
relish the stillness. For him the challenge was over 
because it was in the planning, not in taking the city. He 
had taken a force of revolutionary soldiers and some 
cannons, arranged them in a certain manner, and totally 
defeated the fortress city. He walked down from Sierpe hill 
and across the flat with Major Federico Cervantes, Enrique 
del Valle, and his brother, Eduardo Angeles. (i> 
They arrived at the wall of a dam and sat in silence. 
Angeles was disturbed and needed the diversion because in 
the last few minutes of the battle, as he watched the mass 
of troops blundering about in the valley and being shot 
down, he realised the awful success of his plans. He 
designed them with skill, considering every aspect, and 
formulated them with the intention of a swift and complete 
victory; but the fearful flight of the federal troops and 
103 
104 
their suicidal rushes into the waiting guns was etched in 
his memory. His plans did not include nor had he 
anticipated what happened. He assumed the garrison 
commander would surrender once the officer realized defeat 
was imminent. (2) 
To distract his thoughts and block out the sounds of 
distant gunfire, he and his companions spoke of world 
happiness. They visualized an ideal time when there would 
be no war and people could live in peace. Angeles probably 
touched on the subject that had caused his need for 
tranquillity, his universal love of mankind. As he said 
later, "This is my failing: to love all Mexicans, and 
further more, to love all of humanity, even down to the 
animals, because at times we are ourselves worse than 
they."<3> That day he had witnessed mankind's savagery in 
its extremes: human bodies torn apart by artillery shells, 
men crazed with anger and fear killing other men without 
hesitation, and honorable soldiers blissfully slaughtering 
frightened and broken men. (4> 
They sat on the wall of the dam exchanging personal 
philosophical beliefs and expressing their hopes for an 
ideal life until an evening breeze blew down the canyon. 
Although the breeze refreshed them after the heat of 
battle, it also carried the stench of a dead horse that lay 
nearby. Angeles stood facing south, knowing the moments of 
solitude were over. Down the valley was Zacatecas and the 
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final part of the battle that he dreaded, entering the 
defeated city and seeing the death and destruction. He 
decided to delay that moment by spending the night at Veta 
Grande and face the unhappy experience in the morning. (5) 
As he lay in bed that night, Angeles was able to push 
aside the humanitarianism in him and allow the soldier to 
emerge. He could not resist admiring the precision with 
which the battle was fought, the perfect coordination of 
artillery and infantry acting in unison to capture 
objectives in well defined and logical phases. He 
considered it the perfect effeciency that he and Villa had 
strived for since the capture of Torreon. The Division of 
the North was finally at the height of its fighting 
capacity. As he mentally reviewed the battle phase by 
phase, searching for errors, visions of the wounded and 
dead returned. He was saddened by the memory of wounded 
soldiers who continued to fight and those who pleaded for 
death to take them. Before falling asleep he recalled with 
admiration the reluctant charge of the soldiers on Loreto 
hill against the barricaded federals, which he considered, 
"the heroic effort of the feeble spirits to march stooped 
a g a i n s t  t h e  t e m p e s t  o f  d e a t h 6 )  
On the morning of June 24, Angeles entered Zacatecas 
with his staff. With the influx of thousands of victorious 
soldiers no quarters were available in the city, so they 
turned east toward Guadalupe. It was there that Angeles saw 
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what he had visualized the day before from his position on 
Sierpe hill. Corpses of men and horses were scattered for 
four and one half miles on and beside the road. None of 
them had rifles or side arms and most were stripped of 
their boots, hats and even outer clothing. <7> 
Walking among the bodies, he was reminded that most of 
those dead soldiers had not voluntarily fought for the 
government of General Huerta. He knew the federal army was 
having trouble getting new recruits, and had resorted to 
forcibly drafting men into the ranks. If those men had been 
given a choice, they too may have been in the ranks of the 
revolutionaries. Looking at the still bodies, he concluded 
that most of them.probably were friends of his:in a common 
cause because they too wanted peace and a government based 
on freedom without the injustices. Although he knew his 
duty was to make every effort to defeat the enemy, it 
bothered him when the enemy was a fellow Mexican and a 
fraternal brother. <8) 
Looking over the sea of mangled corpses, he saw the 
results of his military efficiency, the outcome of his 
battle plans to prevent the federal escape to safety. He 
and Urbina agreed that the federals would attempt an escape 
by the Guadalupe road and considered that in their 
placement of troops. Preventing their escape to join other 
federal garrisons in the area was a strategic necessity for 
victory and it succeeded. Of the soldiers in the Zacatecas 
107 
garrison only 2,000 escaped, leaving behind over 5,000 
dead, 2,500 wounded and 5,500 captured. He had planned the 
battle but not the slaughter on the Guadalupe road nor the 
mass executions in the city. His plans which were conceived 
with logic and reason became a contest ruled by emotions. 
Terror and panic had gripped the federals, causing them to 
react erratically. That irrational behavior placed them at 
the mercy of men controlled by revenge and the emotional 
rush of battle. (9> 
Allowing three days for the news of the defeat at 
Zacatecas to reach other federal garrisons, Angeles led 
seven brigades of cavalry southward. Seventy-five miles 
south of Zacatecas, they passed a railroad junction where a 
rail line entered from the east. Commanding that 
intersection meant control over traffic coming from 
Tampico, Saltillo and San Luis Potosi. Ten miles farther 
south, Angeles led his troops into Aguascalientes which had 
been evacuated by the federals. After a tremendous victory 
at Zacatecas and the capture of Aguascalientes, the obvious 
move was to continue southward but it was impossible. (io> 
Soon after the confrontation with General Villa and the 
resulting disobedience of the generals, Carranza took steps 
to punish and hamper the Division of the North. He stopped 
their coal supplies from the Monclova area and the arms and 
munitions coming through Tampico. Both supply points were 
occupied by Gonzalez's army, thus under Carranza's 
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control. In addition, the First Chief instructed his agents 
in the United States to make every effort to stop the flow 
of supplies across the border to Villa's army. After the 
fierce battle at Zacatecas the Division was low on 
munitions and supplies but the critical shortage was coal 
for their trains to transport the army. Without the means 
to move or the ability to fight, their victorious push 
southward was stopped at Aguascalientes. (ID 
Without the means to advance southward, the Division 
returned to its base of operations at Torreon where the 
generals busied themselves with reforming^ refitting and 
waiting for enough supplies to begin another campaign. In 
an attempt to mend their bad relations with Carranza, the 
generals dispatched delegates from their ranks to Saltillo 
with a group apology while Villa attempted to arrange a 
conference between the two factions. While efforts were 
being made to prevent relations from worsening Angeles 
adapted to his new status in the Constitutionalist army. 
(  1 2  )  
When he was an officer attached to the Division and 
filling the post of artillery commander, Angeles operated 
with a minimum of staff personnel. By June 1914 he still 
had only five men on his staff: Major Federico Cervantes, 
Major Jose Heron GonsAles, Major Eduardo Angeles, Major 
Gustavo Bazan and Captain Espinosa de los Monteros. After 
his removal from the post of Subsecretary of War he was 
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incorporated into the Division as a general and the new 
position demanded more responsibilities. To fulfill those 
additional duties, he increased his staff by ten men. He 
was then given a railroad passenger car to serve as his 
headquarters which he altered to suit his method of 
operation and Spartan taste, and appropriately named it 
Zacatecas. While Angeles put order back into his life Villa 
completed arrangements for a conference at Torredn. (13) 
During the second week of July 1914, three 
representatives of the Division of the North met with the 
same number of delegates from the Division of the Northeast 
in Torredn. In the course of four days, they discussed and 
debated proposasls that would hopefully mend the fracture 
of the revolutionary union. The major provisions of the 
resulting pact were: General Villa would retain his command 
of the Division of the North; the structure of the 
government, to be implemented at the end of the revolution, 
would be subject to the influence of a convention of 
revolutionary generals; and Carranza was expected to 
resolve the continuing conflicts in Sonora. There were 
rumors of a secret provision that Angeles was to command 
the entire Constitutionalist army, but if that provision 
truly existed it was either rejected by the carrancistas or 
negated by later events. (n> 
One week after the Torreon Conference ended, President 
Victoriano Huerta resigned his office and fled the country. 
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Before the conferences were held, dissentions in the 
revolutionary ranks appeared to be destroying the movement 
and offered Huerta hope of victory; but the pact signed at 
Torreon presented the appearance of reunion. That 
appearance of reconciliation may have contributed to 
Huerta's decision to leave. Although the abdication sounded 
the triumph of the revolution and removed the basis for the 
federal army to continue fighting, it also produced new 
reasons for dissention in the Constitutionalist ranks. (15) 
Francisco Juan Carbajal was left in the capital with the 
title of Provisional President and the undesirable 
responsibility of surrendering the government to the 
revolutionaries. His primary concern was to prevent 
retributions against federal soldiers and people who had 
supported Huerta. He requested terms of surrender from 
Carranza but when the answer was unconditional surrender of 
the capital, Carbajal searched for another option. Being 
aware of the bad relations between Carranza and Villa, he 
contacted the general asking for reasonable terms for 
surrender of the capital. Although Villa also demanded 
unconditional surrender and Carbajal subsequently 
surrendered to Carranza, the fact that he privately 
negotiated with Villa angered Carranza and increased his 
suspicions of Villa. As surrender negotiations continued 
the federal army began to realize the futility of 
resistance, (is) 
Ill 
Federal garrisons began capitulating in the West, 
allowing Obregdn's army to advance more rapidly. Mazatlan, 
which had resisted the attacks of the Army of the Northwest 
for over six months, surrendered four days after Huerta's 
resignation; Colima fell soon after, as the army moved 
against Manzanillo; and the garrison at Guaymas, that had 
endured a long siege, abandoned the city to reinforce the 
federals at Mansanillo. After long months of delays 
Obregdn's army gained momentum and by the end of July 
occupied both Guadalajara and Manzanillo. As his army 
turned eastward from Guadalajara, Gonzales's forces pushed 
south from San Luis Potosi toward Queretaro. Thus, the two 
armies were swiftly moving down what Angeles refered to as 
their "natural line of operations".(17> But there was one 
element missing from Angeles' concept of the convergence of 
armies, the Division of the North. Carranza had effectively 
isolated it from the grand entry into the capital. (18) 
By turning south from San Luis Potosf and passing 
through Queretaro, Gonzales was the first to arrive on the 
outskirts of Mexico City. But as his army entered the 
suburbs, Gonzales realised that not all of the factions 
under the Constitutionalist banner were pleased with the 
turn of events. General Emiliano Zapata's troops, who 
entered the city from the south, resisted Gons&les's 
approach but retreated after a few skirmishes. The retreat 
did not signal Zapata's acceptance of Carranza as leader of 
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the country but represented a temporary lull in his 
continuing resistance. (19) 
Emiliano Zapata was not alone in his displeasure. 
Governor Maytorena, who had been struggling for a year to 
regain his power in Sonora, saw no resolution to the 
problems under Carranza. General Alvarado failed to quiet 
the controversy and beseiged Guaymas with his troops. When 
Maytorena arrested Alvarado and some of his soldiers it 
sparked another confrontation with Calles, resulting in a 
battle near Santa Ana on August 16. Maytorena believed 
himself to be in a desperate situation and responded by 
threatening to start a revolution against Carranza with 
Villa as his ally. While whispers of rebellion spread 
across the North, loud rumblings of discontent radiated 
through the capital. Federal army officers were displeased 
with the proposed disbanding of the army and rumors 
circulated that they may form a union with General Villa 
to force the acceptance of their candidate for President, 
whi c h  w a s  F e l i p e  A n g e l e s .  ( 2 0 )  
After the conferences at Torre<5n, Villa convened a 
personal convention of generals in Ciudad Juarez and 
established alliances with other factions, among them was 
Governor Maytorena. When the Governor found himself again 
battling Calles' forces, Villa sent 2,000 cavalry troops 
from Chihuahua to reinforce Maytorena and uphold their 
pact. While Maytorena occupied the border town of Nogales, 
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the Division of the North moved south. Coal and other 
supplies were restored after the Torreon Conference giving 
t h e m  m o b i l i t y  a n d  f i g h t i n g  c a p a b i l i t y .  ( 2 1 )  
Villa and Obregon met with Maytorena during the last 
part of August and concluded an agreement they thought 
would solve the problems. Maytorena agreed to serve as 
military governor under Obregon in exchange for the 
replacement of Calles with General Benjamin Hill; but Hill 
was a close associate of Obregdn's and possessed intentions 
similar to Calles. When the fighting continued Villa and 
Obregon agreed to send General Juan G. Cabral to assume 
command of both armies in Sonora. Meanwhile, Angeles went 
to Sonora on September 6, probably to assess the situation 
and attempt to restrain Hill's operations. After conferring 
with his friend, Maytorena, Angeles may have traveled to 
Baja California to arrange other alliances. (22) 
The Territory of Baja California had.remained an obscure 
sideshow of the Revolution and was out of the mainstream of 
the movement of armies. Obregdn sent a few small military 
units and some civilian administrators across the Gulf of 
California as his army pushed south along the coast but the 
peninsula remained outside of Constitutionalist control. In 
the summer of 1914, federal officers stationed on the 
peninsula saw that Huerta's government was losing and began 
forming alliances with followers of Maytorena and Villa. 
Control of the peninsula would have extended Villa and 
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Maytorena's control of the northern area and given them 
more border area with the United States for supply 
purposes. Angeles was probably chosen for the mission to 
Baja because of his diplomatic abilities and the fact that 
he was a former federal officer who could establish a 
rapport with the federals and conduct preliminary talks. 
(  2 3  )  
While Angeles was absent from Chihuahua, representatives 
of the revolutionary forces held conferences concerning 
leadership of the new government. Villa proposed to his 
representatives that Angeles be considered for the office 
of President but the proposal was dismissed as unrealistic. 
Some revolutionaries still considered him a federal officer 
and he had bitter enemies within the army, particularily 
General Obregon who would surely oppose the nomination. 
(  2 4  )  
By September 11 conferences were also being held on the 
peninsula between federal Colonel Esteban Cantu and Major 
Baltasar Aviles of the Division of the North. Those talks 
resulted in a pact uniting the forces of Mexicali, 
Ensenada, Tijuana and Tecate with the Division of the North 
and Maytorena's army. On the same day, Angeles was back in 
Sonora where he found Hill attacking Maytorena's forces at 
Nogales. By September 20, two military units left Chihuahua 
for Sonora: one, composed of 5,000 troops under the command 
of General Juan G. Cabral; and another 4,000 cavalrymen 
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commanded by Angeles. Both forces arrived in Sonora within 
three days but General Angeles was ordered to return 
immediately to Chihuahua with his forces. The reason for 
the hasty recall was a fight that occurred between 
villistas and carransistas when Carranza tried to close the 
railroad between Zacatecas and Aguascalientes. The 
attempted closure was to prevent Villa from moving closer 
to the capital and possibly influencing the Convention of 
Generals scheduled to meet on October 1. but only worsened 
t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  ( 2 5 )  
As Angeles turned eastward, Maytorena refused to 
surrender command of his army to Cabral and moved toward 
Cananea. The next day, Villa officially broke relations 
with Carranza and urged the acceptance of Fernando Iglesias 
Calderon as Provisional President. Carranza refused to 
surrender his position, insisting on allowing the 
Convention of Generals decide. As relations deteriorated 
the main body of the Division of the North moved closer to 
Zacatecas but without one of its most faithful generals, 
Maclovio Herrera. He had served beside Francisco Villa 
since April 1912 and fought in all of the Division's 
battles; but in September he joined his brother, Luis, and 
went to serve in Carranza's army. He would later face 
General Angeles in battles in the Northeast. (26) 
Sporadic fighting between villista and carrancista 
troops occurred in various locations as the tension 
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increased. Within two days of his return from Sonora, 
Angeles left Chihuahua City with 20 cannons to join the 
four brigades in Torreon. The move to strengthen Torreon 
was a reaction to the arrival of 12,000 carrancista troops 
in Saltillo who intended to strike westward and capture 
Villa's supply base. On September 28, the generals of the 
Division of the North, including Angeles, signed a 
manifesto rejecting Carranza as head of the government. 
That made the break official and sounded the beginning of a 
civil war. (27) 
The Convention of Generals assembled three days later in 
Mexico City without representatives from Villa and Zapata. 
After some heated discussions, they voted to move the 
Convention to Aguascalientes to assure villista 
representation. They convened in that city on October 10 
with the villista delegates present and led by General 
Angeles. While the representatives argued over 
qualifications of delegates, Villa concentrated his forces 
north of Aguascalientes and Carranza moved forces up from 
the south; both hoping to pressure the Convention to favor 
their side in the contest. Wishing to establish order in 
the assembly, the delegates pressed for the election of 
General Antonio I. Villarreal as President of the 
Convention when some members insisted that Zapata should be 
represented before the final vote. (28) 
In the middle of October, Angeles led a commission of 
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four men to Morelos where he had been the zone commander in 
1912. After a discussion with Zapata and selection of 
representatives, the party traveled through carrancista 
lines and boarded a train in Mexico City. Instead of 
returning directly to Aguascalientes with the Zapatista 
delegates Angeles took them past the city and on to 
Guadalupe where they met with Villa. The Zapatista 
delegation entered the Convention on October 26 where they 
joined in an alliance with the villistas. (29) 
Angeles was leader of the conservative element in the 
Convention and had a viewpoint very similar to that of 
Francisco I. Madero. Like Madero, he supported most of the 
reforms of the Revolution but wanted them implemented in an 
orderly manner to prevent damage to the country. He urged 
moderation in a radical atmosphere and spoke against 
unreasonable acts against the rich and foreigners. He 
believed that the rich were the ones who possessed the 
knowledge necessary for national survival in a capitalist 
world, and persecution of foreigners or refusing to 
compromise with them created international friction and 
prevented needed investments and assistance. Yet, he 
believed in the sovereignty of his country and the right of 
the people of Mexico to decide their own fate. While a 
member of the Comvention, he served on the Commission of 
War and Government with Obregon and others, whose members 
proposed that both Carranza and Villa resign their posts to 
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assist in the establish of peace. (3°) 
Carranza refused to resign and on November 2 the 
Convention elected General Eulalio Gutierrez temporary 
President of Mexico. Two days later the new Secretary of 
War and comrade of Angeles, General Jose Isabel Robles, 
sent him on a mission to Mexicali, Territory of Baja 
California. The mission was probably a follow up to the 
pact signed in September with Colonel Esteban Cantu and 
designed to transfer the allegiance to the Convention 
government. In his absence the Convention declared Carransa 
a rebel against the legal government of Mexico and named 
Villa commander of the Conventionist army. With his new 
title and authority, Villa immediately began moving his 
forces toward Mexico City. <3i) 
Angeles returned from his mission in time to rejoin the 
Division in its approach to the capital and on November 28 
he led the vanguard into the outskirts of the capital. 
After a week of waiting for Villa to arrive and the 
carrancista forces to evacuate the city, he joined with the 
60,000 villista and Zapatista troops for their triumphal 
parade through the streets on December 6, 1914. (32) 
Once the celebrations settled down, Villa met with 
Angeles and other generals to explain his plan for placing 
three armies in the field against the carrancistas. Angeles 
was to lead one army into the Northeast to capture that 
area; Urbina would move eastward to capture the port and 
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oilfields of Tampico; and Villa would lead an army into the 
western areas where he already had 15,000 troops under the 
command of Generals Rodolfo Fierro and Calixto Contreras 
moving toward Guadalajara. Angeles disagreed with the 
strategy and frankly expressed his opinion. He proposed 
that they retain the base of operations at Mexico City and 
strike directly at Carranza in Veracruz with an army of 
40,000 men. Villa feared losing support of the northern 
States because of the line of supply through Torreon and 
h e s i t a t e d  t o  a g r e e .  ( 3 3 )  
Angeles insisted that it was unwise to give Carranza 
time to reorganize and build his army but Villa was 
determined to allow Zapata's forces to push through Puebla 
and assault Veracruz, while he maintained control of the 
North and West. Angeles ended his argument with a profound 
/ 
analogy: "...but those lesser dangers will disappear when 
the great danger that Carranza represents has passed. These 
other chiefs are like hats hanging on a rack; the rack is 
Carranza, and the best use of our forces is not to pick off 
the hats one by one but to topple the rack, because then 
all the hats will fall."(34) General Villa did not listen 
t o  t h e  a d v i c e  a n d  w o u l d  l a t e r  r e g r e t  t h a t  f a c t .  ( 3 5 )  
After receiving orders to mount the Northeast campaign, 
Angeles began organizing his army. A great number of things 
had changed in the nine months since he first come to the 
Division of the North. His original regimental artillery 
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commanders, Martiniano Servfn and Manuel Garcia Santibanez, 
were no longer in charge of the guns. Santib&riez still 
commanded artillery but was with Villa in the western 
campaign and would distinguish himself a couple of months 
later at the battle of Sayula. Servin, who was transfered 
to command infantry troops at Torreon and later led one of 
the assaults on Sierpe hill at Zacatecas, was a general of 
infantry assigned to Angeles" command. (36) 
Other men who followed those first two commanders had 
served with valor in subsequent battles but were then 
unavailable to command his artillery or be members of his 
general staff. Colonel Federico Cervantes who had served so 
well as his chief of staff replaced Angeles as a delegate 
to the Convention and would not be available for duty; 
Gustavo Baz&n who had commanded artillery at Paredon and 
served on Angeles' staff at Zacatecas was also commanding 
artillery in the West like Santibanez; and Jose Heron 
Gonzalez, the former student of Angeles' who joined the 
artillery corps before the battle of Paredon, had been 
transfered to an infantry command like Martiniano Servin. 
(  3 7  )  
To gain greater assistance with the details of 
organization, Angeles first concentrated on reorganizing 
his staff. With a preference for men with military 
experience to fill the vacancies, he searched for qualified 
former federal officers and there were many available. 
121 
There was at that time an abundance of former soldiers in 
the capital who were mustered out in August and September 
when Obregon disbanded the federal army. He first assigned 
former federal officer Jose Romero as his chief of staff, 
then recruited two former federal generals, Joaquin Mendoza 
Sota and M. Luna, who would be invaluable on his staff in 
helping to recruit good soldiers and understand the demands 
of command priorities. With their assistance, he added nine 
more officers to the staff and filled the ranks of his 
army. (38) 
General Angeles left Mexico City on December 17, 1914 
with 6,000 troops and 60 artillery pieces. As commander of 
the Army of the Northeast, his responsibilities were no 
longer limited to the artillery. To assure the continued 
efficiency of that military arm he carefully chose his 
commanders. Colonel Gustavo Duron Gonzales, who commanded 
the artillery, had distinguished himself at the battle of 
Zacatecas and proved to be proficient in his duties. The 
two section commanders, Colonels Jose Maria Jurado and 
Miguel Saavedra, were also men of great talent with the 
cannons and served Angeles well at Zacatecas. The convoy 
traveled north to Torreon where they were joined by four 
brigades of cavalry and Angeles was briefed on the 
situation in the Northeast. (39) 
Carrancista troops had moved out of Saltillo and 
Monterrey along the two railroads toward Torreon and one 
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group had already established a garrison at Parras, halfway 
between Torreon and Saltillo. The other units were reported 
to be moving out of Pared6n while Generals Maclovio Herrera 
and Antonio I. Villarreal waited east of that town with two 
armies. Using the intelligence reports and his knowledge of 
the area east of Torredri, Angeles applied the principles of 
warfare and formulated strategy for his Army of the 
Northeast. (4°) 
The main body of the army, which included four brigades 
of infantry, two brigades of cavalry and 52 cannons, left 
Gomes Palacio about December 25. They moved north and east 
by railroad through territory familiar to Angeles. Not far 
from Gomez Palacio they passed by San Pedro de las Colonias 
where he commanded the artillery against General Velasco in 
April; then continued eastward on the route he had traveled 
with the Division vanguard in May toward the great victory 
at Paredon. At Marte station, 111 miles east of Torreon, 
the army was stopped by damaged railroad tracks on December 
28. While the tracks were being repaired, Angeles sent a 
cavalry unit farther east toward Hipolito to scout and 
reinforce the enemy's belief that his main advance was 
coming along that route, as it had in the Spring of 1914. 
(41) 
As the main force arrived at Marte, General Emilio 
Madero led his cavalry east from Torredn along the southern 
rail line to Viesca where his trains were also stopped by 
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destroyed tracks. Leaving a crew to repair the tracks, he 
unloaded his cavalry and moved across country toward the 
town of Parras. There he swiftly attacked and captured the 
federal garrison, eliminating the threat closest to 
Torreon. Following Angeles' orders, Madero then continued 
his march to the town of Guadalupe, 10 miles east of the 
town of General Cepeda, and waited. (42) 
Angeles left his trains at Marte station, along with 
General Macario Silvas' brigade to continue cover 
movements, and turned his army away from the northern 
railroad. By departing on the night of January 4, 1915 the 
darkness masked their movements and his army was able to 
cross the 19 miles to Seguin on the southern rail line 
before dawn. They quickly turned east from Seguin and 
joined Madero at Guadalupe where the army rested through 
the next day, preparing for a night attack on the town of 
General Cepeda. (43) 
Angeles planned his operations with precision, based on 
the situation as it existed when he left Torredn. He 
employed not only the principles of the French army which 
stressed: "Security of action, Mobility of action, 
Concentration, and Surprise",(44> but incorporated many of 
Napoleon's principles of warfare. By moving along the 
northern railroad which he believed the enemy expected and 
switching to the other one, he mislead the enemy as 
Napoleon suggested in Maxim #16. He then applied Maxim # 18 
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to his march from Marte to Seguin which recommended the use 
of night to move armies to a better position. After that, 
he utilized Maxim #4 in arranging for the meeting of his 
two units 45 miles from Saltillo. Those tactical 
considerations were based on the belief that his flanks and 
rear would be protected as he advanced on Saltillo. Luis 
Gutf errez, the brother of the Conventionist government 
President, occupied San Luis Potosi to the south; to the 
east General Alberto Carrera Torres was moving toward 
Ciudad Victoria to keep Gonzalez's forces occupied; and 
Angeles' army had cleared the federals to the west. Besides 
the protection afforded to his flanks and rear the 
continued maneuvers along the northern rail line assured 
him that the main armies of Herrera and Villarreal would 
not interfere. But, while Angeles was maneuvering his army 
events in Mexico City were altering the situation around 
him in the Northeast. (45) 
A new Revolutionary Convention assembled on January 1st 
to consider replacing President Eulalio Gutierrez because 
of disagreements over his methods and choice of cabinet 
members. While the delegates determineded his future, 
President Gutierrez was detained at his house by two of 
Villa's cavalry brigades. The clash of wills between his 
brother and General Villa added to the unstable situation 
in the capital and caused General Luis Gutierrez to 
question his choice of governments. He learned that three 
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villista armies were closing on the area of San Luis Potosi 
and decided to move his troops north to join the 
carrancistas at Saltillo. (46) 
Angeles sent four brigades of cavalry to storm the town 
of General Cepeda, 35 miles southwest of Saltillo. They 
attacked on the night of January 5, and by morning captured 
the 300 man garrison and occupied the town. News of the 
defeat at General Cepeda surprised the garrison of Saltillo 
because they believed Angeles' array was moving on the 
northern rail line where Herrera and Villarreal were 
located. On January 6, those two carrancista armies 
attacked what they thought was Angeles' main army at Marte 
station. The few hundred men left on the northern line by 
Angeles could not resist the advance of 8,000 soldiers and 
withdrew toward Torreon, abandoning the trains and 
e q u i p m e n t  i n  t h e i r  f l i g h t .  ( 4 7 )  
As Angeles moved closer to Saltillo, Herrera and 
Villarreal realized they had been deceived and turned back 
toward Pared6n; but they were 87 miles from Saltillo and 
Angeles was only 35 and closing on the Coahuilan capital. 
With an enemy army advancing and their main forces too far 
away to protect the city, the Saltillo garrison fled 
northward. Angeles' army occupied Saltillo on January 7 and 
accepted 600 carrancistas into their ranks. By 5:00 p.m. 
that evening, the vanguard encountered advance units of the 
carrancista armies which were moving down from Ramos 
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Arizpe. Angeles' army of 10,000 and the combined forces of 
Herrera and Villarreal with 15,000 formed battle lines and 
prepared to fight. While Herrera, who was commanding the 
carrancista line, waited for his artillery to arrive from 
Paredon, Angeles planned his tactics and maneuvered troops 
for an attack. (48) 
At 5:00 a.m. on the morning of January 8, a thick fog 
settled over the battlefield. Facing an enemy with superior 
numbers, Angeles saw the low, hasy cloud as a benefit and 
grasped the opportunity. He placed General Santiago 
Ramirez's brigade in reserve and established a line of 
infantry with the support of 60 cannons behind them. With 
the fog covering movements, he sent General Madero to the 
far right of the line with his Cavalry Division and ordered 
the infantry on his far left, commanded by General Servin 
and Colonel Jose Heron Gonzalez, to make a strong attack on 
the enemy. The infantry attack was designed to draw 
attention from Madero's movement and force the enemy pull 
units from the right to reinforce the left. After issuing 
those orders, Angeles personally led an infantry attack on 
the right to further confuse the enemy about his main 
attack and cause them to move any reserve units from the 
rear. (4 9) 
Madero's cavalry rushed around the enemy's left flank, 
turned, and attacked them at La Libertad in their rear. The 
confusion of the surprise attack in the fog, combined with 
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heavy assaults by the infantry led by Angeles and Servin on 
both ends of the line, caused chaos within the carrancista 
army. Servin's infantry swept into Ramos Arizpe on the 
heels of the fleeing carrancistas but the general was 
killed by an enemy rifleman in the town. Angeles used a 
classical Napoleonic movement directly from the textbook by 
requiring the enemy to deploy its reserves to the line, 
directing attention to the front line with assaults and 
using the fog as his cavalry screen for the envelopment. 
(  5 0  )  
In his haste to escape northward, General Villarreal 
left some private papers behind in Ramos Arizpe which soon 
fell into the hands of Angeles':, troops. Angeles was quite 
interested in the contents of those papers because they 
exposed a conspiracy among the leaders of his government 
and the enemy. There were letters from Conventionist 
President Gutierrez and Generals Jose Isabel Robles, Lucio 
Blanco, Eugenio Aguirre Benavides, and Mateo Almanza 
proposing to eliminate both Villa and Carranza from power. 
Angeles immediately notified Villa, who was probably not 
too surprised because he had already accused Gutierrez of 
conspiring with Obregon for the same purpose. Although the 
discovery of the papers was of major importance, Angeles 
saw more immediate benefits from the battle such as the 
capture of 3,000 carrancista soldiers, confiscation of 
great amounts of munitions, supplies and trains, and 
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control of the railroad junction to Monterrey. ( 5 1 )  
Three days after Angeles captured Ramos Arizpe, Villa 
led a three day assault on Guadalajara which was supported 
by artillery under the command of Colonel Gustavo Bazan. On 
January 14th, Generals Manuel M. Dieguez and Francisco 
Murguia abandoned the city and withdrew northward. That 
victory in the West was followed the next day by the 
evacuation of Monterrey when Herrera and Villarreal divided 
their forces into two separate armies for better operating 
efficiency. One man who left the city with the carrancistas 
was Vito Alessio Robles. He had joined the Division of the 
North in May of 1913, accompanied Angeles in his 
reconnaissance of the Paredon area and carried the 
general's battle plans to Villa. A short time before the 
battle of Ramos Arizpe, Vito and Miguel Alessio Robles 
deserted Villa's army and joined the carrancistas in 
Monterrey. But those two men were not unique in their 
transfer of loyalty. The entire fabric of revolution and 
war was shreading and suspicion became an ordinary 
attitude. Loyalties became confused and reasons for 
fighting for a certain government or person were becoming 
vague. (52) 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE DIVISION OF THE NORTH 
On January 16, 1915, General Angeles led his victorious 
army into the city of Monterrey. From the balcony of the 
Iturbide Hotel he spoke to the citizens of Monterrey and 
his soldiers. After assuring the people that their property 
was safe from confiscation and his army was not there to 
persecute them, the general made a statement referring to 
the enemy as mistaken brothers. The reference by a villista 
general to carrancista soldiers as brothers was unique, 
confusing, and yet reflective of Angeles' character, (i) 
The statement reflected his belief that all Mexicans 
were brothers in a common cause, above those espoused by 
various factional leaders. He believed they were all 
fighting for the betterment of their country, and it was 
the leaders who confused the situation and misdirected the 
people. They disrupted rational thought with emotional 
pleas of patriotism and capitalised on petty jealousies and 
regional hatreds to obtain power; and those men would 
perform any deed necessary to attain their goals. Unlike 
those soldiers who were physically forced into the federal 
army and died at Zacatecas, the carrancista soldiers were 
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psychologically manipulated by political propoganda and 
false beliefs. Although they chose which army to fight 
with, their choice was not made without a type of coercion. 
He explained that the political schemes causing those 
brothers of Mexico to continue fighting were perpetrated by 
such men as Obregon and other generals who were dangerous 
animals. < 2 > 
The same day Angeles made his speech about patriots 
being misled through political schemes, the results of 
political intrigues were unfolding in Mexico City. 
President Eulalio Gutierrez escaped from his villista 
guards and the city, taking three brigades of troops and 
over half of the national treasury. The day after 
Gutierrez's departure the delegates elected Roque Gonzalez 
Garza the new President of the Convention. The change of 
presidents in the Convention government created a third 
faction because Gutierrez still claimed his position as 
leader, and gave Villa firm control over the Convention. 
( 3) 
As Gutierrez fled northward, Villa established his 
headquarters at Irapuato and sent 4,000 soldiers to 
Aguascalientes. The reason for the movement of troops was 
twofold: first, to have an extra force in that location to 
dispatch to the capital if Obregon quickened his advance 
westward from Puebla; and second, to prepare for the 
advance toward San Luis Potosi and Tampico. While Villa 
136 
prepared for maneuvers in the center and on the East coast 
his army in the West was being defeated. The carrancistas 
attacked Guadalajara and, after one day of heavy fighting, 
pushed Fierro and Contreras' troops out of the city. The 
villistas' failure to successfully resist the enemy forces 
resulted from their inability to coordinate the movement of 
infantry with artillery fire, a technique perfected by 
Angeles and Villa in numerous battles; but those two 
generals were not present to contribute their personal 
skills in the defense of the western city. Angeles was in 
Monterrey receiving invitations to a conference with 
followers of President Gutierrez and Villa was in Irapuato 
issuing orders to his troops to chase and defeat the same 
man. (4 > 
Eugenio Aguirre Benavides, who defected from the 
Division of the North and left Mexico City with Gutierrez, 
arranged a conference of generals in Saltillo to convince 
them that peace could be obtained only after the 
elimination of Villa and Carranza. Three generals from 
Angeles' command attended the conference and Angeles 
received an invitation, but refused to attend. Upon being 
informed that some of Gutierrez's generals were in San Luis 
Potosi, Villa dispatched two forces from Aguascalientes. As 
those forces advanced northward by separate routes Aguirre 
Benavides telegraphed Angeles in an attempt to convince him 
to abandon Villa and the Conventionist government. (5) 
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In his reply on January 24, Angeles refuted the 
arguments of Benavides, stating that the Convention was the 
just and legal government of Mexico. Having served as a 
delegate to the Convention, Angeles had first hand 
knowledge of its composition and operation, and he believed 
it could fairly govern the country. If Benavides had simply 
expressed a desire to eliminate Villa and Carranza without 
mentioning the Conventionist government, Angeles may have 
conceded because he had previously supported the retirement 
of both men for the good of Mexico. But he would not 
consider supporting the destruction of the Convention and 
what it represented to him. (6> 
Angeles also expressed support of the speech made by 
Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama at the Convention in October. He 
too believed the national flag was used for political 
scheming by appealing to the emotions of the people, as he 
had expressed in his speech at Monterrey; and in reality 
the flag was only a piece of cloth that symbolised the 
peoples' patriotism. Angeles further stated, "I believe 
that to continue at the side of President Gutierrez is 
stupid...."<7) because he negotiated with carrancistas, as 
proven by Villarreal's documents. He regretted that 
Benavides should take such a course and expressed his 
belief that Villa was a true patriot of the people. (8) 
Four days after the telegraphic conversation, Eugenio 
Aguirre Benavides and Miguel M. Acosta led 30,000 troops 
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out of San Luis Potosl. At San Felipe they encountered the 
villista forces under Urbina and Agustin Estrada and were 
severely defeated. As the battle raged at Sari Felipe, the 
Convention evacuated Mexico City and reassembled in 
Cuernavaca. That departure resulted from their lack of 
troops to advance and engage Obregon's army which was 
nearing the city. Their surrender of the capital to an 
advancing carrancists army exemplified the desire of both 
sides to spare the destruction of the capital, which 
probably resulted from the damage and destruction which 
occurred during the February 1913 revolt. (9) 
Obregon entered and occupied the city after a swift 
penetration of Zapatista territory. He had moved east from 
Veracruz, defeated the Zapatistas in Puebla, and pushed 
straight for the capital. It was the reverse route planned 
by Villa for Zapata's conquering army, but the Zapatistas 
advanced only as far as Puebla. When Obregon moved out of 
Veracruz, they offered stiff but brief resistance and 
retreated back to the mountains of the South. (i<>) 
In the Northeast, Angeles was undaunted and less 
surprised by his government's loss of the capital. He had 
advised Villa to strike at Veracruz with the combined 
forces they had in Mexico City. At the same time Carranza 
and Obregon feared an attack by the combined forces of 
Villa and Zapata because they doubted if they could resist 
such an army. Villa listened but would not jeapordize his 
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agreement with Zapata, which designated that area to the 
southerner's army. Angeles knew he had tried to convince 
Villa to do the logical thing and was probably content with 
his efforts; but he had other orders to obey, (ii) 
Control of the northeastern area and prevention of 
carrancista penetration was Angeles' first priority. With 
his army at full strength, Angeles was able to capture two 
major cities and gain control of the railroads to the west; 
but with the Army of the Northeast reduced to less than 
half strength holding that territory was doubtful, much 
less advance and occupy more. With only 4,000 available 
troops, Angeles was_. expected to guard both railroads 
leading westward to Torreon; garrison Saltillo, Monterrey 
and other strategic points; and defend that area against 
three armies. Herrera sat poised with one army blocking the 
railroad north to Nuevo Laredo at Topo Chico, two miles 
north of Monterrey; Villarreal's army waited twelve miles 
east of the city, at Apodaca, on the railroad to Matamoros; 
and Gonzalez was advancing from the southeast, taking 
possession of the railroad to Ciudad Victoria. (12) 
On the first of February, Angeles notified Villa of the 
situation in the Northeast and requested reinforcements so 
he could strike out against the armies. Villa believed 
Angeles capable of holding the area and stressed his need 
to use any additional troops to recapture Guadalajara. He 
assured Angeles that Urbina would soon be assaulting 
140 
Tampico, and those attacks would draw pressure from the 
Monterrey area. A few days later, Villa led a 10,000 man 
army with artillery against Guadalajara and forced the 
carrancista forces out. Dieguez and Murguia withdrew their 
carrancista army northward to Sayula where they were again 
defeated by Villa's army on February 13th. In the battles 
of Guadalajara and Sayula, Villa used the skills of Manuel 
Garcia Santibanez and his artillery to launch coordinated 
attacks and bombardments of the enemy's lines. With the 
enemy routed at Sayula, Villa then pushed into the State of 
Sinaloa and at Tuxpan telegraphed Angeles of the victory. 
(  1 3  )  
Angeles again attempted to advise Villa on strategy by 
recommending that he send the main body of the army North. 
They could defeat Herrera, Villarreal, and Gonzalez; and 
then help Urbina capture Tampico. He saw that the State of 
Chihuahua and most of Coahuila were under their control, 
Maytorena could offer sufficient resistance in Sonora until 
reinforced, and only two states in the North were left to 
conquer: Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. Those were the States 
in his area and could be easily taken with the main force 
of the army. With the carrancistas in Sinaloa fleeing in 
defeat and caught between the villistas and Maytorena, he 
saw no further threat in that area. Once they controlled 
the North, Northeast and border area, they could again push 
into the center of Mexico. Villa again did not see the 
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advantage in the strategy that Angeles proposed. (H) 
Although Villa knew of Obregon's advance from Veracruz 
for many weeks he assumed Zapata would block it. When the 
carrancista advance continued, he had stationed a force at 
Aguascalientes to prevent Obregon's entry into the capital; 
but that force had been dispatched to fight Gutierrez's men 
near San Luis Potosi. Although Obregon was able to occupy 
the capital, Villa evidently did not consider his presence 
an immediate threat, or at least one that took priority 
over the western campaign. Mexico City was the dividing 
line between villista and Zapatista regions and when 
Obregon began moving his forces north and west out of the 
capital he entered Villa's territory. (15) 
About the same time Obregon's army began its move, Villa 
received a message from Angeles that changed his mind about 
the importance of the Northeast. Angeles stated that Luis 
Gutierrez and Herrera were moving from the area of Monclova 
toward Chihuahua with the intentions of capturing Torreon. 
It was Villa's most sensitive spot because he believed 
Torreon and his control over the State of Chihuahua 
necessary for his army to continue operating. That threat 
convinced Villa that without the control of the Northeast 
his supply lines were not safe. (16) 
After a hasty trip to Chihuahua, Villa sent a brigade 
eastward into Coahuila to stop the invasion. Meanwhile, he 
gathered 35,000 troops and was in Monterrey by the 3rd of 
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March. The additional troops must have been a welcome sight 
for Angeles after long weeks of defensive warfare because 
the day after Villa's arrival he advanced eastward out of 
Monterrey along the Matamoros railroad. At Los Ramones, 40 
miles east, he attacked and routed Luis Caballero and 
Villarreal's armies. While he inventoried the fruits of the 
battle which included cannons, artillery shells, and 
equipment, General Hernandez crossed Coahuila and engaged 
the army of Gutierrez and Herrera at Sabinas, north of 
Monclova. He quickly defeated them and moved north toward 
the border town of Piedras Negras. (i?) 
In Monterrey, Angeles and Villa decided on their 
campaign strategy. They sent two brigades southeast against 
Gonzales's army at Cadereyta; another brigade northward to 
secure the Nuevo Laredo rail line and attack Gutierrez and 
Herrera; and a fourth unit eastward to complete the capture 
of the railroad to Matamoros. The success of those 
movements would give them control of all railroads out of 
Monterrey, give them dominance over all rail lines out of 
Saltillo with those controlled by Urbina to the South, and 
add the State of Nuevo Leon to their control areas. After 
those movements were complete, they could mount a major 
offensive southward to aid Urbina who was having 
difficulties with his advance on Tampico. On March 5, 
General Manuel Chao advanced to a point 25 miles east of 
the city but encountered strong defenses at Ebano and was 
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stopped. If the strategy decided on in Monterrey worked, 
Angeles would soon be able to lead three brigades from the 
northeast to strike at Tampico, making the defense forces 
fight on two fronts. (18) 
On March 10, Obregon completely abandoned Mexico City 
to Zapata's troops and continued his move northward. That 
movement bothered Villa but he adhered to Northeast 
campaign pl^ns, and within ten days victory seemed certain. 
Generals Maximo Garcia and Severino Ceniceros defeated 
Gonzales at Cadereyta, 15 miles southeast of Monterrey, 
pushing him farther south; and, the same day, Angeles led 
an attack on Herrera's army at San Francisco de Apodaca, 12 
miles east of the city. After his defeat at Sabinas, 
Herrera had crossed the Nuevo Laredo rail line and circled 
around Monterrey to strike from another direction. After 
the defeat by Angeles, Herrera again circled the city and 
was at Topo Chico two days later when Angeles again 
defeated his army. C19 > 
By March 22, Luis Gutierrez was hiding in the mountains 
south of Monterrey, Villarreal had retreated to Matamoros, 
and Herrera sought safety to the north. The first stage of 
the campaign was complete. They defeated the harrassing 
armies that had kept Angeles' forces pinned down around 
Monterrey and freed their troops to extend their area of 
control and advance south toward Tampico. Urbina began his 
attacks on Ebano with a strong force of 15,000 soldiers but 
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they encountered the strongest network of defenses 
constructed in Mexico. With Gonzales's army protecting them 
from the North, the carrancista defenders of Tampico were 
aware that only one route was left open to attack, the one 
eastward from San Luis Potosi. In the months since the port 
city was captured from the federals, they built a network 
of defenses in the Ebano area to hold the attacking army at 
a distance. The network included trenches, heavy 
concentrations of barbed wire, extensive use of machine 
guns to protect the trenches and floodlights to prevent 
su r p r i s e  n i g h t  a t t a c k s .  ( 2 0 )  
After receiving reports that Urbina's advance was 
stopped at Ebano, Villa was informed that Fierro was losing 
all the area in the West which had been won the month 
before. In a three day battle at Tuxpan, the carrancistas 
forced the western army back into Guadalajara and then 
drove them out of the city on the 23rd after a terrible 
defeat. Added to those disappointments Villa learned that 
Obregdn was closing on Queretaro. Although the army in the 
Northeast was victorious, the failure of his other two 
armies to take and hold their objectives made Villa feel 
more insecure about Obregon's movements in the center. He 
spread his forces too thin in a grand design to capture all 
the area north of Mexico City and Veracruz. In that area of 
approximately 600,000 square miles the carrancista forces 
were concentrated in the east and west coastal areas. To 
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accomplish his grand design of conquest, Villa had divided 
his Conventionist army and was losing the battles, except 
in the Northeast. (21) 
At Monterrey, he decided it was time to assemble a 
fourth army in the center to stop Obregon's advance. 
Angeles told him not to worry about Obregon because he did 
not believe the carrancista army strong enough to pose a 
threat at that time. To support that belief, Angeles 
pointed out that Obregon had abandoned the capital after a 
short siege by the Zapatistas who were not. a well organized 
and efficient army. He believed Obregon's purpose in moving 
north was to draw troops away from the Northeast, thus 
taking pressure off Gonzalez's army; and if that was true, 
Gonzalez was vulnerable. Based on those assumptions the 
most logical steps were to harrass and delay Obregon while 
co n t i n u i n g  t h e i r  c o n q u e s t  o f  t h e  n o r t h e a s t e r n  a r e a .  ( 2 2 )  
Villa disagreed, believing that Obregon was capable of 
swiftly building his army as he moved northward; and the 
larger his army grew the harder it would be to defeat 
later. Angeles must have recalled the principle of time and 
space in Napoleon's elements of warfare when he assured 
Villa that Obregon could be defeated, regardless of which 
way he moved. Obregon had taken two weeks to travel from 
Mexico City to Queretaro, a distance of 140 miles. If he 
turned toward San Luis Potosi to attack Urbina'e rear, it 
would take him two weeks to arrive there, and they could 
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swing down from the northeast to attack his rear. On the 
other hand, if Obregon continued up the center it would 
take him a couple of weeks to reach Aguascalientes where 
forces from Chihuahua could engage him. And, if he was to 
advance toward Guadalajara to trap Fierro's retreating 
forces, it would take him over two weeks and he could be 
isolated in that area. He urged Villa to listen to the 
advise and promised to lead the forces in a concentrated 
assault on Obregon when the time came. He ended the 
discussion with a plea that would later haunt Villa. 
Angeles said, "Don't fall into his trap, don't move south." 
(  2 3  }  
Villa disregarded the advice and began preparations for 
the move southward. He ordered General Agustfn Estrada to 
move back from Queretaro and hold Celaya, and started the 
troop movement from Chihuahua and Torreon. On March 28, 
while Villa was sending orders for his concentration of 
troops, Angeles struck south out of Monterrey. The move may 
have been a last effort to show Villa they could quickly 
take control of the Northeast, allowing them time to 
consolidate forces against Obregon. He led his army 65 
miles south and attacked the combined forces of Pablo 
Gonzalez, Francisco Cosio Robelo, and Luis Caballero at 
Montemorelos. (24) 
After routing the carrancista force, Angeles returned to 
Monterrey where an incident occurred that would affect the 
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war and Mexican history. The horse Angeles was riding fell 
on his foot and seriously damaged it. That injury prevented 
him from being present at Celaya where he may have been 
able to stop the attacks or at least take some measures to 
reduce the losses. When Villa telegraphed Angeles from 
Torreon telling him to prepare to move south, Angeles 
notified him of the accident and regreted that he could not 
directly participate. He again tried to dissuade Villa from 
advancing against Obregon, arguing that the units Villa had 
collected in the area of Irapuato were not a cohesive 
force. He stressed the points that there were not enough 
soldiers to overwhelm the carrancista army and a serious 
shortage of ammunition existed. Villa disagreed concerning 
the army he was organising and confidently replied that his 
soldiers could take ammunition from the dead carrancistas 
on the battlefield. (25) 
Villa met Angeles at the train station in Torreon and 
they again disagreed on the campaign. With a sad smile, 
Angeles urged Villa not to rush to the attack of Obregon 
but draw him farther north and west away from his base of 
operations and supply. Villa interrupted with an abrupt 
statement, "No, General, it will not wait for me;...", as 
if he believed fate dictated that he advance and 
attack.(26) He then added, "I go to launch many cannonades 
first, next I will place the infantry and after that the 
cavalry. What do you think?" (27) 
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Angeles must have seen the determination in Villa's 
eyes, because he grinned and replied, "There is no 
remedy."(28) He knew that Villa would attack as soon as 
possible, regardless of what he said, and believed the 
battle would mean the end of the Division of the North. 
That premonition was based on information that Obregon was 
constantly receiving supplies and reinforcements as he 
slowly advanced. Villa knew those facts and Angeles relayed 
it to President Roque Gonzalez Garza on April 2nd. Gonzalez 
Garza, who was in Cuernavaca, ordered General Zapata to 
attack Obregon's forces at Queretaro to cut his line of 
supply and communication with Veracruz. (23) 
From Torreon, Angeles managed to supply and arrange for 
transportation of troops to Villa in the south. Most of his 
Army of the Northeast accompanied Villa to Salamanca, 
leaving only three brigades to hold back Gonzales's army. 
Jose Heron Gonzalez, who was promoted to general after 
Servin's death at Ramos Arizpe, commanded an infantry 
brigade; and Colonels Jose Maria Jurado and Gustavo Duron 
Gonzalez commanded Villa's artillery batteries. On April 4, 
Obregon captured the town of Celaya and advanced north but 
Villa stopped him at Salamanca and pushed his forces back 
to Celaya. The next day Villa began his attacks against the 
the trenches and barbed wire of Celaya, and for two days 
his army struck at the defenses but were unable to break 
through. With the enemy unwilling to come out and fight, 
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the villistas were unable to resupply their ammunition from 
dead carrancistas as Villa had told Angeles would happen. 
(  3 0  )  
The battle line extended for five miles as the villistas 
attempted to circle and capture Celaya. They intensively 
bombarded the defenses of Celaya but it was ineffective 
because of the poor quality of shells that were 
manufactured in Chihuahua. Unable to obtain better shells 
the artillery could not effectively cover the assaulting 
troops, and that lack of firepower left the infantry and 
cavalry exposed to rifle, machine gun and artillery fire 
which decimated their ranks. For two days assault followed 
assault until the cavalry was almost destroyed and the rest 
of the troops exhausted. By April 6, Villa's army was low 
on ammunition, energy, and the motivation to continue. At 
that point, a carrancista cavalry force flanked them from 
the South and routed the army. (31) 
Pulling his main force back to Irapuat-o, Villa wired 
Angeles in Torreon to send more troops, artillery, and 
ammunition. After the defeat in front of Celaya, Villa 
questioned his reluctance to accept Angeles' advice. In 
those dark hours of defeat he regreted not listening to 
Angeles in December 1914 when he urged the destruction of 
Carransa and Obregon at Veracruz. He recalled his refusal 
to accept Angeles' suggestion to end the pursuit of Dieguea 
and Murguia in Jalisco and concentrate in the Northeast. He 
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even doubted the wisdom of rejecting Angeles' appleals to 
concentrate his armies instead of moving south against 
Obregon. It must have been a moment of truth for Francisco 
Villa because he had not personally experienced defeat 
since the failure to capture Chihuahua City in November 
1913, and had come to believe himself invincible. But the 
reflection of past mistakes did not cause him to waver from 
his determination to destroy Obregon's army. (32) 
On April 12, 2,500 reinforcements and more artillery 
arrived from Angeles in Torreon. Along with the troops and 
guns, he sent more ammunition and artillery shells but 
most of those shells were also of poor quality because he 
could not buy the better quality foreign shell. Meanwhile, 
Obregon also received supplies, ammunition and troops 
because Zapata had not obeyed the order of President 
Gonzales Garsa to cut carrancista supply lines. At 8:00 
p.m. on the 13th, Villa again struck at Celaya. Four 
batteries of artillery supported the center and flanks as 
they advanced across open ground. The attacks lasted for 
two days but with the continued use of bad shells, raw 
recruits and a continuing shortage of ammunition, Villa was 
unable to breach the defenses. (33) 
After fighting continuously for eight hours on the 15th, 
General Cesareo Castro led 6,000 carrancista cavalry troops 
against Villa's left flank. The surprise attack turned the 
villista army and caused a general rout. Villa left 
151 
thousands of dead soldiers, 30 cannons and hundreds of 
prisoners at Celaya as he retreated to Irapuato. While his 
beaten army rushed north toward Aguascalientes, the forces 
left in the Northeast were victorious. General Maclovio 
Herrera, their most determined foe, was accidentally killed 
by his own men during a battle on April 17 near Nuevo 
Laredo. About the same time, two brigades succeded in 
capturing Ciudad Victoria from Luis Caballero; but the 
victories were to be sacrificed for Villa's stubborness to 
defeat Obregon. (34) 
By April 19, Villa had 15,000 soldiers and 14 trains in 
Aguascalientes. He immediately telegraphed Angeles to come 
from Torreon with more men and artillery, and dispatched 
orders to draw troops from other areas. Fierro joined him 
with his forces from Jalisco and in a few days troops 
arrived from the Northeast. The shift in forces from other 
areas freed carrancista units to join Obregon. By April 20, 
Diegues and Murguia reinforced Obregon's army with 11,000 
men from Guadalajara and on the same day Angeles arrived in 
Aguascalientes with 2,000 reinforcements for Villa, When he 
saw the devastated army that had lost 6,000 men and 30 
cannons, Angeles knew the needs would be great to reform 
f o r  a n o t h e r  b a t t l e .  ( 3 5 )  
In a meeting with Villa, Angeles stated that the army 
was not only defeated but demoralised and fatigued. It 
needed a long rest to prepare for another major assault. He 
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drew Villa's attention to the fact that Obregon was 
consolidating the carrancista armies as he moved north 
toward Irapuato. Not only did he have Murguia and Dieguez 
from the west but General Benjamin Hill was arriving from 
Sonora, and there were more coming from the east through 
Tula. He suggested they begin a general withdrawal 
northward, destroying the railroad behind them. They could 
retreat into Chihuahua or Sonora arid rebuild the army. 
While they were rebuilding, the armies under Obregon would 
scatter to occupy different areas. Then, with a refreshed 
and rebuilt army, they could defeat each of those armies 
w i t h  t h e i r  w h o l e  f o r c e .  ( 3 6 )  
Villa refused to consider a withdrawal, wanting to 
attack Obregon as • soon as the army was ready. He then 
offered the command of the Division to Angeles but insisted 
that the only way to win was to assault. Angeles considered 
the proposition and went to reconniter the area where the 
army was positioned. He found the troops dispersed over a 
99 mile area between Aguascalientes and Silao with no 
natural formations to aid in defense. Besides being spread 
thinly in the area, neither the right nor left flanks were 
protected against the same maneuver that had defeated Villa 
twice at Celaya. As he analyzed the terrain for military 
use, he also looked at the troops. The army was merely a 
collection of tired, defeated soldiers, not a campaign 
army. There were few artillery pieces for support, or 
Santa Ana del 
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defense and he saw great gaps in the ranks caused by the 
repeated charges at Celaya. The roost noticable absence was 
Los Dorados. Villa's cavalry escort. After forty charges 
against the trenches, barbed wire and machine guns at 
Celaya, they were only a faint shadow of their former 
g r e a t n e s s .  ( 3 7 )  
What Angeles saw was not the Division of the North he 
had known, with the prancing brigades of cavalry, proud 
regiments of infantry, and sparkling artillery pieces. It 
was no longer the victorious Division of the North that had 
swept the great federal army from the Laguna District and 
stormed the hills of Zacatecas. It was a mass of men 
bloodied and tired from long days and nights of suicidal 
attacks. It was a defeated and exhausted army. (38) 
He returned to Aguascalientes where he found Villa 
conferring with some of his generals about General Dioniso 
Triana. Once the conference was over, Angeles told Villa of 
his observations concerning the positions and defense 
capabilities, and refused the offer of command. Villa had 
refused to heed his advice in Monterrey and Torreon about 
the campaign, and had taken the best military organisation 
in Mexico and flung it against an impregnable position, 
reducing it to what Angeles had seen that day. He was not 
going to take command of that mob and try to turn it into a 
fighting army while defending against a continuously 
r e s u p p l i e d  a n d  r e i n f o r c e d  a r m y .  ( 3 9 )  
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Angeles discovered that General Triana was relieved of 
command because he received messages from his uncle, 
Martfn, who was serving with Obregon. Villa and some of his 
generals suspected Triana's loyalty and believed he may be 
a traitor. Based on those suspicions, Villa had Triana 
disarmed and placed under arrest. Angeles went to speak 
with Triana because he had recruited the man into his 
Northeast army and trusted him. Triana knew that Villa was 
going to execute him, even though the sentence had not been 
ordered, and was confused about the reasons. He appealed to 
Angeles' sense of honor by asking that he be allowed to die 
in combat rather than before a firing squad. After learning 
that some people blamed Triana for the defeat at Celaya by 
communicating with his uncle, Angeles spoke to Villa on the 
prisoner's behalf and believed the situation resolved 
without a firing squad. But while he was examining the 
army's positions around Leon, Triana was taken out and shot 
on orders of General Villa. (40) 
On April 26, 0breg6n's forces advanced north past Silao, 
striking on the left and right, and pushing toward the 
towns of Satelo, Napoles and La Sandia. He was moving out 
of his defensive positions and making himself vulnerable. 
Villa's army waited until his units were extended and then 
struck with fury, defeating all three points of the 
advance. Immediately after the victories, Angeles again 
made the 650 mile round trip to Torreon to collect more 
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reinforcements and artillery and by the 29th was back in 
Aguascalientes with four trains loaded with troops and 
guns. Upon his return, he had another conference with Villa 
concerning strategy. Mi) 
He told Villa that Obregon was following a pattern, The 
carrancista general was cautiously moving north with the 
intention of repeating the events at Celaya. He moved 
slowly hoping that Villa would mount a full attack. At that 
point he would be able to consolidate his forces in 
defenses and let the army beat itself to death. The 
technique was a delayed offense which Angeles must have 
recalled from the principles of warfare. He suggested that 
the best strategy would be to reverse the conditions and 
put Obregon on the offensive. If they withdrew the army 
from Leon and fortified themselves at Aguascalientes, 
Obregon would be forced to attack, thus weakening his army 
and making them susceptible to defeat. By luring Obregon to 
attack Aguascalientes they could move troops down from 
Dolores Hidalgo and attack his rear. (42) 
Villa seemed to agree with the plan and told him to make 
sketches of the best area for defense; but when Angeles 
returned with the drawings and proposals for a strong 
defense, Villa had changed his mind. He stated his 
reasoning which was the main core of his philosophy and the 
cause of his defeat. "..I am a man who came into the world 
to attack, and if I am defeated by attacking today, I will 
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win by attacking tomorrow. "(43) He then followed the 
statement with plans to attack Obregon at Silao. Seeing 
that Villa was determined to assault instead of drawing the 
enemy to him, Angeles knew he could not convince Villa 
otherwise so went to Leon to make preparations. (44) 
In the weeks that followed, Angeles rearranged the 
battle line and prepared for what he believed would be the 
final defeat of the army. He pulled the infantry back into 
a long irrigation ditch that ran west from the Las Otates 
hills, across the railroad tracks connecting Silao with 
Leon, and past the village of El Ciiije. The hills served as 
both protection for their left flank and an advantageous 
artillery position. Angeles placed his guns on the slopes 
of the hills and below them on the road to effectively 
cover the attacks. (45) 
Angeles foresaw the possibility that Villa's planned 
flank attack could force the carrancistas to launch a 
desperate attack on his line of defense. With no reserves 
to reinforce the line, he realised that such an attack 
concentrated on any one part could collapse the entire line 
and cause disaster. With that possibility in mind, Angeles 
arranged for trains to be stationed where the infantry 
could quickly board and escape northward. While he was 
taking precautions against the slaughter of his soldiers, 
Villa prepared to lead another great cavalry assault. (46) 
While Villa was planning his cavalry charge, he lost 
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control of the last stronghold in the Northeast. By May 
21st, General Raul Madero abandoned Monterrey and pulled 
his troops back to Torreon, leaving the Northeast to the 
carrancistas. Meanwhile, the Convention delegates in 
Cuernavaca squabbled over regional differences, and by the 
22nd were divided into groups of northerners supporting 
Villa and southerners supporting Zapata. Thus, the 
government, that the soldiers were dying for was splitting 
into factions and unable to agree on the exact direction of 
the war. (47) 
On May 22, as the Convention delegates bickered, Angeles 
and Villa led attacks against Obregon's army. The 
carrancistas had slowly moved forward until the vanguard 
was near the town of Trinidad, only eight miles from Leon. 
While Villa maneuvered his cavalry into position on 
Obregon's flank, Angeles ordered his troops out of the 
trenches for an assault on Trinidad. The infantry attack 
was launched with the support of artillery to divert the 
enemy's attention and draw his forces toward the front, 
while Villa hit from the flank. After sixteen hours of 
attacking, pulling back and attacking again, Angeles 
received a message that Villa had captured Silao. (48) 
The capture of Silao forced Obregon to withdraw but 
proved an expensive prise that could not be held, and 
Obregon soon reoccupied it. Angeles knew they could not 
continue to sacrifice so many soldiers on the line for a 
158 
shallow victory, but he was helpless in the face of Villa's 
rigid determination to be victorious over his arch enemy, 
Alvaro Obregon. A week later they made another coordinated 
attack with the same objective. Villa led his cavalry 
around the Las Otates hills and'came out near the town of 
Chichimequillas. Angeles led his infantry from the trenches 
in a frontal assault on Trinidad as Villa's cavalry charged 
at Silao. Obregon's troops were routed in the furious 
assault and withdrew southward. It appeared to be a 
v i c t o r y ,  b u t  O b r e g o n  t u r n e d  i t  a r o u n d .  ( 4 9 )  
Instead of continuing to flee from Villa and Angeles' 
troops, the carrancistas went directly to defensive 
positions they had prepared since the last attack. The 
positions on La Loza and Colorada slopes were cut with 
trenches, and the approaches were covered by machine guns 
placed every 10 to 20 feet. Repeated attacks on the 
fortified trenches by Villa and Angeles' soldiers could not 
overwhelm the enemy, and the troops were cut down by the 
concentrated machine gun fire and forced to retreat back to 
their trenches near Leon. As Villa led his bloodied cavalry 
away from the defenses, the words of Angeles must have 
echoed in his ears: "Obregon is coming here to entrench 
himself and make us take the offensive, as he did at 
Celaya."(50> But Angeles could not have been pleased to be 
right because, in one day of fighting, they lost 800 dead 
and 2,200 wounded in a futile battle. Although Villa may 
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have reflected on Angeles' advice as he had before, it did 
not stop his fanatic determination to continue his attacks. 
(51) 
On June 1, Villa again led a cavalry assault southward 
which cost his army the loss of 1,500 men. By the next day 
the carrancistas had moved farther north returning to the 
area of Trinidad, and Villa again struck with his cavalry; 
but that time in the rear of Obregon's army. While he was 
maneuvering in Obregon's rear, Angeles attacked with 35,000 
men and surrounded the enemy. Seeing a weakness in the 
southwest, Angeles urged Villa to send a force to attack 
Santa Ana del Conde that would cut the approach of more of 
Obregon's forces, but Villa would not listen. 0breg<5n had 
accomplished his objective1 he was again surrounded, as he 
had been at Celaya, and Villa was desperately assaulting 
his positions. Then he used the same tactic that had twice 
been successful at Celaya. He launched a flank attack at an 
unexpected time against an exausted army. The killing blow 
came on the right flank where Angeles had urged a movement 
to strengthen that side and completely routed Villa's army. 
(  5 2  )  
On June 6, 1915, the Division of the North was 
completely defeated. Fleeing northward to Aguascalientes, 
it left behind all the trains and artillery, thousands of 
dead and wounded, and the greatness of the Division and 
Villa. Three days after the terrible defeat at Trinidad, 
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the Convention replaced President Roque Gonzalez Garza and 
arranged a truce with Carranza. The disintegration of 
Villa's army continued as it fled north, and two men who 
had joined their talents with Mexico's greatest army 
parted. Villa fought on as a leader of guerrillas, 
outmaneuvered the United States Army in 1916, and was still 
resisting Carranza's government when he again joined with 
Felipe Angeles in 1918. (53) 
Angeles went to Boston and New York within three weeks 
after the defeat at Leon, not as a defeated general but as 
Villa's representative. He assisted in an attempt to form a 
coalition government in Mexico; but when those efforts 
failed in October 1915 and the United States recognized 
Carranza's government, he settled in Texas with his family. 
By early 1916 he established a vineyard near the Mexican 
border but that enterprise soon failed. Resisting defeat in 
civilian pursuits as he had in military enterprises, 
Angeles entered the dairy business in the same vicinity, 
but it also failed. Following those failures in business 
ventures Angeles turned his attention to the conditions in 
Mexico. (54) 
In 1917 Angeles joined with fellow political exiles to 
establish the Mexican Liberal Alliance in New York City to 
consolidate various factions opposing to President Carranza 
and the new Constitution of 1917. Among his associates in 
the organization were General Antonio I. Villarreal who had 
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been Angeles' adversary a couple of years before; Miguel 
Diaz Lombardo who had served as Villa's agent in the United 
States; Jose Maria Maytorena who was forced to flee from 
Sonora after Carranza's victory; and Federico Gonzales 
Garza. Under the banner of the Alliance and as its 
Provisional President, Angeles crossed the border in 
December 1918 to start a new revolution. He joined 
Francisco Villa and his forces in Chihuahua where they 
proclaimed a plan for the establishment of a new government 
a n d  b e g a n  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s .  ( 5 5 )  
In June 1919 Villa commanded the array in an assault on 
Ciudad Juarez but the victory was interrupted and 
frustrated. United States military forces charged across 
the border from El Paso, attacked Villa's army, and routed 
the revolutionary forces. Angeles retreated southward with 
his staff and was captured by Mexican federal forces on 
November 15 near Parral. From there he was taken to 
Chihuahua City where he was tried in the Theater of Heroes 
for rebellion against the government. After two days of 
damaging testimony, eloquent speeches, and futile appeals 
Angeles was sentenced to death. On the morning of November 
26, 1919, Felipe Angeles was escorted from his cell and 
taken to a military barracks where he was shot to death by 
a  f i r i n g  s q u a d .  ( 5 6 )  
Villa continued to fight until the summer of 1920 when 
he retired to a ranch in the State of Durango. He met his 
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end in a hail of bullets in Parral, Chihuahua in 1923 when 
he was ambushed, or again flanked, by men who were 
determined to prevent him from participating in another 
r e v o l u t i o n .  ( 5 7 )  
163 
ENDNOTES 
CHAPTER VI 
1. RDS. Harma to Secretary of State, File No. 812.00/14228, 
January 16, 1915. Cervantes, Felipe Angeles. p. 343. 
Friedrich Katz, The Secret War In Mexico: Europe. The 
United States And The Mexican Revolution. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 278. 
2. Cervantes, Felipe Angeles, p. 202 and 331. 
3. RDS. Silliman to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/14217, January 16, 1915. RDS. Garrett to Secretary 
of State, File No. 812.00/14221, January 17, 1915. Guzman, 
VLLLLa Memoirs. p. 421. Christopher R. Stewart, Pancho 
Villa's Munitions. Master's Thesis, Missoula, University of 
Montana, 1979, p. 95. 
4. RDS. Schmutz to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/14281, January 20, 1915. RDS, Canada to Secretary of 
State, File No. 812.00/14305, January 29, 1915. Guzman, 
Villa Memoirs, pp. 422, 423, and 429-430. 
5. IiM, pp. 428 and 430. Brito, Lugarteniente Gris. pp. 
188-189. Taracena, Mi Vida. pp. 326-327. Cervantes, Villa, 
p. 386. 
6. Ibid, pp. 386-387. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, pp. 428-429. 
Mario Mena, Alvaro Obregon: Historia Militar v Politica 
1912-1929. S.A. Mexico, Editorial Jus, 1960, p. 119. Brito, 
Lugarteniente Gris. pp. 190-191. 
7. Ibid, p. 190. Cervantes, Villa. p. 387. 
8. Ibid, pp. 386-387, Brito, Lugarteniente Gris. p. 190. 
9. Taracena, Mi Vida. p. 329. Cervantes, Villa. pp. 387-
388. Guzman, Villa Memoirs. pp. 430-431 and 432. RDS. 
Cardoso de Oliveira to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/14290, January 27, 1915. RDS. Canada to Secretary of 
State, File No. 812.00/14305. 
10. RDS. Silliman to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/14151, January 6, 1915. Atkin, Revolution. pp. 240-
241. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 387. Taracena, Mi Vida. p. 
328. 
11. Mario Mena, Alvaro Obregon: Historia Militar v Politica 
1912-1929. S.A. Mexico, Editorial Jus, 1960, pp. 65-73. 
164 
Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 387. 
12. RDS. Harma to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/14317, January 30, 1915. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, pp. 
436 and 446. 
13. Thid. pp. 436 and 437-441. Taracena, Mi Vida. p. 333. 
RDS. Garrett to Secretary of State, File No. 812.00/14363, 
February 8, 1915. 
14. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 441. 
15. Ibid. pp. 432 and 442. 
16. IMd, P- 444. 
17. Taracena, Mi Vida. p. 334, Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 
444 and 446. Cervantes, Villa. p. 375. 
18. Guzman, Villa Memoirs. pp. 445 and 446-447. Taracena, 
Mi Vida. p. 335. 
19. RDS. Cardoso de Oleveira to Secretary of State, File 
No. 812.00/14563, March 11, 1915. Cervantes, Villa. p. 375. 
Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 447. 
20. Ibid. pp. 447 and 450-451. Taracena, Mi Vida. p. 339. 
21. New York Times. April 2, 1915. Guzman, Villa Memoirs. 
pp. 448 and 450. 
22. Ibid, p. 451. 
23. Major General J. F. C. Fuller, The Conduct, of War 1789-
1961. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1961, 
p. 49. RDS. Cardoso de Oleveira to Secretary of State, File 
No. 812.00/14563, March 11, 1915. New York Times. April 2, 
1915. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, pp. 451-452. 
24. Ibid. p. 450. RDS. Schmutz to Secretary of State, File 
No. 812.00/14820, April 3, 1915. Cervantes, Villa. p. 375. 
25. Ibid. pp. 415 and 420. Christopher R. Stewart, Fancho 
Villa's Munitions. Master's Thesis, Missoula, University of 
Montana, 1979, p. 114. 
26. Cervantes, Villa, p. 421. 
27. Ibid, pp. 420-421. 
28. Ibid, p. 421. 
165 
29. Ibid, pp. 415, 420 arid 421. 
30. Guzman, Villa Memoirs. pp. 453, 454 and 471. RDS. 
Schmutz to Secretary of State, File No. 812.00/14908, April 
15, 1915. RDS. Vice Consul at Durango to Secretary of 
State, File No. 812.00/14976, April 30, 1915. 
31. New York Times. April 8, 1915. RDS. Carothers to 
Secretary of State, File No. 812.00/14836, April 12, 1915. 
RDS. Bonney to Secretary of State, File No. 812.00/14851, 
April 13, 1915. RDS. Carothers to Secretary of State, File 
No. 812.00/14897, April 20, 1915. RDS. Schmutz to Secretary 
of State, File No. 812.00/14908, April 15, 1915. Cervantes, 
Villa. pp. 437-438. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, pp. 453-459. 
32. Ibid. pp. 460 and 461. RDS. Carothers to Secretary of 
State, File No. 812.00/14795, April.5,, 1915. RDS. American 
Consulate at Aguascalientes to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/14895, April 12, 1915. 
33. RDS. American Consulate at Aguascalientes to Secretary 
of State, File No. 812.00/14895, April 12, 1915. RDS. 
Carothers to Secretary of State, File No. 812.00/14897, 
April 20, 1915. RDS. Silliman to Secretary of State, File 
No. 812.00/14857, April 15, 1915. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, 
pp. 465-468. Cervantes, Villa, pp. 438-439. 
34. Ibid. p. 451. RDS. Carothers to Secretary of State, 
File No. 812.00/14897, April 20, 1915. ECS., Bonney to 
Secretary of State, File No. 812.00/14903, April 21, 1915. 
RDS. Agenda Conf idencial to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/14882, April 15, 1915. RDS. Carothers to Secretary 
of State, File No. 812.00/14910, April 21, 1915. Guzman, 
Villa Memoirs. pp. 468-470 and 471. Documentos Volumen 4 
del Torn a X, p. 110. 
35. RDS. Schmutz to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/14931, April 19, 1915. RDS. Schmutz to Secretary of 
State, File No. 812.00/14880, April 18, 1915. RDS. American 
Vice Consul at Durango to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/14976, April 30, 1915. RDS. Carothers to Secretary 
of State, File No. 812.00/14910, April 21, 1915. RDS. 
Schmutz to Secretary of State, File No. 812.00/14949, April 
30, 1915. RDS. Bonney to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/14903, April 21, 1915. RDS. Carothers to Secretary 
of State, File No. 812.00/14898, April 16, 1915. New York 
Times. April 20, 1915. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 470. 
Cervantes, Villa. p. 452. Taracena, Mi Vida. p. 343. 
36. Guzman, Villa Memoirs. pp. 471-472. Cervantes, YJLLLa., 
pp. 451-452. Vito Alessio Robles, ,"La Convencion 
Revolucionaria De Aguascalientes, LXVII y llltimo" in Todo 
166 
(Mexican Newspaper, N.p.), February 22, 1951 (Photo Copy 
from University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas), p. 12. 
37. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, pp. 468 and 472. RDS, Schmut2 to 
Secretary of State, File No. 812.00/15014, May 6, 1915. 
RDS. Carothers to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/14897, April 20, 1915. New York Times. April 8, 
1915. Cervantes, Villa. pp. 438 and 452. 
38. Ibid. pp. 452 and 458. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 472. 
39. Ibid, pp. 473-474. Cervantes, Villa, PP. 421-422. 
40. Ibid. p. 452. RDS. Schmutz to Secretary of State, File 
No. 812.00/14949, April 30, 1915. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, 
pp. 475 and 479. 
41. Major General J. F. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-
1961. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1961, 
p. 71. Cervantes, Villa, p. 423. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 
475. 
42. Ibid, p. 480. 
43. Ibid. pp. 470-480. Cervantes, Villa. p. 458. 
44. Ibid, pp. 458, 460 and 461. 
45. Ibid. p. 458. 
46. RDS. Cardoso de Oliveira to Secretary of State, File 
No. 812.00/15061, May 22, 1915. RDS, Silliman to Secretary 
of State, File No. 812.00/15064, May 22, 1915. Cervantes, 
Villa, p. 461. 
47. Ibid. p .  460. RDS. Silliman to Secretary of State, File 
No. 812.00/15066, May 23, 1915. RDS. Carothers to Secretary 
of State, File No. 812.00/15063, May 23, 1915. 
48. Cervantes, Villa. pp. 460-461. Vito Alessio Robles, "La 
Convencion Revolucionaria De Aguascalientes, LXVII y 
(Jltimo", Todo (Mexican Newspaper, N.p.), February 22, 1951, 
p. 12. 
49. Guzman, Villa Memoirs, p. 479. 
50. Cervantes, Villa. p. 461. 
51. RDS, Carothers to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/15112, June 2. 1915. RDS. Silliman to Secretary of 
State, File No. 812.00/15149, June 5, 1915. RDS. Schmutz to 
Secretary of State, File No, 812.00/15169, June 1, 1915. 
167 
RDS. Carothers to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/15193, June 11, 1915. Taracena, Mi Vida. pp. 345 and 
347. Cervantes, Villa. pp. 461-462. 
52. RDS. Silliman to Secretary of State, File No. 
812.00/15146, June 6, 1915. RDS. Silliman to Secretary of 
State, File No. 812.00/15159, June 7, 1915. RDS. Schmuts to 
Secretary of State, File No. 812.00/15212, June 12, 1915. 
RDS. Secretary of State Robert Lansing to Brazilian 
Minister, File No. 812.00/15179, June 10, 1915. Atkin, 
Revolution, pp. 272-292. Almada, Revolucion En Chihuahua, 
p. 337. New York Times. June 15, 1919. 
53. New York Times. June 24 and September 26, 1915. 
Documentos Volumen 4 del Toma I, p. 182. New York Times, 
May 30, 1919. 
54. New York Times. June 24, 1915; June 15, 1919; and 
November 20 and 27, 1919. Cervantes, Angeles. pp. 216-217. 
55. Cervantes, Angeles, pp. 253-255. Almada, Revolucion En 
Chihuahua, p. 337. 
56. New York Times. June 15 and 16; and November 20, 26 and 
27 1919. 
57. 'Almada, Revolucion En Chihuahua, pp. 349-350. Atkin, 
Revolution, pp. 323-325. 
CONCLUSION 
History will not say a single word 
concerning me, because I do not deserve 
it; I am insignificant dust which the 
wind will sweep away tomorrow 
Contrary to the above quote from a speech made by Felipe 
Angeles at Parral, Chihuahua on April 22, 1919, he was a 
significant part of history. Angeles was not merely a 
participant in the Mexican Revolution but a universally 
unique person with superior abilities. 
The Mexican Revolution of 1910 unleashed the greatest 
force in Mexican history, the cumulative anger of the 
people. After years of repression and governmental 
domination that anger contained destructive powers beyond 
the comprehension of the leaders of that movement. To 
justify armed insurrection against the federal government, 
the leaders convinced the people that the noble purposes of 
the Revolution merited extreme measures which involved 
violent behavior. Once social constraints were removed and 
violence condoned to obtain improvements, reinstitution of 
those restraints became progressively impossible. 
Once it was realised that violence produced swift 
change, it became acceptable behavior. Those violent times 
created an impulsive atmosphere ruled by unstable emotional 
action and allowed the release of old grudges and hatreds. 
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Within that storm of hatred and disorder was one element 
that acted as a stabilizing force. That counterbalance was 
a small number of intellectuals distributed throughout the 
various factions. Unlike the majority of people 
participating in the Revolution, those men attempted to 
counteract the emotional and illogical decisions and 
intentions of leaders with the use of reason. Men such as 
Luis Cabrera, Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama, Miguel Diaz 
Lombard©, Jose Vasconcelos, and Federico Gonzalez Garza 
were among that small elite group who continued in their 
attempts to direct the movement away from impulsive 
behavior toward more logical and reasonable planning. Among 
that group of intellectuals was Felipe Angeles. 
By the time Felipe Angeles became an active and decisive 
participant in January 1912 the sequence of emotionally 
chaotic events were already in motion. He immediately 
became a strong supporter of President Francisco I. Madero 
who had led the Revolution, and like Madero believed in 
less than revolutionary adoption of reforms. Madero's 
policies coincided with Angeles' belief in moderation and 
the stabilizing effect of institutions on an uneducated 
society. When the treacherous acts of Huerta were revealed 
in the victory of the Barracks Revolt in February 1913, 
Angeles suffered imprisonment for adherence to his 
principles. That willingness to endure severe consequences 
while stubbornly adhering to principles was one of his 
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character traits that contradicted his profession as a 
soldier. 
Once he became a victim of the continuing swell of 
popular violence and was exiled, Angeles realised he could 
not effectively help reestablish a moderate and legitimate 
government in his country while in France. Although he did 
not personally subscribe to the idea of revolution because 
of its unstable and unpredictable nature, Angeles accepted 
the distasteful necessity to use violence against violence 
to restore peaceful stability. The stability he desired was 
not the kind administered by President Porfirio Diaz 
through force, but he hoped the stability would foster a 
democratic process through which Mexico could progress and 
realise social equality. 
He joined the Constitutionalist forces in Sonora as a 
commissioned military advisor to assist in the improvement 
of military operations against Huerta. That position was 
possible because of his long military career with the 
federal army, extensive education in the art of military 
warfare, and the respected position he held as Director of 
the Military College at Chapultepec. Although he worked for 
the revolution, Angeles refused to be incorporated into the 
revolutionary forces because he detested the practice of 
labeling people. 
Angeles believed that labels restricted a person's 
abilities by focusing on a single aspect of that person, 
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and rejected being narrowly identified and labeled even to 
his death in 1919. In various periods of his life Angeles 
was labeled a soldier, teacher, mathematician, 
artilleryman, and revolutionary. His dislike for those 
labels resulted from people's inclination to assume each 
was the only skill he possessed, and Angeles was much more. 
He was not only a soldier but an administrator, teacher, 
scientist, technician, mathematician, artilleryman, 
organiser, diplomat, strategist, tactician, advisor, 
leader, humanitarian, and intellectual. 
Among the labels that Angeles rejected the most 
incorrect was that of "Revolutionary" because he never 
subscribed to revolutionary philosophy. He saw a distinct 
difference between assisting in the attainment of the goals 
espoused by the movement and believing in revolution as a 
form of social change. The purpose of the revolution of 
1913 was declared to be the reestablishment of a moderate 
and legitimate form of government not the creation of a new 
type of control structure. Thus, he did not view the 
revolution as a magnificent and noble movement above the 
ultimate purpose for its existence, nor did he believe that 
a man's patriotism had to be based on strict and emotional 
adherence to the revolutionary movement. 
When he joined the revolutionary force in Sonora, 
Angeles quickly learned that many of the revolutionary 
leaders had limited, subjective views of the purpose of the 
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revolution. That attitude resulted from most of the major 
leaders being regional caudillos (strong men) whose vision 
was limited to matters affecting their personal power and 
the area they controlled. The two persons Angeles mainly 
dealt with during the Revolution were both regional leaders 
with provincial viewpoints. 
Carranza was not a national leader but a regional 
caudillo from Coahuila. When forced out of his native State 
in 1913, he elected to go to Sonora where he acted like an 
insecure caudillo compelled to appease the persons in power 
because he had entered the area of another caudillo. When 
he named Angeles Minister of War, Carranza committed a 
transgression against the local power structure headed by 
Alvaro Obregon and Ignacio Pesqueira. He demoted Angeles to 
a position that would not threaten the local power base and 
assure his continuing support by those men until he could 
return to Coahuila. 
Francisco Villa was as much a local strong man as 
Carranza except he administered his power differently. 
While Carranza wielded his power through political favors 
and compromises, Villa managed his through the force of 
personality. The two main ingredients of that force were 
fear and hero worship. The element- of fear used to maintain 
control came from his background as a bandit which 
necessitated the intimidation of people and preservation of 
a rugged and harsh image. He encouraged hero worship 
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through daring deeds and statements of reckless disregard 
for his own safety. The admiration gained Villa a faithful 
following and satisfied his enormous desire for praise; but 
it was the hero worship that eventually destroyed him 
because he began to believe in his own invincibility. 
Angeles was not a caudillo who maintained power over any 
certain area. Instead, he possessed a strictly personal 
power which was based on his reputation and skills of 
logical reasoning. Because he could not offer political 
favors or the patronage of a host of loyal followers, 
Angeles was literally unarmed in a power conflict. When he 
joined the Division of the North on temporary assignment to 
escape the continuing power struggles in Sonora, he did not 
escape the problems of dealing with a regional caudillo. 
Among his various duties in the Division was the continuing 
effort to control Villa's emotional outbursts and 
irrational decisions. Even though no one could dictate to 
Villa, Angeles could often give direction to his energy 
and ambitions. That direction was often successful and 
usually correct, and at least Villa considered Angeles' 
blunt and honest advice concerning alternative courses of 
action and their consequences. 
From the time Angeles began his association with the 
Division of the North there were reciprocal influences. His 
contributions to the organization and operation of the 
Division were greatly responsible for subsequent victories 
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and the increase of its fame. Meanwhile, Angeles 
discovered a large element in the Division that agreed with 
his high regard for the late President Madero and enjoyed 
the absence of malicious denunciations he experienced in 
Sonora. The absence of that disruptive atmosphere was due 
to the lack of competition for Villa's power base, not the 
perfection of Villa. Serving with people who agreed with 
his aspirations for the revolution and men who had faith in 
his military judgment created a bond between Angeles and 
the Division. 
When the confrontation between Villa and Carranza 
occurred in June 1914, Angeles saw the existence, strength, 
and independence of the Division as a necessity for the 
defeat of Huerta and success of the revolution. The 
Division was the federal army's most powerful and 
formidable foe, and that strength resulted from the 
independence of movement and lack of manipulation by 
Carranza. If the Division yielded to that influence and 
subsequently lost the independence, its strength would be 
radically decreased, thus increasing the enemy's strength. 
After examining the alternatives, Angeles concluded that 
the act of disobedience was necessary for the good of the 
country and to hasten the end of the revolution. He 
realized the consequences of that act and suffered the 
effects but still believed he made the right choice. After 
the tremendous victory at Zacatecas and Villa broke 
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relations with Carranza circumstances drastically changed. 
Villa became Commander of the Conventionist Army and 
rejected Angeles' advice, although he continued in his 
attempts to direct Villa on the correct course through 
reasonable argument, and often did so with uncharacteristic 
bluntness. 
Although Angeles admired Villa for his resolve and 
dedication, he knew Villa was not qualified to command a 
military unit as large and intricate as the Division of the 
North. Villa detested the petty details of organization and 
planning, preferring to personally lead soldiers in the 
attack and leave the details to others. Along with his 
dislike for details, Villa also possessed many traits of an 
incompetent. general. He often operated on extreme 
impulsiveness, was superstitious, required or expected 
complete submission to his orders and wishes, presented an 
authoritarian image of toughness and power, and had a 
tendency to blame others for his mistakes or failings; but 
those were not the ultimate cause of his failure as a 
general. 
Villa kept qualified men at his side to counterbalance 
those failings but no one could counter the results of hero 
worship. People believed Villa to be invincible and they 
had a tendency to tolerate a lot from such a man. That 
tolerance was transformed into blind obedience of an 
invincible hero which blunted their ability to reason for 
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themselves, and that transformation created the disasters 
at Celaya and Ledh. Because the men blindly believed Villa 
unbeatable and that he would lead them to victory, they 
threw themselves against the enemy in suicidal attacks 
which destroyed the Division of the North. 
While Villa continued to act impulsively and seemingly 
without direction from December 1914 to March 1915, Angeles 
did not stop in his attempts to force him to see the 
strategical situation. Villa sketched out a grandiose plan 
to conquer the country for the Conventionist government and 
failed to make needed changes to those plans as the 
situation changed. It appeared that he chose an objective 
and would not waver in his attempt to capture it. That was 
true with the cities of Guadalajara, Tampico, and Celaya. 
Angeles recognized that inflexibility at the train station 
at Torre6n and surrendered to Villa's stubbornness, 
although he knew what the results were going to be. 
Angeles was himself far from being a perfect man, in 
fact he was a contradiction. He was a general who had the 
ability to formulate battle plans that were both simple and 
magnificent. He could analyze a situation, examine terrain, 
determine lines of positions and advance, and arrange the 
army in such a manner to assure complete victory. Yet, he 
detested the killing involved in the battles. That contrast 
in his abilities and thoughts exemplified the contradiction 
of his being a military intellectual. A soldier cannot 
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afford to philosophize about war because if he questions 
the nature of battle, he will question his duty. If a 
soldier considers the enemy a human being rather than a 
thing to kill, he doubts his right to kill. Angeles 
experienced that internal conflict because as a 
professional soldier his duty was to defeat or destroy the 
enemy, yet he questioned not only the death of soldiers but 
the entire basis of the war. 
Angeles was absent when the Division of the North was 
destroyed at Celaya in April 1915, but when he viewed the 
results near Aguascalientes and discovered that Villa was 
still determined to attack, he knew it was over. By the 
time Angeles left Mexico in June 1915, he was not only 
tired of the useless bloodshed but was also losing his hope 
for democracy in his country. At his trial in Chihuahua 
City in November 1919, General Angeles was deprived of the 
justice which he had fought long to preserve in Mexico. He 
lived by a high set of principles and adhered to his 
beliefs as few other men could, and died with the dignity 
and purity of soul that he aspired to maintain through the 
worst of times in Mexican history. 
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